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ABSTRACT
As the English and French grappled for North American hegemony in the first 
half of the eighteenth century, trade with the Indian groups of the Great Lakes and 
Ohio Valley transcended mere financial calculations and assumed a broader imperial 
significance. To the native peoples who exchanged their peltry for European 
manufactured goods, trade was the material manifestation of mutual obligation, 
political dialogue, and military alliance. If the contest for empire inevitably became a 
battle for the hearts and minds of potential Indian allies, the spoils of victory were 
most visibly reckoned in furs and skins.
Yet, despite the outspoken criticism of William J. Eccles, historians of Anglo- 
French trade rivalry continue to embrace the dubious claims of Cadwallader Colden 
and other eighteenth-century American imperialists that Canadian traders could not 
compete on level economic ground with their New York and Pennsylvania 
counteiparts. Allegedly beset with shoddy and costly French goods, a jealous 
monopoly company that greedily fixed the price of fiirs and skins, and the levies and 
restrictions of a militaristic state, Canadians were deemed unable to match the 
successes of their Anglo-American competitors, who conversely reaped the benefits of 
cheap and superior trade merchandise in a commerce largely free of meddling 
monopolists and obtrusive officials.
A rigorous cross-border comparison of trade-good costs, transportation 
charges, and peltry prices deflates the hoary myth of Anglo-American economic 
superiority. With few exceptions, French-Canadian fur traders appear to have 
supplied goods of equal or better quality at rates of exchange competitive with their 
New York and Pennsylvania rivals. Purely economic considerations, however, never 
determined success in the trade. As frustrated Anglo-American officials readily 
admitted, the cohesive and scrupulously-managed French-Canadian trade network 
proved aptly suited to winning and maintaining Indian friendship and alliance, while 
unregulated and unscrupulous American traders perennially poisoned Anglo-Indian 
relations. The persistence of characteristically Canadian commercial practices and 
Indian trade loyalties despite the 1760 conquest of New France is, perhaps, the most 
compelling measure of French-Canadian preeminence in the eighteenth-century contest 
for North American trade and empire.
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THE PRICE OF EMPIRE 
ANGLO-FRENCH RIVALRY FOR THE GREAT LAKES FUR TRADES
1700-1760
INTRODUCTION
RECEIPTED WISDOM
What the Trade was in the time of the French, no two persons can
agree about.
William Johnson, 8 October 1764*
In the summer of 1712, Colonel Peter Schuyler returned to Onondaga to meet 
with the sachems of the Iroquois. Two years earlier, Schuyler had been sent by New 
York’s anxious Commissioners of Indian Affairs to destroy a blockhouse that a 
French party had recently erected at the village. Now he came to assure the Five 
Nations that, contrary to the "notorious falsehoods" circulated by the French, the 
English were not planning to sever the "Covenant Chain" uniting them in friendship.
The sachems listened politely as the New Yorker denied the rumors and 
promised the delivery of gunpowder and various other items as a token of his 
government’s sincerity. But before they addressed the content of his speech, the 
Iroquois leaders reaffirmed their belief in the fundamental unity of trade and alliance.
1 William Johnson, "A Scheme for Meeting Expenses of Trade," WJP, 4: 556.
2
"It is well known," they declared, "the original Foundation of their alliance with the 
Christians were the Advantages they received by Trading with them." Before the 
arrival of the Europeans, "they made use of Earthen Pots, Stone Knives & Hatchets & 
Bows & Arrows," but after securing "Good Arms" from the English they had "rooted 
out" and conquered their enemies. "Our first entering into a Covenant with you," 
they recalled, "was Chiefly grounded upon Trade. We then bought for a Bever a 
Stroud Water Blanket or Two Duffel Blankets, but since these have always been 
growing dearer & dearer the Pouder we now buy for a Bever is scarce worth 
naming." Their pleas for cheaper European goods, however, had lately fallen upon 
deaf ears. "We now tell you," they cautioned, "this Affair may be the occasion of 
breaking that Chain of Peace & Friendship which hath subsisted between us & you." 
Only if goods were sold cheaper, they concluded, would the Covenant Chain be 
preserved and the Iroquois and English "live in peace forever.1,2
New France, New York, and Pennsylvania were founded on fur, a commodity 
readily obtained from Indian hunters that found a lucrative market in Europe. The 
compact Canadian colony never outgrew its initial dependence on the export of beaver 
and a variety of other peltry; while the economies of New York and Pennsylvania 
eventually burgeoned into broader pursuits of pecuniary happiness, colonial Anglo- 
Americans continued to reap considerable economic benefits from the exchange of 
European manufactured goods for furs and skins. But after 1700, as the French and
2 AIA, 94-95.
English vied more vigorously for North American hegemony, trade relations with the 
Indian peoples of the Great Lakes and Ohio Valley transcended the realm of private 
profits and emerged as a matter of imperial importance.
Though increasingly enmeshed in a world of commodities and markets, the 
Indians who supplied the craving for fur refused to be reduced to mere ciphers in a 
transatlantic economic equation. The Iroquois sachems who censured Schuyler in 
1712 spoke more broadly for every native group that was eventually drawn into trade 
with the rival European powers: if they were collectively reluctant to embrace the 
ruthless pursuit of profits with the fervor of their new commercial partners, the 
Indians were hardly averse to exploiting the curious European appetite for peltry to 
their own material and diplomatic advantage. To the Algonquians and Iroquoians 
who accommodated the eighteenth-century fur trades, exchange connoted more than 
an impersonal transaction between two parties intent on exploiting the other for 
maximum gain. Rather, trade was the material manifestation of mutual obligation, 
political dialogue, and military alliance. It was in this context that virtually every 
Indian group attempted-with varying degrees of success-to link the exchange of furs 
to the exigencies of European-Indian diplomatic relations.
If the contest for North American empire inevitably became a battle for the 
hearts and minds of potential Indian allies, the spoils of victory were ultimately 
reckoned in furs and skins. At its height, the Anglo-French commercial rivalry 
centered on two distinct theaters: along the shores of Lake Ontario, where the pursuit 
of beaver and other furs pitted the French at forts Frontenac, Toronto, and Niagara
against the New Yorkers at Oswego, the only Anglo-American stronghold on the 
Great Lakes; and in the western Great Lakes and Ohio Valley, where garrisoned 
French posts jealously guarded against the increasing incursions of Pennsylvania 
deerskin traders who drove their pack trains into the vast mart of the trans-Allegheny 
West.
Because General Montcalm was obliging enough to fall mortally wounded on 
the Plains of Abraham, leaving Canada open to defeat at the hands of Anglo- 
American invaders, it is tempting to assume--with a chauvinism worthy of Francis 
Parkman-that somehow New France was ripe for the plucking. After all, what was 
Canada if not a stunted colony, its tiny peasant population huddled in feudal fashion 
along the St. Lawrence and its staple economy equally subservient to the vagaries of 
an unpredictable European fur market? But if the British victory at Quebec owed 
more to inept French leadership than to the brilliance of British stratagems, it is 
equally evident that the conquest of Canada emphatically did not signal the triumph of 
vigorous American enterprise over phlegmatic French authoritarianism.3 It is rare, in 
the smugly skeptical Iate-twentieth century, to stumble across a historiographical issue 
that is still framed by the self-serving rhetoric of centuries-dead participants. Yet this 
remains true of the scholarship surrounding the Anglo-French rivalry for the Great 
Lakes fur trades.
3 For the significance of the Conquest, as well as Parkman’s influence on the 
historiography of French North America, see: W. J. Eccies, "The Battle of Quebec: 
A Reappraisal," reprinted in Eccies, Essays on New France (Toronto: Oxford 
University Press, 1987), 125-133; Eccies, "The History of New France According to 
Francis Parkman," Ibid. , 16-25.
Two fundamental assumptions shaped the thinking of eighteenth-century 
American imperialists concerning the contest for the commercial allegiance of the 
Iroquoian and Algonquian peoples of the Great Lakes and Ohio country. The first 
dictated that, for a variety of reasons, Canadian traders could not compete on level 
economic ground with their New York and Pennsylvania counterparts. Beset with 
shoddy and costly French goods, a jealous monopoly company that greedily fixed the 
price of furs and skins, the levies and restrictions of a militaristic state, not to 
mention a river that was navigable only a few months a year, it was simply 
impossible for Canadians to match the success of Anglo-American traders who 
conversely reaped the benefits of cheap and superior trade merchandise in a 
commerce largely free of meddling monopolists and obtrusive officials.
Paradoxically, the second assumption granted that the French had encompassed 
the Indian trade of the Great Lakes and Ohio Valley--and reaped the concomitant 
diplomatic rewards~for the very reasons that had allegedly inhibited their economic 
success. Detailing a deplorable record of fraud and abuses committed by their own 
traders, disheartened Anglo-American commentators conceded that any inherent 
advantages they had wielded over their northern rivals were obliterated by the absence 
of an effective regulatory structure. Stubbornly independent New York and 
Pennsylvania traders, they feared, ran dangerously amuck in the resulting vacuum of 
authority, drowning their hapless Indian customers in cheap rum before pilfering their 
peltry at egregious rates of exchange. Having enshrined the inseparability of trade 
and alliance in their imperial policy, however, the French had enjoyed far greater
success in monitoring the behavior of their traders, addressing native grievances, and 
ensuring that the pecuniary interests of merchants never overshadowed the careful 
conduct of diplomacy on the Canadian frontier.
Though both assumptions had widespread currency in Anglo-American 
imperialist circles well into the 1760s, it was the first—decreeing the dismal economic 
circumstances of the Canadian trade-that has proved most persistent, having been 
reproduced in countless incestuous variations over several historiographical 
generations. In fact, the only scholar to have challenged the shibboleth of an afflicted 
Canadian trade has been William J. Eccies. But, as Eccies himself was the first to 
admit, his revisions were rooted more in common sense than quantitative rigor.
Peruse the dusty ledgers of rival fur merchants, he proposed, and it should become 
apparent that a gun, kettle, or knife cost roughly as much in Montreal as it did in 
Albany or Philadelphia. Under such scrutiny, the hoary myth of Anglo-American 
economic advantage would disintegrate like a tattered trading blanket.
Scholars have universally eschewed a comparison of the routine operations of 
English and French traders and so have uncritically accepted the dubious assertions of 
eighteenth-century polemicists-with all their bulging political baggage-that the 
Canadians were at a profound disadvantage in the pursuit of the Great Lakes fur 
trades. A careful examination of English and French trade-good prices at every nexus 
of exchange, however, deflates the overblown rhetoric of interested colonial agents; 
it is evident that Canadian merchants and traders consistently matched their Anglo- 
American rivals day-to-day, pound-to-livre, at their own economic game. Despite
occasional wartime disruptions to transatlantic shipping, the French-Canadian fur 
trade survived, and even flourished, in the decades before the Conquest for the 
patently non-economic reasons that Anglo-American imperialists had so shrewdly 
perceived. Trade-good prices mattered, but Indian loyalties ultimately ran deeper 
than lucre- a lesson the British and Americans stubbornly refused to learn. Now, 
after nearly three centuries, the tired myths of Anglo-American supremacy in the 
Great Lakes fur trades should, deservedly, be laid to rest.
CHAPTER I 
THE FRENCH-CANADIAN TRADE
The scrape of heavily-laden birchbark canoes on sand marked the end of a 
journey of thousands of miles, from the teeming quays of La Rochelle into the heart 
of North America. Tearing open the carefully stitched packs of goods which for 
months they had alternately paddled, shouldered, and hauled into the wilderness from 
Montreal, weary voyageurs completed a cycle of manufacture, transportation, and 
marketing that linked the artisans, merchants, and consumers of France to the 
residents of its small Canadian colony on the St. Lawrence. Yet even as brandy kegs 
were tapped, bolts of cloth unrolled, and tobacco smoked, a parallel process was 
already underway. Beaver pelts, deerskins, and other furs that had been hunted, 
trapped, scraped, and toted by Ottawas, Potawotamis, and Crees had already begun 
an equally arduous passage from the forests and marshes of the western Great Lakes 
across the Atlantic to the busy hat-making manufactories of Paris and the genteel 
markets of Europe.
Only Canadians, in the elongated continuum of exchange between Europeans 
and the native peoples of North America, owed their fortunes overwhelmingly to the 
fruits of Indian-European trade. The vainest courtiers at Versailles might have
9
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endured being stripped of their beaver hats and fur-trimmed garments, just as the 
great merchant houses of La Rochelle, Bordeaux, and Rouen would have sweetly 
prospered from their lucrative Caribbean trade alone.1 In a pinch, Parisian hatters 
might turn to European sources of furs, and they endlessly experimented with cheaper 
and more readily available materials for their chapeaux. Astute Indian consumers of 
the western Great Lakes and Ohio Valley had eagerly adapted and adopted those 
European goods which best met their own specific needs, but they had lived without 
cloth, brass, and glass for centuries, and might easily do so again.
With a tiny settler population and an abbreviated agricultural season, New 
France came to depend on fur as the only exportable commodity that could attract 
specie to the otherwise cash-strapped colony. French hopes of discovering oriental 
wealth at the source of the St. Lawrence may soon have been dashed, but beaver 
swiftly supplanted gold and spices in the schemes of those seeking a Canadian 
fortune. Because of the unique binding properties of its barbed under hairs, beaver 
fur was valued by French hatters as the best material for "felting" in the process of 
hat manufacture. Smaller luxury furs, or menues pelleteries, as well as deerskins and 
moose hides, also had their markets, but as long as European fashion and social ritual 
dictated the wearing of ostentatious, broad-brimmed hats, beaver’s dominance of the
1 The highest recorded annual value of Canadian furs imported at La Rochelle 
was 3,828,424 livres in 1754. Between 1718 and 1761 fur imports averaged one 
million livres annually, while imports from all French colonies totalled 140 million.
A. Jean E. Lunn, "Economic Development in New France, 1713-1760" (Unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, Department of History, McGill University, 1942), 464-65; W. J. 
Eccies, "A Belated Review of Harold Adams Innis’s, The Fur Trade in Canada," 
Canadian Historical Review, 60:4 (1979): 420-21.
fur market remained assured.2
In keeping with its status as the most prized of Canadian furs, beaver was 
classified into a Linnaean array of grades according to its perceived quality and the 
season in which it was harvested. Most valuable for its self-adhesive qualities was 
castor gras, literally "greasy beaver." These pelts had already been scraped and 
greased, then sewn together and worn by Indians as winter clothing, absorbing bodily 
oils and, to French noses, a distinctive aroma. Untreated beaver was known as castor 
sec, or "dry beaver," and was less valuable because it required labor-intensive 
treatment before it could be transformed into felt. Pelts worn as coat beaver but less 
slick from bodily contact were deemed castor demi-gras, while discriminating 
merchants and hatters paid least for poorer quality pelts such as the artificially-oiled 
castor fa lsifii and the thick-skinned gros cuir.3
Until the 1660s, the majority of furs traded in New France were carried to the 
colony by Indian middlemen and traded at Montreal’s boisterous trade fairs. Whether 
to avoid the impositions of the Compagnie de VOccident, which from 1665 retained a 
royal monopoly on the marketing of beaver, or the watchful eye of churchmen and 
seigneurs, each year an unknown number of young men slipped away in canoes to 
trade directly with the tribes of the Great Lakes. The freebooting life of these
2 Michael Sonenscher, The Hatters o f Eighteenth-Century France (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1987), 12-17, 20-25; J. F. Crean, "Hats and the 
Colonial Fur Trade," Canadian Journal o f Economics and Political Science, 28:3 
(1962): 378-86.
3 Lunn, "Economic Development," 113-15.
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coureurs de bois, or "runners of the woods," was ritually condemned in sermons and 
royal proclamations, but to little avail. In 1672 it was estimated that some three or 
four hundred Canadians were living and trading in the pays d ’en haut, or up-country, 
and a decade later as many as 800 had fled—in the words of alarmed administrators— 
"into the depths of the woods."4 Fearing the depopulation of the settlements as much 
as the inevitable debauching of Canadians and Indians alike through mutual 
intercourse, religious and secular officials agreed on a licensing system in which 
twenty-five permits, or congas, were granted either to needy institutions or 
trustworthy traders, allowing them to transport one canoe-load of trade merchandise 
west. The combined efforts of both licensed and unlicensed Canadian traders at the 
end of the seventeenth century produced a prodigious amount of beaver for the 
monopoly company, so much so, in fact, that by 1695 the French fur market was 
glutted, leaving the company on the brink of bankruptcy with a surplus of 3,500,00 
livres of beaver sitting unsold in its warehouse.5
In the grip of a growing economic crisis, the reflexive reaction of anxious 
French officials was to strangle the export of Canadian beaver by arbitrarily cutting 
off direct trade with the tribes of the western Great Lakes. The lease on the Canadian 
beaver monopoly was conveniently due to expire in 1697, and the colonial authorities 
dictated that no trading permits would be issued after that date. The western posts
4 W. J. Eccies, The Canadian Frontier, 1534-1760 (Albuquerque: University of 
New Mexico Press, 1969), 110.
5 Eccies, Canadian Frontier, 124-25. For the sake of clarity, livres (weight) will 
be italicized to differentiate it from livres (currency).
13
were to be boarded up and abandoned while all Frenchmen in the pays d ’en haut were 
ordered to return home. While cobwebbed Canadian canoes rotted in storage, 
however, it soon became apparent that the western Indians were unwilling to resume 
their past practice of transporting furs to Montreal as French officials had hoped. 
Canadian leaders, however, fully fathomed the profound diplomatic advantages that 
would accrue to the English from the complete severance of French trade 
relationships with the tribes of the western Great Lakes, and they lobbied vigorously 
for the resumption of at least a limited trade. Faced with a crippling oversupply of 
beaver, yet now aware of the potential for English encroachment in the Great Lakes 
region, the French government ultimately fell back on a compromise position. A 
handful of Illinois-Michigan posts were allowed to reopen in 1701, including 
Michilimackinac, St. Joseph des Miamis, and St. Louis des Illinois, as well as Fort 
Frontenac on the shores of Lake Ontario. This year would prove to be a watershed in 
the history of French expansion in North America as Louis XIV embarked on a 
flamboyant bid to halt the westward expansion of the English by literally encircling 
the seaboard colonies. With the founding of a trading settlement at Detroit designed 
to dominate the western Great Lakes, and the Louisiana colony to restrict the southern 
access to the Mississippi watershed, a new era of vigorous competition with the 
English for trade and empire had begun.6
Assuming that with a closer knowledge of Canadian trading conditions they 
would meet with greater success in controlling and marketing the beaver supply, a
6 Eccles, Canadian Frontier, 126-31.
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coalition of colonial merchants took control of the company in 1700. The Canadians 
may have been more attuned to the peculiar economic and political circumstances of 
their colony, but they had no more influence than their predecessors over the vagaries 
of demand for beaver in Europe. By 1705, they too found themselves overstocked 
and deeply in debt. Once again the monopoly privileges of the floundering beaver 
company were transferred, this time to the French partnership of Aubert, Neret, and 
Guyot, who paid the company’s debts and set about reorganizing the ailing beaver 
business. For the next five years no castor gras was to be received by the company 
in the hope that eventually the supply of prime Canadian beaver would be brought in 
line with the demand of the French hat industry. From 1712 until 1717 gras would 
once again be accepted at the price of 40 sols per pound. The less desirable castor 
sec, it was agreed, would be bought during the entire period of their lease at 30 sols 
per pound.7
Long before the lease of Aubert, Neret, and Guyot had expired, however, the 
condition of the beaver market was abruptly altered. In 1712 company officials 
discovered that the 400 bales of excess castor gras that had been sitting for years in 
their warehouse had been ruined by vermin. With the entire supply of Canadian 
beaver lost virtually overnight, Parisian hatters soon found themselves in the midst of 
a materials shortage so acute that they were compelled to import large amounts of fur 
from England and the Netherlands. In response, the beaver company immediately 
began buying Canadian castor gras, three years earlier than originally planned. In the
7 Lunn, "Economic Development," 136-37.
interim, however, Canadian sources of gras had virtually disappeared since Indian 
hunters had turned to gathering other, more lucrative peltry.8
Constant changes in ownership of the monopoly company inevitably created a 
highly unstable commercial environment for Canadian traders. Frustrated with 
irregular payments for their furs, Canadian merchants and exporters clamored 
continually for the reform of the beaver trade until Louis XV finally authorized the 
formation of the Compagnie des Indes in 1717. After several years of controversial 
experimentation with import duties, the newly-formed company settled into a stable 
pattern of operation which endured from 1722 to the Conquest. The company 
reserved the exclusive right to export all beaver traded in New France, and on the 
return voyages brought shipments primarily of textiles and gunpowder to supply the 
Indian trade. The company maintained a comptroller, an inspector, and three 
receivers to supervise the collection of peltry at each of the largest Canadian towns of
Montreal, Quebec, and Trois-Rivifcres, as well as a host of lesser officials, clerks, and
guards. Though all beaver arriving in New France from the pays d ’en haut was in 
theory to be brought to a company office within 48 hours, in practice it tended to 
circulate within the colony as currency. The company also issued receipts to 
Canadian sellers which could later be converted into bills of exchange redeemable 
through its Paris treasury. These receipts, like the pelts themselves, were also 
commonly traded in lieu of scarce specie.9
8 Lunn, "Economic Development," 137-38.
9 Lunn, "Economic Development," 148-50.
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Though it has often been suggested that close regulation of the Canadian trade 
was a drag on the eighteenth-century commerce in furs, the beaver monopoly more 
likely had a benign, if not a salutary, role in the economic life of New France.10 In 
no sense did the Compagnie des Indes regulate the export of all furs from Canada: its 
monopoly extended solely to beaver, and since the disastrous years of oversupply and 
unstable markets at the turn of the eighteenth century, an increasing proportion of 
Canadian fur exports to La Rochelle and other French ports consisted of deerskins 
and menues pelleteries, all of which were sold on the open market. In fact, during 
the years between 1713 and 1761 for which La Rochelle shipping records are 
available, it is clear that in any given year beaver comprised only about half of 
Canadian fur exports.11 Though the company retained ultimate control over how 
much would be paid for the various grades of beaver brought to its offices, the 
Governor-General and Intendant of New France (the resident military and civil 
administrators, respectively), as well as Canadian exporters, had at least some voice 
in determining beaver prices. Despite the robust lobbying of the Parisian hatter’s 
guild, on several occasions the company did in fact raise the price paid for beaver in 
Canada on the recommendation of colonial merchants and officials. It is also unlikely
10 The harshest assessment of the beaver monopoly is offered by Harold Adams 
Innis in The Fur Trade in Canada: An Introduction to Canadian Economic History 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930),
11 E. R. Adair, "Anglo-French Rivalry in the Fur Trade During the 18th 
Century," Culture, 8 (1947), 434-55, reprinted in Canadian History Before 
Confederation: Essays and Interpretation, edited by J. M. Bumsted (Georgetown: 
Irwin-Dorsey, 1972), 145; Lunn, "Economic Development," 464-65.
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that beaver prices would have been significantly higher had the trade gone 
unregulated. The combination of demands by French manufacturers and the need for 
middlemen to handle the importing and marketing of furs at La Rochelle and other 
French ports of entry would have acted as a continual brake on beaver prices. Under 
monopoly control, however, the Canadians were guaranteed a stable market for all the 
beaver they had to offer, as well as insurance against price fluctuations. The 
company was further able to dispel the old specter of oversupply through more 
efficient marketing of the commodity in France and the penetration of broader 
European markets. Though it has been suggested that the company was perhaps 
reaping more than its fair share of profits from the sale of Canadian beaver, it seems 
unlikely that the market would have performed much differently had it operated free 
of company influence. Considering the unpredictable nature of the European fur 
market, not to mention the tremendous economic and diplomatic importance of the fur 
trade to the survival of New France, the "limited monopoly" of the Compagnie des 
Indes was, perhaps, ultimately more necessary than evil.12
If a unique blend of free enterprise and mercantilist doctrine characterized the 
merchandising of furs in the eighteenth century, a similar fusion of government 
regulation and private enterprise shaped the exchange of furs for European 
manufactures on the periphery of French North America. The sale of congis, or
12 12 Lunn, "Economic Development," 151-56; Adair, "Anglo-French
Rivalry," 144-49. For a more critical assessment of the Compagnie des Indes, see 
Thomas Wien, "Selling Beaver Skins in North America and Europe, 1720-1760: The 
Uses of Fur-Trade Imperialism," Journal o f  the Canadian Historical Association, 1 
(1990): 300-01.
trading licenses, had been a means for the Canadian government both to regulate 
those who headed west to trade with the Indians as well an effective method of 
financing the garrisoned posts of the pays d ’en haut where the trade was conducted. 
Before the western trade was restricted in the mid-1690s, congas had been sold 
primarily to highly-placed individuals or institutions who in turn might sell them to 
others who actually conducted the trade. After the revitalization of the fur trade in 
the early years of the eighteenth century, however, three distinct types of trading 
posts came to characterize the trade. The "King’s Posts" of Frontenac (1673), 
Niagara (1720), and Rouilte/Toronto (1720) were administered by government 
officials and the trade was conducted with goods supplied from the royal stores. 
These posts were of particular strategic value to the French since they were located in 
the regions of most intense competition with English fur traders. Close government 
regulation ensured that goods were sold to Indian customers at prices which were 
competitive with those offered by the English, even if that meant occasionally 
operating at a loss. In contrast, the bustling posts of Michilimackinac and Detroit 
were open to all traders who could pay the post commandant a fee of 500 livres. By 
the 1720s, a third form had evolved in which trade was conducted on the basis of 
permis, or permits, granted by the governor-general, the vast majority of which were 
sold to officers of the Troupes de la Marine, the colonial regulars. From this time 
on, much of the Canadian fur trade was conducted through a complex relationship 
that linked merchant capital, political influence, and government direction in what has
19
been described as a "military-commercial complex."13
In a typical arrangement, a commandant with access to a monopoly on trade at 
a given post struck a three-way commercial partnership with one or more Montreal 
marchands iquipeurs, or merchant-outfitters, who supplied the goods required for 
trade and hired the necessary paddlers, and a marchand voyageur, the professional 
trader who oversaw the delivery of the goods and their sale to Indian consumers in 
the pays d ’en haut. Furs obtained from trading with the Indians were subsequently 
shipped back to Montreal and sold by the merchants either to the beaver company or 
on the open market. For his part, the commandant was responsible for ensuring the 
support of the post’s military garrison and buildings, while overseeing the daily 
conduct of the trade and dispensing gifts to Indian allies on behalf of the Canadian 
government for diplomatic purposes. By farming out these fur-trading posts to 
coalitions of individuals which linked merchant capital to agents of military and 
diplomatic authority, the French government was able to assert its sovereignty, at 
least nominally, over the vast interior of North America at very little cost in 
manpower or materials while simultaneously ensuring the stability of Canada’s staple 
economy.14
13 Dale Miquelon, New France, 1701-1744: "A Supplement to Europe" (Toronto: 
McClelland & Stewart, 1987), 160.
14 W. I. Eccles, "The Fur Trade and Eighteenth-Century Imperialism," William 
and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Series, 40:3 (1983): 346, 355-56; Miquelon, New France, 
155, 157; "1747: Lease for the Post at Green Bay," and "1747: Partnership to 
Exploit La Baye," Collections o f the State Historical Society o f Wisconsin, edited by 
Lyman C. Draper and Reuben Gold Thwaites (Madison: The Society, 1906-08), 17: 
451-55, 18: 7-10; Gratien Allaire, "Officiers et marchands: les societds de commerce
20
For all its overarching diplomatic, political, and economic importance, 
however, the fur trade was at root a commerce founded on the physical transfer of 
material goods. European manufactured goods were exchanged for beaver fur, 
deerskins, and other peltry, which in turn were transformed into felt hats, leather, and 
fur-trimmed garments in a continuous cycle of production and consumption. By the 
eighteenth century, the material exchange between Europeans and Indians had settled 
into a pattern as regular and predictable as the neatly itemized lists of trade items 
ordered annually by Canadian officials from the royal warehouses at the port of 
Rochefort, or the meticulously-kept account books of Montreal merchant-outfitters. 
From papers of sewing needles to bulky kegs of brandy, the various items which 
made their way across the Atlantic and into the Great Lakes region reveal as much 
about those who created them as those who used them. Some were wholly functional, 
others decorative or seemingly frivolous, but in every case the context and conditions 
of their exchange forged links between individuals and peoples in ways that both 
transformed and transcended their everyday use.15
des fourrures, 1715-1760," Revue d ’Histoire de VAmirique Frangaise, 40:3 (1987): 
409-428.
15 One of the most exhaustive sources of information on the manufacture, trade, 
and use of French trade items is Marie Gerin-Lajoie’s unpublished Montreal 
Merchants Records Project Research Files, 1971-1975, microfilm edition (M496), in 
the collections of the Minnesota Historical Society. The Museum o f the Fur Trade 
Quarterly of Chadron, Nebraska, is another mine of material on the material culture 
of the fur trade. See also Carolyn Gilman, Where Two Worlds Meet: The Great Lakes 
Fur Trade (St. Paul: Minnesota Historical Society, 1982); Patricia Miquelon, "Fur 
Trade Goods of the Montreal Traders, 1760-1821," National Historic Sites Service 
[Canada], Unpublished in-house report, 1970; Robert C. Wheeler, A Toast to the Fur 
Trade: A Picture Essay on its Material Culture (St. Paul: Wheeler Productions, 1985);
awls (alines):
Identical to those used by French shoemakers, iron trade awls were short, straight, 
and triangular in cross-section. Shipped by the gross without handles, these awls 
were hafted with wood or horn by the Indian consumer. They were used for a variety 
of purposes that included punching holes in leather to sew clothing and in birch bark 
to stitch canoes. English trade awls were almost identical, but by the eighteenth 
century they had introduced offset, or crooked, awl blades designed so that the user’s 
hand would be protected should the handle split from excessive pressure. A number 
of other small iron implements were also commonly traded, including chisels, 
scrapers, scissors, and projectile points.
axes (Itaches):
Many sizes and styles of French axes made their way into the pays d ’en haut, from 
the broad and sturdy haches de service, or service axes, to small hatchets (hachettes) 
with hammer heads on the opposite end. Most were iron, but some were steel-tipped 
(aciri) for added strength and durability. One of the most popular styles was the 
hache biscayenne, or "Biscayan" axe named after the Spanish region in which they
Bruce M. White, "Montreal Canoes and Their Cargoes," in ”Le Castor Fait Tout": 
Selected Papers o f the Fifth North American Fur Trade Conference, (1985), edited by 
Bruce Trigger, Toby Morantz and Louise Dechene (Montreal: Lake St. Louis 
Historical Society, 1987), 164-92; Louise DechSne, Habitants and Merchants in 
Seventeenth-Century Montreal, translated by Liana Vardi (Montreal and Kingston: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1992), 78-84; Miquelon, New France, 150-53; 
Peter Kalm, Travels Into North America, translated by John Reinhold Forster (Barre, 
Mass.: The Imprint Society, 1972), 489-92.
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were originally produced. By the eighteenth century, however, "Biscayan" most 
likely referred to the characteristic shape of the blade. By the 1720s a variety of 
haches du pays were made in Canada by colonial blacksmiths to supply the trade.
beads (mssades):
Glass beads in a variety of shapes, sizes, and colors, including black, white, green, 
red, and especially blue, were produced specifically for the Indian trade in Venice and 
Rouen. They were sold by the pound and used for jewelry as well as for decorating 
clothing and even canoes. Black and white beads were frequently sold as cheap 
imitation wampum.
blankets (couvertes):
Perhaps the most enduring symbol of the material culture of the fur trade was the 
ubiquitous woollen trade blanket, sold in a wide variety of standardized sizes, often 
designated by the number of "points," or stripes on the edge. The smallest blankets 
included the d la capuchine and d berceau (cradle) styles, while point blankets ranged 
in size from one to eight points and upward, with two and two-and-a-half points the 
most common. Many trade blankets, especially a characteristic green variety, came 
from Toulouse, while a variety of others were woven in Montpellier, Bordeaux, and 
Rouen (which produced a version made of dogs’ hair). On the insistence of 
demanding Indian customers, government officials ensured that the quality and size of 
trade blankets remained consistent. Two-point blankets measured 4 ’11" long by 4’2"
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wide, three-points 5*7" by 4*10", and four-points 5*9" by 5*5". They were shipped 
to Canada in bales of 150 wrapped with straw, packing linen, and cord.
capotes:
Heavy, hooded coats made of a woollen blanket material such as dourgne, molton, 
mazamet, or cadis cloth, capotes were often decorated with trim, braid, or decorative 
tape. They were made almost exclusively in Canada in a number of different sizes 
and colors, and were described in terms of the number of aunes of material that went 
into their construction (e.g. une capote de trois aunes).
cod-line (ligne du banc):
A heavy, untarred hempen or cotton cord used in the Atlantic fisheries, cod-line was 
sold by the pound and had a variety of uses in the trade, including tying up bales of 
goods and furs.
combs (peignes):
Combs were used for grooming as well as for hair decoration. The cheapest and 
most common varieties were made of boxwood, but more expensive horn and ivory 
combs were also traded. Different sizes were available, with varying spaces between 
the teeth. The manufacture of combs centered in Paris and Rouen, while ivory combs 
were exclusively the product of Dieppe, the center of the French ivory craft.
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dourgnei
A relatively inexpensive twilled woollen fabric with a flannel finish, this cloth from 
the town of Dourgne in southern France was most commonly dyed blue or violet.
drap:
Drop was the generic name for a costly woollen cloth dyed in bright hues of red, 
blue, and black and used primarily for making blankets and outerwear. Designed to 
compete with the renowned English stroud cloth, it was imported in large amounts by 
the Compagnie des Indes and was a staple of the Canadian trade.
eau de vie:
Despite the persistent opposition of Canadian clerics, eau de vie (loosely translated as 
"brandy," though it could be many things, including armanac, cognac, marc, poireau, 
or calvados) from Charente and Aunis remained an essential, and lucrative, 
component of the fur-trader’s assortment of goods. Since 1679 the sale of brandy to 
the Indians had been strictly prohibited on the grounds that alcoholism was insidiously 
weakening the fabric of native society. On the urging of Canadian administrators, its 
sale at Fort Frontenac was legalized in 1716 so that French traders might more 
effectively compete with rival New Yorkers who did not share Jesuit scruples about 
plying Indian customers with liquor. Flagrant abuses of the trade led to its 
prohibition once again in 1718, but with the establishment of the English trading post 
of Oswego on the southern shore of Lake Ontario it became clear to secular officials
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that unless French traders could supply brandy they would rapidly lose their Indian 
customers, and allies, to the English. The trade was officially reinstated in 1727 over 
the dissent of the clergy. In an act of protest in 1730, the bishop of Canada, Pierre- 
Herman Dosquet, reserved to himself the right to absolve penitents guilty of selling or 
otherwise providing alcohol to Indians. Though he returned the power of absolution 
to the priests several years later, clerical and secular authorities remained bitterly 
divided over the issue until the end of the French regime.
Realizing the fantastic profits possible from the sale of brandy, the majority of 
traders most likely ignored the official wrangling over the legality and morality of the 
trade. And so, in spite of the potential spiritual penalties, brandy continued to flow 
freely into the pays d ’en haut. Costs were high, since brandy was heavily taxed on 
entry into Canada, and in its bulky wooden casks it was difficult and expensive to 
transport by canoe. But it never failed to find thirsty consumers. In fact, it was one 
of the only goods which had an almost bottomless market among native peoples 
whose demand for most other European goods was notoriously inelastic.
firesteels (battefeux):
In the eighteenth century the most common implement for lighting fires was the 
firesteel, a small, variously shaped hand-held steel implement which produced sparks 
when struck against flint. These cheap, ubiquitous trade items were produced in 
Rouen, Amsterdam, Touraine, Brittany, and St.-Eti&nne en Forest, and were 
shipped to Canada by the thousands.
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gunflints (pierres h fusil):
With the flintlock the standard military and hunting weapon, there was a constant 
demand for the small, wedge-shaped flints necessary for their firing. The best French 
flints were manufactured in the old province of Berry at Meunes, Couffi, and other 
small towns surrounding Saint-Aignan.
gunpowder (poudre h mousquet)'.
This crucial trade item was manufactured in various locations in France, including 
Rouen, Brest, Limoges, Bordeaux, Toulouse, and Marseille, under strict government 
regulation. By law, French gunpowder consisted of 75 percent saltpetre, 12.5 percent 
sulphur, and 12.5 percent charcoal. Its price fixed by state decree, it was supplied to 
the King’s powder magazines at Rochefort for export to Canada. All batches of 
powder were rigorously tested before shipment to guarantee its quality.
gunworms (tirebours):
An array of implements was necessary for the maintenance and effective firing of 
flintlock weapons, including the gunworm, a small, spring-like piece of wire that fit 
on the end of a ramrod. Often a hunter would find it necessary to change from 
smaller shot to a ball-or vice versa-in mid-hunt, depending on the type of quarry he 
encountered. The gunworm allowed him to quickly remove the unused charge from 
the barrel and reload the necessary shot. The gunworm also came in handy for 
cleaning the bore after repeated firings.
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handkerchiefs (mouchoirs):
Perhaps the only thing truly "Indian" about the native peoples of eighteenth-century 
North America were the costly handkerchiefs they prized. Exotic Bemagor and 
Romal silks were imported by the French from India specifically for the North 
American trade. Though the predominant color was blue, some were checkered and 
others had colored borders. Inexpensive cotton handkerchiefs were also available for 
less discriminating noses.
hawkbells (grelots):
Small copper or brass bells, usually a half-inch in diameter, sometimes larger, were 
traded as novelties to be sewn onto shoes and clothing.
hats (chapeaux):
A small number of beaver hats made the long return journey to the forests of the New 
World from which they had originated, but many other hats, from blends of vicuna, 
camel, and rabbit hair to woollen felts, were cheaper and more popular in the pays 
d ‘en haut. Warm cloth caps better suited to the Canadian climate such as the 
deerstalker-style tapabord, with ear-flaps and turn-down brim, were assembled in 
Montreal before shipment west.
kettles (chaudi&res):
Brass, copper, and occasionally iron kettles were manufactured in a wide range of
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"nesting" sizes for easy transportation. Kettles were an extremely valuable 
commodity in the pays d ’en haut since they replaced the much less efficient wood, 
bark, and pottery vessels previously used for cooking. They were sold by weight and 
the iron handle, or bail, was attached after shipping.
knives (couteaux):
A bewildering assortment of cutlery, including razors, hunting knives, folding knives, 
pen knives, butcher knives, spring knives, and scalping knives, found an enthusiastic 
market among Indian consumers who quickly adopted European steel implements over 
their stone counterparts. The major center of cutlery production in France was St.- 
Etifcnne de Forest, south-west of Lyon. By the eighteenth century, knife 
manufacturing was a highly specialized industry characterized by a complex and 
efficient division of labor that could turn out high quality knives at low prices. Knife 
handles were crafted by hand in Paris from boxwood and beech, a cheap, easily 
workable wood which took a good polish. Occasionally cow or bull horn was used, 
but ram’s horn was the finest and most expensive material available and it was used 
primarily for mounting razors.
lead/lead shot (plomb/balles):
France had few lead mines in the eighteenth century, and most of the lead exported to 
Canada originated in England, Germany, and Poland. Roughly half of the lead 
shipped to New France arrived in bar form; the rest came pre-cast in a wide range of
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gauges and types of shot, from balls to pellets and hunting shot, 
leggings (mitasses):
Different sizes of leggings in various sturdy fabrics such as molten and mazamet were 
made up by Montreal seamstresses for shipment west. They were worn both for 
warmth and protection against thick undergrowth.
linen (toile):
Numerous weaves and styles of linen cloth, from tough hempen sail-cloth to finer and 
more expensive bleached weaves for shirts, were a staple of trade textiles. The finest 
linens were manufactured in Roux, Morlaix, Rouen, Paris, Beaufort, Laval, and 
Holland.
mazamet:
This heavy woollen cloth, similar to molton, originated in the town of Mazamet, near 
Dourgne in the south of France.
mirrors (miroirs):
Mirrors of many shapes, styles and sizes were traded in great numbers in the pays 
d'en haut. The popular miroirs de chagrin were covered with rough-surfaced 
shagreen leather from horse, mule, or ass hide. Other popular trade mirrors were 
made of tin or had leather wallets for storage, while others had japanned or tortoise­
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shell frames, or were covered in studded and decorated leather. Mirrors were 
reportedly most popular among native men who used them for hair-dressing, face- 
painting, and other preparations for war or ceremonial occasions.
moUon:
Like its English equivalent from Melton, molton was a heavily fulled, short napped, 
plain cloth. Woven either entirely from wool or with a cotton warp and woollen 
weft, molton was a completely smooth fabric that had a tight construction and a finish 
that concealed all trace of the warp and weft. Like its equivalent from Mazamet, 
molton was generally dyed a deep blue, red, or violet.
muskets (fusils):
Relatively few muskets were traded by the French because most were given as gifts 
by the Canadian government to Indian allies. The majority of military muskets were 
made in Tulle, the center of French armaments production, but the fusil de traite 
(trade gun) or fusil de chasse (hunting/fowling piece) was fashioned in St.-Etienne. 
Fusils de chasse were popular with Indian hunters because their shorter and lighter 
barrels were ideally suited to wooded conditions. Trade guns came in a number of 
barrel lengths, the most popular being from three-and-a-half to 
four-and-a-half feet long. Caliber was measured by the number of ball shot per 
pound of lead; the standard military musket had a caliber of 18 balls per pound, the 
hunting piece 28.
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needles 0aiguilles):
Needles were sold in paper packets in a variety of sizes. Smaller ones were used 
with thimbles, another small but common item of trade, to sew clothing, to string 
beads, and even for tattooing. Larger sizes were used to stitch birch bark for canoes 
and the heavy toile d ’embalhge, or canvas cloth, used to wrap bales of trade goods 
and pelts for shipment.
rings (bagues h cachet):
A relatively inexpensive yet ubiquitous trade item were brass finger rings, often 
known as "Jesuit rings" after the seventeenth-century missionary practice of 
distributing rings bearing religious symbols to new Indian converts. By the eighteenth 
century, however, these mass-produced rings had lost their spiritual significance and 
thousands of them were carried to the pays d ’en haut in trade-good assortments. 
Typical French rings had a thin brass band with a flat bezel in oval, heart-shaped, 
round, or octagonal form, and were often engraved with designs of crosses, bleeding 
hearts, priests, or initials, most commonly "IHS." French trade rings were fairly 
ornate compared to their English equivalents, which tended to be plain brass bands.
shirts (chemises):
Not all items used in the Indian trade necessarily came from France. Seamstresses in 
Montreal were often contracted by merchant-outfitters to sew various items of 
clothing such as shirts on a piecework basis. Shirts came in a variety of sizes,
including three for men, two for women, and the smallest for children, their price 
depending on the size, material, and design.
sleeves (manches):
Like shirts, woollen sleeves of molton, mazamet, or dourgne cloth were pieced 
together in Montreal for merchant-outfitters. Sold in pairs, the different sized sleeves 
allowed for a custom fit. Like leggings, sleeves offered both warmth and protection 
against mosquitoes and underbrush. They were generally not sewn onto the garment, 
but were tied by a string at the nape of the neck.
stockings (bas):
During the eighteenth century, Canada was a major consumer of Orleans hosiery. 
Much of it was worn by the colonists themselves, but some stockings found their way 
to Indian customers in the pays d ’en haut. The most common types were the cheaper 
bas de Poitou and the more elegant bas de Saint-Maixent.
thread (Jil):
Hempen threads from Poitou and Rennes, flaxen from Flanders, and other varieties 
from Holland were traded by the pound. Small amounts of false gold and silver 
thread were used for decorative sewing, while more durable types were used for 
sewing canoe sails, shoes, clothing, and fishing nets.
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tobacco (tabac):
Many different varieties of tobacco had a market among Indian consumers, from the 
locally-grown white, to the highly prized black Brazilian imported from La Rochelle.
tomahawks (casse-tites):
Many iron tomahawks, often with "dagger" ends, were fashioned by colonial 
blacksmiths for the trade. Like axes, the Indian consumer fashioned and fitted the 
wooden handle after purchase. The term casse-tite, literally "head-breaker," also 
referred to traditional round-headed war clubs.
vermilion (vermilion):
This bright, high quality scarlet pigment made of a compound of mercury and sulphur 
was a crucial element of any trade-good assortment. It was sold by weight in 
powdered form, and transported in small wooden boxes, leather bags, and papers.
Most vermilion sent to Canada was purchased from Dutch suppliers, who in turn 
imported it from China. Vermilion could be rubbed into buckskin or human skin, and 
was usually mixed with water or grease for use as face and body paint. If blended 
with a bonding agent such as mucilage from boiled beaver tail, it could also serve as 
an effective dye for robes or wooden objects.
wampum (porcetaine):
It is often assumed that the French had no independent source of wampum, the small
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black and white cylindrical shells used in strings and belts as currency and for 
ceremonial and diplomatic exchange. But just as much of the English wampum was 
not the original "quahog" variety from coastal New England, the French exported 
various equivalents known as porcelaine. French "wampum” included cowries, 
burgaus, periwinkle, sea-snail, Venus mercenaria, and purslain shells. Cowries, in 
particular, were purchased by French exporters from the Dutch who controlled the 
European market. The individual beads, which were carefully drilled with awls for 
stringing, were known as grains. There was also a market for imitation wampum 
manufactured from porcelain, but this artificial type was always distinguished from its 
shell counterpart and was sold by weight, while the "real" item was traded by unit.
wine (vin):
Though twice as much wine as brandy was shipped to Canada during the eighteenth 
century, it never rivalled the popularity of eau de vie in the fur trade. Most imported 
French wines were reds from Bordeaux, but a smaller amount of Spanish wine was 
also available.
Archaeologists of the North American fur trade have long assumed that metal 
implements and beads were the most important components of the trading assortments 
brought into the pays d ’en haut. This misinterpretation of the relative importance of 
certain categories of items in the overall context of the trade is largely the result of 
the frequency at which only certain durable objects are recovered in the
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archaeological record. The work of Dean Anderson, however, has shown that 
without considering "preservation bias," or the tendency of perishable goods such as 
cloth, wood, and other biodegradable materials to disappear almost entirely from the 
archaeological record, it is impossible to form a complete picture of the variety of 
material objects which ultimately wound up in the hands of Indian consumers. 
Anderson tackled this problem by juxtaposing the documentary record of goods 
intended for trade as itemized in the account books of eighteenth-century Montreal 
merchants with inventories of archaeologically-recovered trade items. He determined 
that certain functional categories-especially metalwares and decorative items-that 
were overrepresented in the archaeological record comprised a relatively small 
proportion of the total trade assortment based on total merchant expenditure.
Similarly, clothing and textiles, which rarely appear archaeologically, comprised a 
significantly greater proportion of the value of trade outfits supplied by Montreal 
merchants to voyageurs.16
Anderson’s conclusions are important in that they emphasize the degree to 
which the documentary record must be integrated into any analysis of the relative 
proportions and importance of various categories of trade items. His method of 
determining the relative percentage of any given item or category of goods, however,
16 Dean Lloyd Anderson, "Documentary and Archaeological Perspectives on 
European Trade Goods in the Western Great Lakes Region" (Unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Department of Anthropology, Michigan State University, 1992).
DechSne came to a similar conclusion for the period 1650-1720 based on inventories 
of Montreal merchants found in notarial records. Dechene, Habitants and Merchants, 
79.
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unfortunately does not reflect the complexities of exchange in the pays d ’en haut. 
Despite his clearly-stated concern with patterns of native consumption, he relies solely 
on calculations based on Montreal merchant expenditure as the gauge of how native 
societies integrated, and were influenced by, European goods. This approach is 
understandable given the paucity of records detailing the rates at which French goods 
were exchanged for furs. Since the only logical method for comparing the relative 
value of aunes of textiles, pots of brandy , and livres of lead shot is to divide their 
individual cost by the total value of the trade assortment, in examining only merchant 
invoices Anderson is measuring the relative value of these items to the Canadian 
supplier, not the Indian consumer. The fragmentary price evidence that does exist 
suggests that different types of trade items were sold in the pays d ’en haut at widely 
varying rates of retail mark-up (Table 1.2, column VI). The usual price inflation for 
blankets, for example, might have been in the range of 25 percent of their Montreal 
value, while the cost of brandy typically shot up by almost 300 percent once it 
reached the western Great Lakes. Depending on the amount traded, then, the relative 
value of blankets and brandy to the merchant wholesaler might have been something 
quite different to the Indian purchaser.
A detailed account of trade goods exchanged at the King’s Post of Niagara 
between 1729 and 1738 is preserved in the official correspondence of Canadian 
officials to the French Ministry of Marine.17 A breakdown of the Niagara items into
17 "Etat des effets vendfls a Niagara depuis le deux May 1729 jusqu’au dernier 
Juin 1738," AN, 0 %  73: 310-12.
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the same functional categories established by Anderson and the calculation of Indian 
expenditure on these items suggests that Anderson’s model does not adequately 
represent native purchasing patterns (Figure 1.1). The category of clothing, including 
bulk textiles and blankets, finished apparel such as shirts, sleeves, leggings and 
stockings, as well as needles, thread, and decorative ribbon, made up the largest part 
of the value of goods traded at Niagara, but was relatively less important on the 
whole than Anderson’s figures would suggest. Considering the high rates of mark-up 
on alcohol in the pays d ’en haut, it comes as no surprise that eau de vie would 
comprise a significantly larger proportion of Indian expenditure in trade than its 
wholesale value would indicate. The same holds true for tobacco, another item with a 
relatively elastic demand among Indian consumers. The large discrepancy in the 
category of cooking and eating can be attributed to the sale of large amounts of bread 
at Niagara, a commodity which rarely figured in the accounts of Montreal merchants. 
While Anderson’s ranking of items by functional category generally holds true for the 
Niagara data, the relative proportions of merchant and Indian expenditure differ 
considerably as a function of varying rates of price inflation in the pays d ’en haut.
As the icy St. Lawrence began to buckle and heave, and the cobblestones and 
slate roofs of Montreal and Quebec emerged from a heavy blanket of snow, the gears 
of the complex transatlantic cycle of shipping, buying, and selling began to move 
once again. Keepers of the King’s storehouses took stock of the merchandise that 
remained in their stores after a year of liberal gift-giving to local and visiting Indians. 
Quebec factors of large French trading houses braced themselves for another frantic
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summer of sales to Montreal merchant-outfitters, while they in turn were busy 
contracting with marchatids voyageurs, hiring crews, and provisioning canoes for the 
long westward journey to trade at the distant posts of the pays d ’en haut.
The Canadian trading season was short and frenzied after a long, idle winter. 
Since the St. Lawrence River, the essential artery of commerce, communication, and 
transportation in New France, was generally only navigable between July and 
October, all the essential operations of the Canadian fur trade were crammed into the 
space of a few short months. Six or eight weeks after leaving France, merchantmen 
laden with European merchandise arrived at the port of Quebec and were unloaded 
either into the warehouses of large importers or the King’s stores. A journey of four 
to six days in smaller sloops, barks, or bateaux brought the goods 150 miles upriver 
from Quebec to the shores of the island of Montreal, where the Ottawa River meets 
the St. Lawrence in a series of lakes and rapids, and sailing vessels gave way to 
birchbark canoes. Here the goods lay in the dank basements of Montreal merchant 
outfitters before being hauled by cart to Sault-Saint-Louis, or Lachine. Finally, the 
sturdy packs of trade items destined for the posts of the Great Lakes were loaded into 
thirty-to-forty-foot canoes capable of carrying cargoes of up to three tons. After 
celebrating the customary farewell mass at Ste-Anne de Bellevue at the western end of 
the island, the crew of four or five paddlers pushed off on an arduous two-month 
journey to the Great Lakes country, either by the northern route along the Ottawa and 
Mattawa rivers to Lakes Nipissing and Huron, or the southern passage along the St.
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Lawrence and into Lake Ontario.18
As French manufactured goods intended for the western trade passed through 
the hands of merchants and traders from La Rochelle to Montreal, their selling price 
rose at every point of exchange to meet the various costs of shipping, handling, 
insurance, storage, and--invariably--the seller’s commission. In this respect, the 
unique geography of the colony dictated the nature of its commerce: with Quebec the 
primary entrepot and break-bulk point for transatlantic commerce, and Montreal more 
directly involved in provisioning and organizing the westward shipment of trade 
goods, the fur trade supported two distinct levels of Canadian "middlemen." Thus, 
by the time trade goods reached the voyageur’s canoe, their value could easily have 
doubled.19
A substantial amount of documentary evidence remains that, if carefully 
examined, details the movement of trade goods through this transatlantic system of 
exchange in the first half of the eighteenth century. The correspondence of colonial 
officials with the French ministry (AN, C*!A), as well as the day-books, ledgers, and 
accounts of Montreal merchant-outfitters, contain enough price information to allow a 
reconstruction of the cost of a wide variety of trade goods at each stage of their 
journey from the shops and manufactories of France to the posts of the pays d ’ett 
haut. Each year the Canadian government gave away thousands of livres’ worth of
18 DechSne, Habitants and Merchants, 65-67; Dale Miquelon, Dugard o f  Rouen: 
French Trade to Canada and the West Indies, 1729-1770 (Montreal and Kingston: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1978), 73.
19 Dechene, Habitants and Merchants, 84-89.
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gifts from the King’s storehouses at Quebec, Trois-Rivifcres, and Montreal to secure 
the friendship and alliance of western tribes, as well as to feed and clothe the resident 
sauvages domiciles, or Christian Indians, of neighboring mission towns such as 
Sillery. In the final weeks before the first French sails appeared before Quebec, royal 
officials were kept busy drawing up long lists of the goods that had been disbursed 
from the royal stores and preparing itemized invoice orders for goods from the King’s 
warehouses at Rochefort to replenish the Canadian stores for yet another year of gift- 
giving and treaty-making.20 For the period roughly between 1730 and 1750, it is 
possible to reconstruct the average price of the most common trade items as they were 
supplied to the French government at Rochefort to be shipped to New France (Table
1.1, column I). By determining the mean price of each item at Rochefort and 
comparing it with the price at which comparable goods were delivered to the King’s 
storekeepers at Quebec (Table 1.1, column II), it appears that the average rate of 
mark-up on trade items imported from France for official use was in the range of 33- 
34% over this period (Table 1.2, column I).
In an age in which the division between official business and private interest 
was less distinct, and the central government simply lacked the resources and the 
bureaucracy required to supply every aspect of its colonial needs, the same large
20 A typical list of merchandise taken from the King’s store at Quebec and 
distributed as Indian gifts is the "Estat de Munitions, vivres et autres Effets qui ont 
6td delivrd des magazins du Roy h Quebec aux sauvages domiciliers et autres qui sont 
venus en cette ville pendant l’annde 1730," AN, ^ A ,  57: 105-20. For an example of 
an annual invoiced order, see "Estat des Munitions et Marchandises qu’il est 
necessaire d’Envoyer du port de Rochefort 1’annde mil sept cent trente et un pour 
Gamir les Magasins du Roy k Quebec," AN, C lA, 53: 281-83.
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merchants houses in La Rochelle, Rouen, and Bordeaux that privately shipped the 
bulk of goods destined for the Canadian fur trade also vied for the lucrative business 
of supplying the King’s stores in New France. These substantial trading firms, such 
as Rouen’s Dugard and Company, handled the bulk of the colonial trade, only part of 
which involved Canada, for the real money was always to be made in supplying the 
great sugar plantations of the Caribbean. Still, there were comfortable profits to be 
made in Canadian furs, and these merchant houses unfailingly sent agents to represent 
their commercial interests in New France.
Of the roughly one hundred Quebec shopkeepers who jockeyed for their share 
of the town’s retail trade, only a handful could be deemed "principal traders," and 
nearly all of these were "metropolitans," or factors representing influential French 
trading companies.21 While a few of these colonial agents, including Frangois Havy 
and Jean Lefebvre of the Dugard company, were salaried employees of the "home 
office," the majority of their associates worked as commission agents, earning a profit 
of 5 percent on each incoming cargo they handled and 2.5 percent on the fur 
shipments they sent back in return. These resident factors enjoyed a great deal of 
prestige within the Quebec mercantile community and they frequently shuttled back 
and forth between France and the colony on business. Few factors put down 
permanent roots in the colony; most were merely serving time in a small, dreary 
colonial outpost until they had accumulated enough experience and capital to return 
home to further advance their careers in metropolitan society.
21 Miquelon, Dugard o f Rouen, 70-71.
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While posted to New France, however, they were constantly occupied with the 
countless tasks that filled the lengthy day of the eighteenth-century merchant. When 
the trading ships began to arrive in the colony in mid-summer, the Quebec merchant 
was responsible for overseeing the unloading and storage of specially-marked bales of 
trade goods sent by French exporters. Before long, Montreal merchant-outfitters 
began to arrive in Quebec to buy up the goods they required to assemble the trading 
outfits to be sent to the pays d ’en haut. Sales continued at a frenetic pace until the 
late summer and early fall when furs from the west began arriving in town via 
Montreal. The Quebec factor then donned the hat of a fur merchant, inspecting the 
pelts that arrived for damage and assessing their quality, delivering all beaver to the 
Compagnie des Indes, and determining the price to be paid for the remaining skins 
and menues pelleteries. He then arranged for shipment of the furs to the company in 
France and, based on his analysis of local market conditions, drew up and forwarded 
an invoice of goods necessary for the next year’s trade. With the short trading season 
over, entries in day-books had to be transferred to ledgers, accounts balanced, and 
various other mundane tasks completed before the merchant could relax briefly during 
the quiet winter season and prepare for the coming of spring when the cycle would 
begin anew.22
Quebec importers sold trade goods to Montreal merchant-outfitters in an 
idiosyncratic commercial relationship which changed little over the course of the 
eighteenth century. When a Quebec factor received a shipment from France, the
22 Miquelon, Dugard o f Rouen, 73-82.
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invoiced price of the goods was automatically inflated 5 or 6 percent over wholesale, 
a practice which went unremarked by purchasers. In addition to this hidden invoice 
inflation, the Quebec merchant charged an additional mark-up, known in the trade as 
the binifice, which covered all the charges of shipping, handling, as well as the 
factor’s commission. The binifice rate was flexible, varying considerably from year 
to year, and even month to month, depending on the state of the market and shipping 
conditions. At the start of each new trading season, the Quebec binifice quickly 
found its level. According to Intendant Gilles Hocquart, the invoice prices of the La 
Rochelle firm of Pascaud Fr sires were generally accepted as the standard by all local 
importers.
The average binifice set by Quebec merchants during the 1730s and 1740s can 
be determined by comparing the mean prices of various trade goods as purchased by 
Montreal merchant outfitters (Table 1.1, column III) with the French wholesale prices 
as listed on government invoices for replenishing the King’s stores in Quebec (Table
1.1, column I). This calculation produces an average binifice over the period of just 
over 32 percent, almost identical to the rate of mark-up on goods shipped to Canada 
to be used as gifts. Thus, it appears that the same cadre of French merchants who 
supplied goods for both the private trade and the King’s stores were charging virtually 
the same mark-up to the government as to private purchasers.23 Of course, the rate of 
32 percent is only a measure of central tendency; in reality, binifice levels ranged
23 This figure of 32.389 percent is consistent with that suggested by Miquelon, 
who estimates that the binifice charged by Quebec merchants typically ranged 
between 26 and 36 percent. Miquelon, New France, 132, 158.
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from as low as 18 or 20 percent in peacetime, to upwards of 200 percent during 
periods of severe disruptions in shipping occasioned by the unwanted attentions of the 
British Navy.24 Though most goods were marked up by Quebec merchants at the 
same fixed rate, certain special items, particularly brandy, wine, and tobacco were 
subject to significantly higher rates of price inflation. Brandy and wine, in particular, 
were generally sold at prices as high as the local market would bear, and there is 
evidence to suggest that it was the sale of alcohol, above all else, that allowed French 
exporters to reap a healthy profit from an otherwise unspectacular Canadian trade.25 
Certain other goods, including foodstuffs and other local Canadian products, were 
generally not subject to the binifice, but were sold to Montreal merchant-outfitters at 
pre-arranged prices (d prix fait).26
The brief shipping season on the St. Lawrence not only shaped the pattern of 
commercial exchange within Canada, but also dictated the elaborate structure of 
colonial debt and credit that supported the fur trade. French merchantmen rarely 
arrived in the St. Lawrence before July but, in order to reach the distant inland posts 
before winter, the voyageurs were forced to leave Montreal by May or June. This 
meant that in order to buy sufficient goods from a Quebec importer to support a
24 Miquelon, Dugard o f Rouen,, 75.
25 Miquelon, New France, 132; Miquelon, Dugard o f  Rouen, 75-76; Lunn, 
"Economic Development," 364; Dechene, Habitants and Merchants, 82-83.
26 Miquelon, Dugard o f Rouen, 75. DechSne estimates that during the last quarter 
of the seventeenth century, Quebec importers earned a net profit of 15 percent on the 
value of the goods sold to Montreal merchants after deducting for the costs of freight, 
import duties, handling, and storage. Dechene, Habitants and Merchants, 86-87.
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trading expedition, the typical Montreal merchant-outfitter needed to obtain credit 
from his supplier, conventionally advanced at the standard French interest rate of 6 
percent per annum, payable the following year once the canoes had returned with 
western furs. Thus, goods arriving from France often sat in Quebec warehouses for 
the greater part of the year, while Quebec importers waited to be reimbursed by 
Montreal merchants for the advance of last year’s goods.
Alexis Lemoine, or Monifcre, as he was familiarly known to his Montreal 
colleagues, was a typical eighteenth-century marchand iquipeur. As a youth he had 
paddled west as an engagi, or hired canoeman, but through a combination of family 
connections and thrifty saving had accumulated enough capital and credit to establish 
himself as a merchant-outfitter, supplying trade goods to his voyageur associates. At 
his death in 1754, Monifere passed on to his son an estate worth 50,000 livres, a 
respectable sum for a merchant who had worked his entire life in a saturated and 
highly competitive Montreal trading market.27
Twenty years younger than his colleague, Pierre Guy was unique among his 
fellow marchands iquipeurs because he had emigrated from France, while the 
majority of Montreal traders were native-born.28 Otherwise, Guy’s career from his 
arrival in Montreal to his early death in a comfortable, two-story stone house in the 
Rue Saint-Joseph followed a common trajectory. Guy was a military man as well as a
27 Louise Dechdne, "Alexis (Jean-AIexis) Lemoine, dit Monfere," Dictionary o f  
Canadian Biography/Dictiormaire biographique du Canada, edited by George W. 
Brown et al. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974), 3: 379.
28 Miquelon, New France, 157.
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merchant, serving in the local militia and eventually rising to the rank of captain.
With eight children from his first marriage and another five from his second, Guy 
certainly had a material incentive to commercial success. By the 1740s, he presided 
over a successful trading business and owned several pieces of property in Montreal. 
Like Monifere, Guy assembled and sold trading outfits to voyageurs for transportation 
to the pays d ’en haut, but he also imported general merchandise-especially wine and 
spirits-for sale to his Montreal neighbors. Guy had a long connection with the 
French factors Havy and Lefebvre who represented the substantial Dugard company 
in Quebec and it was through them that he shipped the bulk of the furs he collected as 
payment from his voyageur customers. Occasionally he dealt with other Montreal 
merchants, and sometimes directly with France, but most often he relied on his 
Quebec contacts for credit, trade goods, and the latest business news.29
If in many ways the Canadian colony mirrored the social hierarchies of 
France, albeit on a smaller scale, then family connections, astute marriage, and access 
to credit necessarily played an essential role in ascending to the rank of a powerful 
Montreal businessman. Louis-Frangois Hervieux rose to prominence as much for 
who he knew as what he knew: through his mother, brothers and sisters he was 
related to several important Montreal merchant families, including the Magnans,
Marins de la Malgue, Pothiers, Le Contes Duprd, and La Comes. In 1742, Hervieux 
married Louise Quesnel, the daughter of a local merchant, and not long after she died 
he wed the daughter of prominent trader Joseph-Jacques Gamelin. The fact that his
29 Josd Igartua, "Pierre Guy," Dictionary o f Canadian Biography, 3: 271-72.
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daughter would later marry the son of Pierre Guy illustrates how closely-knit the 
Montreal merchant community was in the mid-eighteenth century. Hervieux 
conducted the majority of his business with his brother Jacques, as well as his two 
fathers-in-law. As with most Montreal merchant-outfitters, Hervieux sold dry goods 
on a small scale to the general public; but the real profits always came in supplying 
bulk trade goods to voyageurs.30
These three prominent Montreal merchant-outfitters had more in common than 
their mutual jostling for commerce in a tough, aggressive Montreal market, and 
occasionally the ties of marriage and family.31 What links them most powerfully in 
the present is the historical accident that their business accounts survived for two 
hundred years, to be discovered in musty boxes in the basement of Montreal’s 
Chateau de Ramezay Museum. These records offer a rare glimpse at the day-to-day 
business practices of eighteenth-century Montreal merchants, containing detailed 
invoices of some 70 trade outfits sent between 1715 and 1758 to a number of posts in 
the western Great Lakes region, including Green Bay, Rainy Lake, Detroit, Sioux 
Post, Michilimackinac, Ouiatanon, Nipigon, and Michipicoten.32
30 Jos6 Igartua, "Louis-Frangois Hervieux," Dictionary o f Canadian Biography, 3; 
290.
31 For a detailed account of the demographic peculiarities of the Montreal 
merchant community in the mid-eighteenth century, see Jos6 Igartua, "The Merchants 
of Montreal at the Conquest: Socio-Economic Profile," Histoire Sociale/Social 
History, 8:16 (1975): 275-293.
32 This collection, which includes 36 separate volumes, is generally referred to as 
the "Montreal Merchants’ Records," though microfilm copies of these documents are 
cataloged under a variety of different titles. The original documents are owned by the 
Antiquarian and Numismatic Society of Montreal and are on permanent loan to the
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With the arrival of spring, Monifere, Guy, Hervieux and their colleagues could 
inevitably be found assembling large outfits of trade goods, extending credit to the 
marchands voyageurs who would oversee trade in the pays d ’en haut, purchasing 
canoes and provisions for the trip, as well as hiring the canoemen and paying for the 
congi or trading license required to send goods to the western posts.33 Like their 
Quebec counterparts, Montreal merchants tended to supply complete trading 
assortments to their customers, although occasionally they sold smaller amounts of 
goods to supplement the outfits sold by fellow traders. Like their Quebec 
counterparts, Montreal merchants also tended to fix on a common binifice early in 
the trading season. On each bulk sale, goods were individually invoiced at the 
Quebec cost with the Montreal binifice tacked on only at the bottom. For the years
Public Archives of Canada where they are cataloged as M847-M853, M869, and 
M1005. The microfilm copy of the master negative in the holdings of Michigan State 
University was used in this study; at MSU the collection is cataloged as "Account 
Books of Eighteenth Century Merchants of Montreal." For a more detailed 
discussion of the MMR see Anderson, "Documentary and Archaeological 
Perspectives," 45-68, and Gerin-Lajoie, "MMR Project Research Files."
33 Bruce M. White’s analysis of the account books of the Lake Superior trader 
Jean-Baptiste Cadot from the 1780s suggests that the various expenses of providing 
these services for the traders could amount to more than 40 percent of the value of 
the merchandise sold. Packaging, storage, and land transportation of the outfit 
amounted to almost 7 percent, equipment purchases and repairs accounted for more 
than 9 percent, and the purchase of the trading permit approximately 15 percent. By 
far the largest expense shouldered by the Montreal merchant, however, was the 
payment of the canoemen’s wages and the purchase of their equipment and 
provisions, which came to almost 69 percent of the value of the merchandise. Bruce 
M. White, "Montreal Canoes and Their Cargoes," in ”Le Castor Fait Tout”: Selected 
Papers o f the Fifth North American Fur Trade Conference, (1985), edited by Bruce 
Trigger, Toby Morantz, and Louise Dechfine (Montreal: Lake St. Louis Historical 
Society, 1987), 180.
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between 1735 and 1747, the average annual Montreal mark-up on goods was in the 
neighborhood of 50 percent (Figure 1.2; Table 1.2, column III).34 Certain locally- 
crafted goods, such as tomahawks, axes, leggings, and capotes were exempt from the 
binifice, as was the perennial trade essential, bulk woollen cloth. Foodstuffs such as 
com, flour, and bacon, as well as the ever-popular eau de vie and wine were sold at 
specially determined rates (compare columns III and IV of Table l . l ) .35
Besides the critical task of supplying and organizing the annual trade 
expeditions to the pays d ‘en haut, Montreal merchants formed a crucial link in the 
second phase of the fur trade cycle: the collection, marketing, and shipment of furs 
and skins once the voyageurs’ canoes returned in late summer. The merchants 
carefully inspected all furs, assessed their fair market value, and credited them to the 
voyageur’s account. All beaver received in the colony was eventually sold to the 
local bureau defermier of the Compagnie des Indes, but the Montreal merchant was 
personally responsible for determining the value of all other skins and menues 
pelleteries. As a result, the seller had virtually no control over the price paid for 
peltry. Each fall, the marchands iquipeurs met to determine the standard prices, 
known as the "tarifde Vautomne," or the "prix des marchands-iquipeurs," for each
34 Miquelon estimates that Montreal merchants marked up their goods by 25 to 33 
percent. This may well have been true for the peace-time years of the 1720s and 
1730s when goods were readily available, but rates skyrocketed during periods of 
shortage, or during wartime when French shipping was interrupted. See Figure 1.2,
35 According to DechSne, Montreal merchants in the latter part of the seventeenth 
century could expect a net profit of approximately 18 percent of the value of the 
goods they advanced, factoring in the costs of transporting goods upriver from 
Quebec, wastage, handling, and storage. DechSne, Habitants and Merchants, 86-87.
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type of pelt. The sum ultimately credited to the voyageur’s account would be 
assessed on the basis of quality, with inferior grades of furs fetching a fraction of the 
standard price. In determining these annual prices, the Montreal merchants tended to 
offer a "cautious, delayed reading of La Rochelle market rates," while also 
considering the average quality of the year’s "crop," the amount of each type on the 
market, and the current freight and insurance rates,36 Montreal merchants made little 
or no profit in the purchase of furs, however, as Montreal prices appear to have 
matched those offered by the Quebec exporters who in turn purchased them for 
export.37
For as much as can be ascertained with any certainty about fur-trade 
operations in the pays d ’en haut, one might as well be standing on the banks of the 
St. Lawrence at Lachine, watching as the heavily laden voyageurs’ canoes slowly 
disappeared over the western horizon. So little of what transpired between voyageurs 
and Indians as they exchanged European merchandise for peltry was ever recorded 
that it is difficult to draw any definitive conclusions concerning the everyday conduct 
of the trade in the Great Lakes and Ohio Valley. Though it is commonly assumed 
that voyageurs sold goods in the pays d ’en haut at 100 percent profit, it is nearly 
impossible to determine with any certainty the exact rates at which European items
36 Thomas Wien, "Exchange Patterns in the European Market for North American 
Furs and Skins, 1720-1760," in The Fur Trade Revisited: Selected Papers o f  the Sixth 
North American Fur Trade Conference, Mackinac Island, Michigan, 1991, edited by 
Jennifer S. H. Brown, W. J. Eccles and Donald P. Heldman (East Lansing, 1994),
28.
37 Dechene, Habitants and Merchants, 86-87, 89; Miquelon, New France, 158.
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were exchanged for peltry.38 Fortunately, two previously unmined sources detailing 
frontier exchange offer a unique insight into this question. The CnA  records contains 
occasional accounts of trade goods sold at the King’s posts of Frontenac, Toronto, 
and Niagara, complete with itemized prices.39 Buried in this correspondence, as well, 
are numerous small bills from private traders for the goods they had supplied to 
commandants of posts in the pays d ’en haut for official use as Indian gifts.40 In the 
latter case, the prices demanded by the traders were so inflated that they clearly 
represented the conventional rates for various goods in the pays d ’en haut, with the 
addition of transportation charges and the voyageur’s profit. Frequently, a frugal 
French official would make a correction to these bills, pencilling in a revised, and 
inevitably lower, price in the margin, implying that the going rates of exchange for 
goods in the West were somewhat standardized.41
38 Miquelon and Dechene both suggest a voyageur’s mark-up of 100 percent. 
Dechene, Habitants and Merchants, 86-87; Miquelon, New France, 158.
39 See, for instance, the "Etat des effets vendfls h Niagara depuis le deux May 
1729 jusqu’au dernier Juin 1738," AN, CUA, 73: 310-312. This account of goods 
sold over a ten-year period at Niagara is unique in that the prices of goods are 
denoted primarily in "chats" (raccoons), worth 15 sols each. It also appears that 
brandy was sold to Frenchmen at Niagara at double the price paid by Indian 
customers. This distinction is important because it suggests the extent to which the 
trade at the King’s posts was geared toward providing the lowest possible prices to 
Indians in order to sustain their business and alliance.
40 A characteristic bill of this kind is the "Memoire des foumitures fait pour le 
Roy par ordre de M. Linctot commandant pour le Roy au poste des ou8atenons par 
nous gauche chateauvieux et Compie au quicapous revenant de guerre des chicachias," 
AN, <?lA, 73: 220.
41 Buried within the reams of paper sent by Canadian administrators to France is a 
fascinating document which amounts to no less than a "Rosetta Stone" in the analysis 
of trade good prices in the pays d ’en haut. Drawn up by Intendant Gilles Hocquart in
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Not surprisingly, the final selling prices of trade goods at the King’s posts 
were consistently lower than those exchanged at the privately-leased posts in the pays 
d ’en haut. The raison d’etre of these forts was to ensure that the cost of goods could 
be closely monitored and adjusted in response to competition from nearby English 
traders at Oswego on the southern shore of Lake Ontario. Prices culled from the 
0 1A  correspondence make this point clearly (Table 1.1, column V). When compared 
with the cost of comparable goods at Quebec, the prices of items at the posts of 
Niagara, Toronto, and Frontenac appear to have been marked up at an average rate of 
around 100 percent (Table 1.2, column IV).42 This markup covered the cost of 
transporting the goods along the shores of Lake Ontario either by canoe or in one of 
the King’s barques, as well as the wages and provisions of the garrison troops and 
employees. After 1742, the French government authorized the leasing of the King’s 
posts to merchants, who soon claimed that it was impossible to turn a profit while 
maintaining prices at artificially low levels. After only two trading seasons, the
October 1729, it consists of a detailed list of trade goods sent to the posts of 
Frontenac and Niagara, indicating both the prices at which they were obtained by the 
crown in France and Quebec, as well as the prices ultimately paid by the Indian 
consumer. The rate of
price inflation varies greatly among items, from no mark-up at all on trade guns to a 
staggering 700 percent on signet rings. On the basis of this information, it was 
possible to determine whether subsequent lists likely referred to prices current in 
France, Canada, or the West. Hocquart k ministre, 25 October 1729, "Estat des 
marchandises et munitions qui ont est envoydes au forts Frontenac et Niagara pour y 
faire le traitte pendant l ’annde 1730 avec le prix qu’elles coutes au Roy et celuy 
qu’elles doivent y etre traittdes." AN, 0 lA, 51: 286.
42 This figure corresponds with Hocquart’s 1729 calculation of the gross profits 
expected from the trade at Frontenac and Niagara. AN, 0 lA, 51: 286.
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discouraged lessee at Frontenac griped that if he was allowed to mark up goods only 
by 15 percent to cover the costs of transportation and wages he was bound to lose his 
chemise.**
If  the sale of trade goods at the King’s posts was closely regulated, often to 
the detriment of profits, the private traders and post commandants operating in the 
western Great Lakes and Ohio Valley were constrained only by their consciences, as 
tempered by the demands of their scrupulous Indian customers. Merchandise arriving 
in the pays d ’en haut saw price hikes, on average, in excess of 170 percent (Table 
1.2, column VI; Figure 1.3), though diverse goods were marked up at vastly 
different rates. Brandy, for example, garnered considerable profits, often trading 
hands at a price around 300 percent over Montreal cost. The same also held true for 
wine, tobacco, and a variety of foodstuffs and metalwares. The high frontier price of 
tobacco and alcohol was due in part to considerable import duties, and in the case of 
brandy, the sheer difficulty of transporting large quantities of liquid stocks to the 
interior.44 The relatively elastic demand for these rapidly consumable goods, of 
course, further encouraged traders to sell for as much as the market would bear.
Other sundry items such as soap, axes, oil for cooking and burning, firesteels,
43 Frangois Chalet & Gilles Hocquart, 20 October 1744, AN, (?lA t 81: 425-26.
44 The import duties on alcohol and tobacco were supposed to be 10 percent of 
their assessed value, but were fixed by custom at 9 livres per barrique for wine, 22 
livres, 10 sols per barrique on brandy, and 5 sols per pound on tobacco.
Based on the average French wholesale prices of these items (Table 1, column I), the 
duty in reality amounted to approximately 35 percent on brandy, 20 percent on wine, 
and as much as 45 percent on tobacco. Lunn, "Economic Development," 364-65.
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needles, and kettles could be exchanged at even steeper rates because their initial cost 
was relatively low. Profits on textiles, however, appear to have significantly more 
moderate, in accordance with their status as an essential component of the trading 
assortment. If Indians could not find a bargain on the blankets and bulk cloth that 
comprised the single largest category of their expenditure, it was likely that they 
would take their pelts elsewhere, perhaps to another post or, more ominously, to the 
English.
As voyageurs pushed off and paddled eastward to the shelter of their homes 
and hearths on the St. Lawrence, and Indians settled back into their winter routine of 
hunting and trapping, another trading season in the life of the French transatlantic 
commercial world came to an end. Furs from the depths of North American forests 
passed through the bustling markets of Montreal, Quebec, La Rochelle, and Paris; 
Indians, meanwhile, set about chopping wood with iron axes, boiling water in brass 
kettles, and cooking the game they had hunted with guns from the armories of St.- 
Etienne. Nearly lost among the products of European and Caribbean trade, the neat 
rows of figures detailing Canadian fur imports to La Rochelle only hint at the 
overwhelming importance of the French-Indian trade to Canadian society. Though he 
would scarcely have realized it, the fashionable customer who bought a beaver hat in 
the latest style at a Paris shop was enmeshed in a complex cycle of trade and alliance 
that immeasurably shaped the history of France in North America.
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TABLES 1.1 AND 1.2 
LEGEND
TABLE 1.1
COLUMN
I FR: Cost in France.
II QB: Cost to Canadian government at Quebec
III MW: Cost to Montreal merchant-outfitters
(merchant wholesale).
IV MR: Montreal retail price (merchant retail).
V KP: Sale price at king’s posts of Niagara,
Toronto, and Frontenac.
VI PAYS: Price of goods sold by private
traders in pays d ’en haut.
TABLE 1.2
I (QB-FR)/FR: Mark-up on goods purchased by Canadian
government.
II (MW-FR)/FR: Mark-up on goods purchased by Quebec
importers.
III (MR-MW)/MW: Mark-up on goods sold by Montreal merchant-outfitters
IV (KP-QB)/QB: Mark-up on goods sold at king’s posts of
Niagara, Toronto, and Frontenac.
V (PAYS-MR)/MR: Mark-up on goods sold by
private traders in pays d ’en haut.
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TABLE 1.1
PRICES OF SELECTED FRENCH TRADE GOODS, 1730-1745
(Livres)
Sources: AN, CnA; MMR.
1 II III IV V VI
FR QB MW MR HP PAYS
ITEM
AIGUILLES/NEEDLES {100) 0.4862 0.7899 1.0259 1,3348 3.0000
AIGUILLES A COUDRE/SEWING NEEDLES (100) 0.4257 0.8344 0.3000 0.5763 3.0000
ALENES/AWLS (GROSS) 3.1076 3.0204 2.6218 4.7735 16.3450 20.5687
BAGUES A CACHET/SIGNET RINGS (DOZ.) 0.2034 0.1917 0.2692 0.4521 0.7976 0.6667
BAS/STOCKINGS (PAIR) 2.4807 2.4208 3.0390 5.9261 2.7548
8ATTEFEUX/FIRESTEELS (DOZ.) 0.8767 1.3703 0.9456 1.8505 2.7156 6.8544
BAYONETTES (EA.) 2.0000 1.0000 1.3300 1.6225 3.7500
BISCUIT (100#) 11.8848 15.2042 15.2042 9.0000 18.1231
BLE D'INDE/INOIAN CORN (MINOT) 2.6687 3.4741 3.4741 17.4286 19.2751
CANOTS/CANOES (EA.) 81.2297 129.0000 129.0000 116.0000 180.0455
CAPOTES (EA.) 25.0873 8.8649 9.4900 18.7167 58.6364
CARISE (AUNE) 1.2450 1.8919 1.3122 2.5263 2.0151 6.0000
CASSETETES/TOMAHAWKS (EA.) 2.4783 1.8333 1.8333 2.0000 2.4750
CHAPEAUX/HATS (EA.) 3.7584 3.8505 5.2651 3.0000 6.2000
CHAUDIERES/KETTLES (#) 1.7155 2.3565 1.7208 3.1259 3.3400 6.0205
CHEMISES/SHIRTS (EA.) 5.1669 1.6093 2.5793 3.4609 8.3328
COUTEAUX/KNJVES (DOZ.) 1.8135 1.9755 1.2184 2.3877 4.0164 5.6218
COUVERTES/BLANKETS (EA.) 6.7365 6.7954 5.6036 9.6694 10.3433 12.1896
DARDS/DARTS (EA.) 0.5000 1.2000 1.2000 1.5000
DOURGNE (AUNE) 1.7272 2.0290 1.8763 3.0209 3.9991
DRAP (AUNE) 5.7500 7.1912 8.5328 8.5328 9.0000 15.5340
ECARLATINE/STROUD (AUNE) 7.5000 9.2000 36.0000
EAU DE VIE/BRANDY (POT) 0.6032 1.2496 2.6253 2.6253 4.5366 10.3871
FARINE/FLOUR (100#) 9.1910 13.1376 13.1376 35,7073
FIL/THREAD (#) 1.6021 2.2917 1.4818 2.7210 3.5997 11.8109
FUSILS/MUSKETS (EA.) 18.1722 23.7343 13.3228 21.9454 21.3361 37.6150
GRAISSE/FAT (#) 0.4773 0.6630 0.9637
GRELOTS/HAWKBELLS (DOZ.) 0.4500 0.4413 0.5512 0.8473 0.8872
HACHES/AXES (EA.) 1.4050 3.5500 2.0000 2.0000 2.4559 4.0494
HUILE/OIL (POT) 0.4904 0.9813 2.0000
LARD/BACON (#) 0.2849 0.371 B 0,4725 0.4725 0.3497 0.8889
LIGNE DU BANC/COD LINE (#) 0.5207 0.7564 0.6304 1.3390 0.8315 3.0000
MANCHES/SLEEVES (PAIR) 3.7429 1.5267 2.6388 4.8517 14.2564
MAZAMET (AUNE) 2.0944 2.8173 1.9390 3.8340 3.9725 15.0000
MIROIRS/MIRRORS (DOZ.) 9.5857 11.8195 5.8889 7.5423 20.3812 27.0000
MITASSES/LEGGINGS (PAIR) 3.0000 2.8000 2.8000 4.7944 7.7515
MOLTON (AUNE) 2.4637 2.9754 2.5180 4.4142 4.6838 5.9325
MOUCHOIRS/HANDKERCHIEFS (EA.) 0.6074 0.5750 1.4030
PEIGNES/COMBS (DOZ.) 2.2143 2.5007 2.2722 3.4173 5.2795 13.5224
PIERRES A FUSILVGUNFLINTS (100) 0.7055 0.7613 0.3148 0.7658 5.0000 3.2257
PLOMB ET BALLES/LEAD AND SHOT (#) 0.2214 0.2868 0.3838 0.4945 0.7249 0.9096
POIS/PEASE (MINOT) 2.7603 3.7955 3.7955 3.9801 6.4231
POIVRE/PEPPER (#) 1.3814 1.7808 1.5571 3.0344 3.0000
PORCELAINE/WAMPUM (1000) 42.4394 37.0000 50.2966
POUDRE A MOUSQUET/GUNPOWDER (#) 0.6331 0.7761 1.4382 1.4382 1.7399 2.0143
RASSADES/GLASS BEADS (#) 1.3437 1.1363 1.0214 1.9143 1.9104 2.7767
SAVON/SDAP (#) 0.7202 1.3293 1.1359 1.1359 1.4836 3.7500
SEL/SALT (MINOT) 1.5000 1.3911 4.7778 4.7778 29.1667
SOULIERS/SHOES (PAIR) 1.6019 3.7500 6.5357 3.8214 4.2500
TABAC/TOBACCO (#) 0.5523 0.5925 0.5925 1.0018 1.8827
TIREBOURS/GUNWORMS (DOZ.) 0.7972 0.5588 0.2277 0.9649 2.0506 2.7941
TOILE/LINEN (AUNE) 0.9359 1.4998 0.9611 1.7197 3.0087 5.5867
VERMILLON/VERMILION (#) 5.8187 6.4424 5.2985 9.4939 12.5493 15.4234
VIN/WINE (POT) 0.4197 0.7962 1.6128 1.6128 2.8725 5.6922
VINAIGRE/VINEGAR (POT) 0.2326 0.3508 1.2500 2.5875
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TABLE 1.2
PERCENTAGE MARK-UP ON SELECTED FRENCH TRADE GOODS, 1730-1745
Sources: AN, 4; MMR.
I II III IV VI
(QB-FR)/FR (MW-FR)/FR (MR-MWJ/MW (KP-QB)/QB (PAYS-MR)ZMR
ITEM
AIQUIU.ES/NEEDLES (100) 62.464 111.0037 30.1101 124.7528
AIGUILLES A COUDRE/SEWING NEEDLES (100) 96.0066 -29.5276 62.1000 420.5622
ALENES/AWLS (GROSS) 22.6045 -16.0073 82.0696 316.9217 330.8935
BAGUES A CACHET/SIGNET RINGS (DOZ.) -5.7522 32.3500 67.9421 318.0668 47.4674
BAS/STOCKINGS (PAIR) -2.7674 22.0629 95.0016 13.7971
BATTEFEUX/FIRESTEELS (DOZ.) 56.302 7.8618 95.6545 98.1756 270.4080
BAYONETTES (EA.) -50 -33.5000 21.9925 131.1248
BISCUIT (100#) 0.0000 -24.2730 19.1980
BLE D’INDE/INDIAN CORN (MINOT) 0.0000 553.0745 454.6228
CANOTS/CANOES (EA.) 0.0000 42.8049 39.5702
CAPOTES (EA.) 7.0514 -25.3937 517.8757
CARISE (AUNE) 51.8501 5.3215 92.5240 6.5120 137.5015
CASSETETES/TOMAHAWKS (EA.) 0.0000 -19.2995 35.0025
CHAPEAUX/HATS (EA.) 44.2296 -20.1383 17.7565
CHAUDIERES/KETTLES (#) 37.3652 0.3089 81.6539 41.7356 92.6005
CHEMlSES/SHtRTS (EA.) 60.2747 •33.0179 223.0644
COUTEAUX/KNIVES (DOZ.) 6.933 -32.8150 95.9701 103.3106 143.8246
COUVERTES/BLANKETS (EA.) 0.87434 -16.8173 72.5569 52.2103 26.0657
DARDS/DARTS (EA.) 0.0000 25.0000
DOURGNE (AUNE) 17.4734 8.6325 61.0030 97,0971
DRAP (AUNE) 25.0643 48.3965 0.0000 25.1530 82.0504
ECARLATINE/STROUD (AUNE) 22.6667
EAU DE VIE/BRANDY (POT) 107.162 335.2288 0.0000 263.0442 295.6538
FARINE/FLOUR (100#) 0.0000 171.7947
FIL/THREAD (#) 43.0435 -7.5089 83.6280 57.0755 334.0647
FUSILS/MUSKETS (EA.) 30.6077 -28.8858 64.7206 71.4027
GRAISSE/FAT (#) 38.9063
GRELOTS/HAWKBELLS (DOZ.) -1.9333 22.4889 53.7192 101.0424
HACHES/AXES (EA.) 152.669 42.3488 0.0000 102.4700
HUILE/OIL (POT) 100.102
LARD/BACON (#) 30.4317 65.8477 0.0000 -5.8934 88.1270
LIGNE DU BANC (#) 45.266 21.0678 112.4046 9.9286 124.0478
MANCHES/SLEEVES (PAIR) 72.8434 29.6241 440.2607
MAZAMET (AUNE) 34.5159 -7.4198 97.7308 41.0038 291.2363
MIROIRS/MIRRORS (DOZ.) 23.3035 -38.5658 28.0786 72.4371 257.9810
MITASSES/LEGGINGS (PAIR) 0.0000 59.8133 176.8393
MOLTON (AUNE) 20.7696 2.2040 75.3058 57.4175 34.3958
MOUCHOIRS/HANDKERCHIEFS (EA.) 144.0000
PEIGNES/COMBS (DOZ.) 12.6341 2.6148 50.3961 111.1209 295.7042
PIERRES A FUSIL/GUNFLINTS (100) 7.90926 -55.3792 143.2656 556.7713 321.2196
PLOMB ET BALLES/LEAD AND SHOT (#) 29.5393 73.3514 28.8431 152.7545 83.9434
POIS/PEASE (MINOT) 0.0000 44,1908 69.2294
POIVRE/PEPPER (#) 28.9127 12.7190 94.8751 68.4636
PORCELAINE/WAMPUM (1000) 35.9388
POUDRE A MOUSQUET/GUNPOWDER (#) 22.5873 127.1679 0.0000 124.1850 40.0570
RASSADES/GLASS BEADS (#) -15.435 -23.9660 87.4192 68.1246 45.0504
SAVON/SOAP (#) 84,5737 57.7201 0.0000 11.6078 230,1347
SEL/SALT (MINOT) ■7.26 216.5200 0.0000 510.4630
SOULIERS/SHOES (PAIR) 74,2853 138.5542 -34.9725
TABAC/TOBACCO (#) 0.0000 81.3869 217,7553
TIREBOURS/GUNWORMS (DOZ.) •29.905 -71.4375 323.7593 266.9649 189.5740
T01LE/LINEN (AUNE) 60.2522 2.6926 78.9304 100.6067 224.8648
VERMILLON/VERMILION (#) 10.7189 -8.9401 79.1809 94.7923 62.4559
VIN/WINE (POT) 69.7069 284.2745 0.0000 260.7762 252.9390
VINAIGRE/VINEGAR (POT) 50.8169 107.0000
MEAN 33.6299 32.3690 33.6704 101.6768 174.0249
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FIGURE 1.1
RELATIVE EXPENDITURE ON TRADE MERCHANDISE OF MONTREAL 
MERCHANTS AND INDIAN CONSUMERS BY FUNCTIONAL CATEGORY
90-.
80-
70-
60- 
% 50- 
40-!30-
oCV
J
10-
0-
Legend
Merchant
Indian
I hunting j drinking | tobacco weapons 
clothing cooking/eating adornment woodworking grcT r PB r i  r^.— rmj^ M tobacco weapons- -   ___________________L -______— J_________________. ■ ■ooming
Sources: Anderson, "Documentary and Archaeological Perspectives," 116, 144; AN, 
C lA, 73: 310-12.
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FIGURE 1.2
BENEFICE RATES CHARGED BY MONIERE, 1735-1747
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Sources: "Journal #3, Monifcre, 1731-1737, Ventes: credit et d6bit," 
M848, reel 2, vol. 4,; "Journal No. #4, Monifere, 1737-1748, Ventes: 
Credit et ddbit," M849, reel 3, vol. 8, MMR.
FIGURE 1.3
ESTIMATED MARK-UP ON GOODS SOLD AT LEASED POSTS
Legend 
[~~~1 Quebec importer 
Montreal outfitter
HI Voyageur
Sources: AN, C 'U; MMR.
CHAPTER n  
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN TRADES
With a strong, steady wind at his back and a favorable tide on the mighty 
Hudson River, the captain of a 50-ton sloop cast off from New York’s "Albany 
wharf." In the local grog shops he had often boasted of completing the 150-mile 
journey up to Albany in less than 24 hours; on this trip, he could expect to drop 
anchor at the walled Dutch town in about three days, perhaps even a week if the 
weather worsened. When he reached Albany, the local fur merchants would be 
waiting, eager to inspect the bales of stroud cloth, kegs of rum and gunpowder, and 
the array of other items they had ordered the previous year from their commercial 
agents in London and Amsterdam. Would the woolens be of a sturdy weave, the 
colors the dark hues of scarlet and blue their Indian customers preferred? What was 
the latest price of beaver on the London market? Would there be war with France? 
While the merchants chatted in Dutch with the captain, animatedly exchanging the 
latest news and gossip from New York, licensed cartmen rowed the merchandise 
ashore in canoes and skiffs, hauling it up from the riverside to the scrubbed and tidy 
merchants’ homes, which also served as warehouses and stores.1
1 David Arthur Armour, "The Merchants of Albany, New York, 1686-1760," 
(Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of History, Northwestern University, 
1965), 200.
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From its charter by the English in the 1680s until the fall of New France, 
Albany was a focal point of trade and diplomacy in the northern colonies. Facing 
competition from the French to the north, the Pennsylvanians to the south, and the 
traders of Schenectady and Oswego to the west, the town’s fur fortunes fluctuated 
through the eighteenth century. Yet, as long as New York dominated the trade in 
furs with Great Britain and the French remained poised a mere two hundred miles 
from the gates of the town, Albany endured as a critical link with the powerful 
Iroquois nations and the citadel of Anglo-American empire in the rivalry with France 
for North America.2
If the Canadian fur trade of the late seventeenth and eighteenth century was 
characterized by an alliance of public and private interest in many significant aspects 
of the trade, New York’s colonial fur trade was marked by bitter, ethnically tinged 
factionalism, and a chronically strained relationship between private interest and 
public purpose. The underlying diplomatic disposition of European-Indian exchange 
was thus frequently ignored in the political maelstrom of a notoriously factious 
people. Britain’s Board of Trade, its gaze unflinchingly fixed on the bottom line of
2 No other Anglo-American colony ever rivalled New York’s beaver exports to 
London. Pennsylvania generally outproduced New York in the deerskin trade as the 
eighteenth century progressed, but in terms of total fur and skin exports, New York 
went unrivalled until the 1740s. Stephen H. Cutcliffe, "Colonial Indian Policy as a 
Measure of Rising Imperialism: New York and Pennsylvania, 1700-1755," Western 
Pennsylvania Historical Magazine, 64:3 (1981): 240-44; Murray G. Lawson, Fur; A 
Study in English Mercantilism, 1700-1775, University of Toronto Studies, History and 
Economic Series, Vol. 9 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1943), Appendix E, 
108; Thomas Elliot Norton, The Fur Trade in Colonial New York, 1686-1776 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1974), 92-93.
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import ledgers, offered little imperial support to the colony during peacetime. Safely 
beyond the reach of skulking French and Indian raiders, the settlers of the lower 
Hudson valley and Long Island were also reluctant to open their purses to provide for 
the defense of a distant frontier. And when the neighboring New England colonies 
griped that Albany’s Dutch merchants callously betrayed the British cause by 
continuing to trade with Canada during wartime, their censure was certainly 
understandable. Despite the meddling efforts of imperial-minded governors and their 
eminent cadre of supporters, the business of Albany remained business throughout the 
eighteenth century, a reality rooted as much in the peculiarities of the town’s fur 
economy as in the disposition of its leading citizens.
Chartered by the English in 1686, Albany was home to some 1,000 
predominantly Dutch-speaking inhabitants, many of whose ancestors had arrived in 
the earliest days of settlement at the beginning of the century,3 The handlaers or fur 
merchants of Albany had long thrived from the exchange of manufactured European 
goods for the beaver, skins, and peltry of the Iroquois nations and other skins, and 
the arrival of the English did little to alter generations of trade and tradition. Too 
intent on their ledgers to pay much heed to the transition of authority, the handlaers 
nonetheless had little reason to resent the new governing class. Explicit in the town’s 
new charter was a provision that ensured Albany’s monopoly over the colony’s fur 
trade. In practical terms, the monopoly forbade anyone from bartering with Indians— 
or storing peltry—beyond the city walls. The new regulations also imposed strict
3 Armour, "Merchants of Albany," 1.
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limits on the routine practices of local merchants. Though still permitted to offer 
credit to Indian customers, fur merchants could no longer accept pawns as collateral 
or lure unwary patrons into their shops with offers of gifts or a tot of rum. Finally, 
the handlaers were barred from dispatching brokers or agents with trade merchandise 
to the settlements of the Five Nations, and from contracting with Indians to sell 
Albany goods in their own villages. Trade was to be conducted only during daylight 
hours, and no commerce was permitted on the Sabbath. In the absence of an effective 
local constabulary, enforcement of these provisions would be carried out, it was 
conceived, through the aid of informants. Concerned citizens were encouraged to 
report illicit activities to the Albany authorities, if not for the sake of altruism, then 
for the one-third to one-half share of the resulting fine they would collect for their 
trouble.4
The New York beaver business was weathering a downturn in the 1680s, and 
the new English legislators trusted that the fur monopoly, combined with the more 
vigilant regulation of commerce in and around the town, would boost the ailing local 
economy. Every citizen of Albany was dependent in some measure on the Indian 
trade, from the most powerful merchant-importer to the humblest indentured servant. 
The new administrators quickly grasped the financial and diplomatic importance of the 
exchange in furs, and the 1686 ordinances were intended more to validate the town's 
existing commercial structure than to fundamentally reshape the trade. The new
4 The Annals o f  Albany, edited by J. Munsell (Albany: J. Munsell, 1857), 8: 205-
14.
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regulations, for example, recognized the three existing classes of fur merchants. Only 
a handful of wealthy wholesalers were permitted to import goods directly from 
England or the Netherlands, and they were required by law to sell their merchandise 
exclusively to Albany traders, not directly to the Indians.5 The Navigation Acts 
stipulated that all foreign goods were to be transshipped through an English port, 
though this did not prevent Albany’s Dutch merchants from preserving their trade ties 
with suppliers in the Netherlands, even if this meant their ships occasionally neglected 
to make the obligatory call at London or Bristol.6
When goods arrived at the port of New York, they were unloaded under the 
supervision of an agent, then transferred to the smaller river-going sloops for the final 
leg of the journey up the Hudson. Having reached Albany, the merchant-importers 
sold the same trade merchandise at an average markup of 100 percent.7 Despite their 
legal status, many Albany importers in the early years of the eighteenth century still 
did not possess sufficient credit to purchase goods directly from European merchants, 
so instead acted as resident factors for overseas trading houses. In such instances, a 
European exporter shipped a cargo of merchandise at his own risk and expense; the 
Albany merchant then oversaw its sale in the colony, collecting a 5 percent 
commission for his efforts. The Albany merchant invariably paid the freight charges,
5 Annals o f Albany, 8: 212.
6 Armour, "Merchants of Albany," 51-52.
7 Armour, "Merchants of Albany," 52. Norton suggests that importers reaped net 
profits in the range of 20 to 40 percent after deducting for costs. Fur Trade in 
Colonial New York, 113-14.
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customs duties, and insurance premiums on the return shipment of peltry. The 
London correspondent completed the commercial cycle by selling the furs and skins at 
the current market price, in turn skimming off a 5 percent share of the gross profits.8
The Albany ordinances further distinguished between two lesser classes of 
handlaers: those who dealt primarily in relatively expensive goods, such as bulk 
duffel and stroud cloth, blankets, and other "big ticket" items, and merchants who 
traded in supplementary "smallwares," such as knives, mirrors, vermilion, awls, 
tobacco, flints, firesteels, brass wire, ribbon, thread, bells, beads, combs and 
needles.9 Operating out of their homes, the handlaers exchanged manufactured goods 
for furs with the Iroquois and western Indians who travelled to Albany to trade.
There were ample profits to be had in this trade, particularly when it involved 
dispensing rum to thirsty Indian customers. But, with the free flow of alcohol 
invariably came increased allegations of cheating and fraud. Albany’s merchants 
were routinely derided by their English-speaking neighbors, who characterized them 
as money-grubbing, unprincipled boors who would stop at nothing to separate Indian 
customers from their pelts. "It is hardly possible to keep ones Pen within the Bounds 
of Moderation, when these Vermin come in ones way," seethed Peter Wraxall, New 
York’s Secretary for Indian Affairs in the 1750s. "The People of Albany," he 
claimed, "are extremely Ignorant & Illiterate & so enslaved to the love of Money that
8 Armour, "Merchants of Albany," 51-52. For the importance of maintaining 
sound commercial relationships with London factors, see Norton, Fur Trade in 
Colonial New York, 118-20.
9 Annals o f Albany, 8: 212.
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they have no other Principle of Action."10 The Swedish naturalist, Peter Kalm, paid a 
brief visit to Albany while touring the colonies in 1749, during which he deduced that 
the character of the Dutch populace was tainted by their "vagabond" ancestry. Kalm 
deplored their alleged trickery and false-dealing, noting that "the merchants of Albany 
glory in these tricks, and are highly pleased when they have given a poor Indian a 
greater portion of brandy than he can bear, and when they can after that get all his 
goods for mere trifles." Since Kalm was hosted during his New York sojourn by 
Wraxall and his ilk, it was inevitable, perhaps, that the visitor was persuaded that 
"the avarice and selfishness of the inhabitants of Albany are very well known 
throughout all North America."n
Though the most rabid attacks on the Albany Dutch were characterized by 
ethnic slurs, the invective heaped upon them was primarily the byproduct of broader 
political antagonisms brewing within the colony. Without doubt, a certain amount of 
sharp dealing, perhaps even flagrant cheating, characterized the relationship between 
Albany traders and their Indian customers. The exaggerated allegations of critics 
such as Wraxall and Kalm should not be accepted uncritically, however, particularly 
since no Dutch rebuttals to such allegations have survived, if they were ever offered. 
What is apparent is that local Dutch merchants were content to conduct their business 
as usual, leaving others of a more imperial-minded bent to fret about the broader
10 AIA, 135n., 132n.
11 Peter Kalm, Travels Into North America, translated by John Reinhold Forster 
(Barre, Mass.: The Imprint Society, 1972), 332-34.
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diplomatic implications of the fur trade in challenging the French presence in the 
West.12
The French diplomatic and commercial hegemony over the western Great 
Lakes was indeed hampering the Albany fur trade by the end of the seventeenth 
century. The economic sluggishness of the 1680s was precipitated largely by the 
Canadians’ ability to intercept virtually all the best western furs before they reached 
the Iroquois middlemen who traditionally carried the peltry to Albany. The fur- 
bearing animal populations south of Lake Ontario were already depleted by the time 
the English arrived in Albany, and it was obvious to the more percipient colonial 
officials that unless English traders penetrated the western markets, and the western 
Indians were encouraged to deal through Iroquois middlemen or bring their peltry 
directly to Albany, the prospects for continued profits in the New York fur trade were 
bleak.13
One of the earliest proponents of expansion in the Great Lakes region was 
Governor Thomas Dongan, who drew criticism from supporters of a strict Albany 
monopoly in the mid-1680s by sponsoring a dual trade and diplomatic mission to the 
western tribes. The purpose of this expedition was as much to promote New York 
trade interests among the Indians as to send a clear signal to Quebec that the English 
were now prepared to intercede in what had previously been an uncontested sphere of
12 Norton, Fur Trade in Colonial New York, 7-8.
13 For an early expression of this position, see "Mr. Robert Livingston’s Report 
of his Journey to Onondaga (April 1700)," NYCD, 4: 648-52; Norton, Fur Trade in 
Colonial New York, 155-56.
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French influence. Dongan issued licenses to Jacob Lockerman and thirty others, who 
ultimately journeyed as far west as Michilimackinac. Based on the success of 
Lockerman’s expedition, which had been warmly received by Indians relieved to see a 
challenge to the French commercial monopoly, additional trading parties were 
dispatched the following year in hope of permanently extending the range of New 
York’s influence. By 1687, Governor Dongan was confidently considering the 
establishment of an English fort at Niagara, while encouraging the Iroquois to make 
peace with their former enemies, the Hurons, and other western tribes with access to 
ample fur resources. Despite the early success of Dongan’s imperial initiatives, the 
dream of extending New York’s trade into the interior was soon shattered. That same 
year, a trading party under the command of Major Patrick Macgregory was set upon 
by a party of French and Indians. Their valuable stock of trade merchandise was 
plundered and the men sent to labor in the construction of Fort Frontenac on the north 
shore of Lake Ontario. In the wake of the Macgregory debacle, no comparable trade 
missions would be attempted for the next twenty years.14
Despite the failure of these early efforts at gaining a foothold in the western 
fur trade, New Yorkers never forgot the critical importance of Indian alliances to the 
economic stability and military preparedness of the colony. The Commissioners of 
Indian Affairs, a body of influential Albany merchants reporting directly to the 
governor, met frequently with representatives of the Five Nations at Albany,
14 Armour, "Merchants of Albany," 11-21; Norton, Fur Trade in Colonial New 
York, 153-54.
70
discussing matters ranging from the cost of strouds to the necessity of curtailing 
French activities in the pays d ’en haut. As fur merchants themselves, the 
Commissioners may occasionally have turned a blind eye to the transgressions of their 
colleagues. But in their speeches at least, the agents of Indian affairs generally 
appeared willing to address the sources of Indian complaints.15
The expressed interest of the Commissioners in maintaining good relations 
with their Iroquois neighbors generally coincided with the expansionist program of the 
budding "imperialist" faction spearheaded by the powerful Scots merchant-proprietor, 
Robert Livingston, and subsequently promoted by governors Dongan, Hunter, and 
Burnet. These "imperialists" preached active intervention through commercial, 
military, and diplomatic channels, to eradicate the threat of French expansion in the 
western Great Lakes. From their perspective, the greatest obstacle to wiping out 
French influence in North America was the commerce of the traitorous, rapacious 
Albany handlaers, who neglected the greater interests of the Anglo-American colonies 
by brazenly trading with the Canadians in peace and war alike.16
15 AlA, passim.; Armour, "Merchants of Albany, 218-35; Norton, Fur Trade in 
Colonial New York, 73-82.
16 "As Trade with the Indians is the only Method of securing and extending an 
Influence over them," Wraxall reflected, "how pernicious this Trade from Albany to 
Canada must have been at this time when the French were laying the Foundation of 
that extensive Influence they have since obtained over the Indians . . . .  I say the 
pemiciousness of this Trade must have been no less obvious to those who helped it 
forwards at Albany than to every Body who in the least considered it. But those 
Albany men got money by it to which they would sacrifice every other 
consideration." AlA, 119n.
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As early as the 1670s, a number of Albany merchants had established regular 
business contacts with fellow traders in Montreal, supplying them with a narrow 
range of goods not easily available in New France in exchange for Canadian beaver.17 
With the two fur-trading towns a mere 220 miles apart by way of the Richelieu River- 
Lake Champlain route, the temptation to bypass the Compagnie des Indes and dispose 
of at least part of their fur stocks by sending them southward was irresistible to many 
Canadian merchants, Albany merchants could frequently offer higher prices for 
Canadian beaver than the monopoly company, and the New Yorkers-unlike the 
discriminating French agents—paid equally for all passable grades of peltry. 
Montrealers could also expect to be reimbursed by their Albany contacts in a matter 
of weeks, while they could rarely expect returns on their bills of exchange from the 
Company in under a year.18
The bulk of the furs smuggled to Albany was carried by parties of converted 
Mohawks, whose Jesuit-founded settlement at Caughnawaga lay on the south shore of
17 The most complete record of the Albany-Montreal trade is preserved in the 
Letterbook of Robert Sanders, 1752-1758, in the collection of the New-York 
Historical Society. The Montreal merchants were far too scrupulous to leave any 
record of their illicit activities, but Sanders’s letters to his Montreal correspondents 
offer a unique insight into the Anglo-French trade during the 1750s. Rarely 
addressing his contacts by name (he used coded symbols to identify each of them), 
Sanders arranged for the purchase of Canadian beaver, paying primarily in wampum, 
supplemented occasionally by small amounts of woolens. Norton also recognized the 
limited range of items traded between Montreal and Albany, noting that wampum and 
stroud cloth made up the bulk of northward-bound cargoes. Rum and gunpowder 
were rarely purchased by the Canadians. Norton, Fur Trade in Colonial New York, 
89-91, 126.
18 Jean Lunn, "The Illegal Fur Trade Out of New France, 1713-1760," Canadian 
Historical Association, Report o f the Annual Meeting, 18 (1939): 67-68.
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the St. Lawrence, just upriver from Montreal. Caughnawaga had a long tradition of 
smuggling. The most notorious of the contraband traders were the doughty 
Desaulnier sisters-Marie Magdelaine, Marie Anne, and Margu6rite~who facilitated 
much of the exchange of Canadian beaver for English goods through the Indian town 
between 1727 and 1752. Canadian officials perennially suspected the sisters of illicit 
dealings, noting that they grew noticeably wealthier each year without bringing a 
single beaver pelt to the Company’s offices. Despite this official scrutiny, however, 
the Desaulniers and others continued to reap healthy profits from their illegal dealings 
until the Conquest.19
The hazards involved in such smuggling operations were always substantial, 
and the Montreal merchants customarily bore all the risks and losses associated with 
the trade on both treacherous legs of the journey. Armed French patrols operating 
out of Fort Chambly and later the fort at Crown Point policed the Montreal-Albany 
route throughout the spring and summer months, seizing the contents of all suspicious 
southward-bound canoes. It was also essential for the Canadians to employ reliable 
Indian carriers, due to the potential for theft along the route. Intendant Hocquart 
estimated that traders could expect to lose upward of 10 percent of the value of their 
furs over the course of a season, whether through the pilfering of Indian paddlers or 
confiscations at the hands of the authorities. The advantages of commerce with 
Albany clearly must certainly have outweighed the risks, however, for each year 
dozens of canoes boldly set off from Caughnawaga for Albany, loaded with the
19 Lunn, "Illegal Fur Trade," 61, 73-75.
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coveted spoils of the pays d ’en haut.20
Though the Canada trade was not illegal in New York, the imperialists were 
infuriated that Albany merchants continued their trade with the French, even during 
the bitter hostilities of Queen Anne’s War. While no decisive action could be taken 
to restrict the trade while the conflict raged, support for strangling the Albany- 
Montreal commerce grew stronger after the Treaty of Utrecht. The simmering anti- 
Albany sentiment was fueled by two distinct sets of interests: those of the virulently 
anti-French imperialists and the jealous Schenectady merchant community. The 
imperial faction opposed any intercourse with the French during peace or wartime. 
Alleging that the French could not supply the Canadians with sufficient merchandise 
to support the Great Lakes trade, the imperialists concluded that the Albany merchants 
dealing with Montreal were, in effect, furnishing the Canadians with the means to 
maintain their stranglehold on the western trade. The only way New Yorkers could 
hope to rival the French in the Great Lakes was to disrupt the Canadian fur trade, and 
that could be accomplished only by stifling the flow of English goods to Montreal. 
Similarly, the merchants of Schenectady, on the Mohawk River sixteen miles 
northwest of Albany, were in a better position geographically to deal with the western 
tribes, but since the arrival of the English in 1664 had been barred from the trade.21 
Anticipating the potential collapse of Albany’s monopoly in the New York fur trade,
20 Lunn, "Illegal Fur Trade," 69-70, 62-63.
21 Thomas E. Burke, Mohawk Frontier: The Dutch Community o f  Schenectady, 
New York, 1661-1710 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 31-32.
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the Schenectady merchants were only too eager to throw their support behind the 
imperialist cause.22
During the tenure of Governor Robert Hunter, an ardent proponent of 
westward trade and expansion, the ambitions of the imperialists were wedded to the 
frustrations of the Schenectady merchants. The result of this pragmatic alliance was a 
powerful anti-Albany coalition which spared no invective in condemning the Dutch 
merchants for endangering the security of New York by their collusion with the 
French, not to mention their alleged mistreatment of Indian trading partners.23 When 
his tenure as governor ended and he returned to England in 1719, Hunter immediately 
lobbied the Board of Trade for the immediate restriction of the Canada trade. The 
greatest achievement of the early anti-Albany campaign was Hunter’s success in 
having William Burnet, his ideological alter-ego, named as his successor. Long 
before Burnet sailed for the colony, he had been convinced by the former governor
22 The most forceful expression of the argument that the Canadian trade was 
insupportable without supplies from Albany was offered by Cadwallader Colden.
See, for example, "Report of a Committee of the Council held at New-York, 
November 6, 1724," and "A Memorial concerning the Furr-Trade of the Province of 
New York," HFIN, 2: 21, 44. For Schenectady resentment of the Albany monopoly, 
see Norton, Fur Trade in Colonial New York, 145; Armour, "Merchants of Albany," 
137, 161; Burke, Mohawk Frontier, passim.
23 Wraxall peppered his Abridgment with editorial condemnations of the Albany 
Dutch, alleging that they ignored the diplomatic repercussions of the trade in lieu of 
self-enrichment. "I suppose Pouder was sold by the Bag and the Albany People 
according to their general and usual Principle of Action had cheated the Indians and 
made their Bags less," he surmised. "It was by such Mean and dishonest Methods 
that they became Odious and Contemptible to the Indians, lost their Esteem and 
Confidence, and that great improvement of their Trade with the Western and farr 
Indians wch might have fallen into their hands and by that means secured those Indians 
to our Interest." AlA , 61n.
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that it was imperative that he terminate the Albany-Montreal commerce, a cause upon 
which he would remain fixated throughout his controversial administration. Shortly 
after his arrival in New York in 1720, Burnet launched a whirlwind campaign to 
persuade the assembly to outlaw the Canada trade. By the end of the year he had 
succeeded in convincing the legislators to accede to an act banning New Yorkers from 
selling what were deemed "Indian goods" to Canadians. Even those in possession of 
trade merchandise north of the town would be considered guilty of trading with the 
French. Albany's sheriff was given the authority to search all property and 
conveyances north of the town limits, and those convicted of participating in the 
forbidden trade were subject to a steep fine of £100. Their merchandise was also 
liable to seizure, to be handed over-along with half the fine-to any informer aiding 
in their apprehension.24
Albany was in no danger of becoming a second city of brotherly love in the 
wake of the 1720 act. Though the merchants involved in the Canada trade voiced no 
public opposition to the new measures, neither did they go out of their way to obey 
them. Within a year, in fact, it was obvious to all concerned that the act was a
24 Norton, Fur Trade in Colonial New York, 135-38. The fine of £100 New York 
currency would be equivalent to nearly $7,000 U.S. in 1995. Calculation based on 
John J. McCusker, How Much Is That in Real Money? A Historical Price Index for  
Use as a Deflator o f Money Values in the Economy o f the United States (Worcester: 
American Antiquarian Society, 1992), and Money and Exchange in Europe and 
America, 1600-1775; A  Handbook (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1978).
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failure.25 Unwilling to sit idly by while his cherished law was flagrantly ignored, 
Burnet once again turned to the New York assembly for support. In 1722, he 
rammed through a new, harsher law that allowed Albany officials to administer an 
oath to suspected smugglers. Accused lawbreakers who refused to take the oath were 
automatically declared guilty and slapped with the £100 fine. Though the Act of 1722 
admittedly made business more difficult for the Albanians still deeply involved in the 
Canada trade, it was still not enough to deter them from buying Canadian furs. A 
few of the most hardened traders simply absorbed the steep fines as part of their 
operating expenses, while others risked a potentially greater penalty by perjuring 
themselves before frustrated officials.26
After several years of official persecution and harassment, the typically 
apolitical Albany merchants were finally driven to take action in opposition to the 
restrictive acts, asking their London contacts to petition the Board of Trade on their 
behalf. In July, 1724, twenty London merchants, including some of the most 
powerful and influential players in the English fur trade-Samuel Baker and Samuel 
Storke among them--drafted a memorandum to the Board of Trade, laying out their 
rationale for the repeal of the New York acts. With the bulk of the furs arriving on 
London docks coming from Canada via Albany, the British fur merchants undeniably
25 Norton, Fur Trade in Colonial New York, 138-40.
26 Norton, Fur Trade in Colonial New York, 141-42. "The Penalty of £ 100 -- 
upon being convicted of sending Strouds to Canada did not deter some," Wraxall 
remarked, "who paid it and yet found it a profitable Trade. Others swore themselves 
off, much to the astonishment of the Commiss” . . . .  They seem to suspect some of 
Perjury and I am of their Opinion." AlA, 159n.
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had a vested interest in the decriminalization of the Canada trade. The London 
petitioners nonetheless mustered a convincing geopolitical argument against Burnet’s 
laws. Cutting to the heart of the matter, the merchants attacked what they grasped to 
be the fallacious premise upon which the restrictive legislation was based: that the 
Canadians could maintain their economic and diplomatic ties with the western Indians 
only because they were supplied with the necessary trade merchandise by Albany 
merchants. This was simply not the case, they asserted, pointing to the fact that the 
Compagnie des Indes had only recently stepped up imports of imported English stroud 
cloth, as well as equivalent French woollens, to meet the demand generated by the 
severance of the Albany trade. Furthermore, they claimed, it was dangerously 
irresponsible to cut off the supply of Canadian furs without adequately ensuring for 
continued exports by expanding trade contacts. Finally, and most bitterly, the 
merchants lamented the contraction of fur imports, which had the deleterious effect of 
raising prices on the London market and upsetting the delicate balance of colonial 
trade.27
Whatever effect this petition may have had on a Board of Trade traditionally 
sympathetic to mercantile interests, it was soon counteracted by a rival memorandum 
drafted by Cadwallader Colden on the instructions of Governor Burnet. After 
scoffing at the embarrassing unfamiliarity of the London merchants with North 
American geography, Colden merely reiterated the imperialists’ a priori assumption 
that, without English goods from Albany, the French could not sustain their presence
27 HFIN, 2: 1-5.
78
in the Great Lakes region. Burnet’s trade acts were already working to New York’s 
advantage, he claimed. If the Albany traders could be permanently prevented from 
supplying their Montreal correspondents, it would only be a matter of time before the 
Canadian regime in the Great Lakes capitulated, leaving New York free to reap ample 
profits.28
Realizing that the unfamiliarity of their London representatives with the minor 
details of the colonial fur trade was weakening their cause, the Albany merchants sent 
a delegation to deal directly with the Board of Trade, which appeared increasingly 
sympathetic to the imperialist position. In 1725, the Board finally held hearings to 
address the issue. Though the Lords of Trade agreed with the Colden-Bumet 
contention that the volume of trade between New York and Britain had not been 
significantly affected by the prohibition of the Canada trade, they concluded that the 
oath-taking provisions of the 1722 act were grounds enough for disallowing Burnet’s 
legislation. Colonial policy should be directed at actively encouraging western trade, 
the Board suggested, rather than merely stifling the commerce with Canada.29
Though the Privy Council never acted on the recommendations of the Board of 
Trade, a politically beleaguered Burnet soon began to re-think his position on the 
Canada issue. Even staunch imperialists such as Robert Livingston’s son, Philip, 
were beginning to appreciate that the trade restrictions were penalizing only those 
who obeyed the law, while others who flouted the authorities continued to profit from
28 HFIN, 13-32.
29 Norton, Fur Trade in Colonial New York, 143-44.
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Canadian beaver. Some worried that, in the absence of Albany merchandise, the 
French would be encouraged to supply comparable merchandise thus precluding any 
opportunity for New York to gain a foothold in the western trade. With support for 
his restrictive regulations dwindling, Burnet was forced to employ more subtle means 
when he once more attempted to resolve the thorny problem of the Canada trade in 
1726. The resulting act imposed duties on all fur-trade merchandise, but the rate on 
goods carried north of Albany was twice that on those destined for the western trade. 
Strouds, for example, were taxed at either 15 or 30 shillings per piece, depending on 
their destination. Similarly, traders paid an additional duty of 1 or 2 shillings per 
gallon on rum.30
Burnet’s final legislative effort aimed at stamping out the Canada trade met 
with little more success than its antecedents. The tax farmers who had contracted to 
collect the duties quickly antagonized and alienated the Albany merchant community 
by their overzealous collection of the duties. By this time, both sides were exhausted 
by years of wrangling, and when Burnet was finally transferred to Massachusetts, it 
became clear that the Albany merchants were on the brink of victory. The new 
governor, John Montgomerie, did not share his predecessor’s obsession with 
eradicating the Canada trade, and, in 1729, the Board of Trade recommended that all
30 A "piece" of stroud generally measured 24 yards long, though strouds 
purchased by Croghan in Philadelphia varied in length, with some as short as 22 
yards. Norton, Fur Trade in Colonial New York, 146; George Croghan Section, 
Cadwallader Collection, Historical Society of Pennsylvania. On duties, see Norton, 
Ibid. , 109, 146, 170; Johnson Gaylord Cooper, "Oswego in the French-English 
Struggle in North America, 1720-1760," (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department 
of History, Syracuse University, 1961), 76.
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Burnet’s trade legislation be disallowed. This time the Privy Council agreed. New 
York’s brief attempt to strangle Canada by its purse strings sputtered* io an end.31
Yet, not all of Burnet’s legislative efforts were brushed aside by a British 
government weary of the relentless internecine bickering in New York. The most 
significant and enduring success of the governor’s imperialist program was the 
establishment of the fortified trading post of Oswego, at the mouth of the Onondaga 
(later the Oswego) River, on the southeastern shore of Lake Ontario. From its 
establishment in 1727 until the end of the French regime, Oswego was the only 
English post on the Great Lakes and thus played a critical role in the Anglo-French 
rivalry for control of the region’s Indian trade. Despite the criticism of his political 
opponents, Burnet had always recognized that the severance of commercial ties 
between Albany and Montreal would not benefit the colony unless trade with the 
western tribes was simultaneously encouraged. Plans for a trading post at the Oswego 
site had been proposed as early as 1700, but not until the end of Queen Anne’s War 
did New York officials seriously consider the project. In the end, it was their fear 
that the French would soon establish a foothold on the southern shore of Lake Ontario 
that spurred colonial administrators to implement the long-awaited plans for imperial 
action.32
After a New York expedition thwarted a French attempt to construct a 
blockhouse at Onondaga in 1710, Governor Hunter responded by encouraging trade
31 Norton, Fur Trade in Colonial New York, 147-48.
32 Cooper, "Oswego," 1-5; Norton, Fur Trade in Colonial New York, 152.
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and diplomatic missions to the Senecas, the westernmost of the Five Nations, in order 
to woo them away from the French and to encourage them to renew their trading 
alliances with the "Far Indians" of the western Great Lakes. When the French 
completed a stone trading post at Niagara in 1720, it became clear to New York 
imperialists that the colony would lose all possiblity of competing in the western 
trade unless they took immediate and decisive action to challenge the French.
Already suffering from the prohibition of the Canadian trade, the Albany merchants 
opposed the program of western expansion. Fearing that a post on the Great Lakes 
would discourage the Iroquois and other western Indians from coming to trade at 
Albany, they were also suspicious of any belligerent action that might antagonize the 
French and jeopardize their longstanding commercial ties with Montreal. Initially, the 
Albany merchants would support only the idea of a military, not a commercial, post 
on Lake Ontario, but they finally acquiesced in a permanent English trading presence 
on the Great Lakes as their forty-year-old monopoly crumbled around them.33
Governor Burnet issued licenses to young traders and encouraged them to head 
west into Onondaga and Seneca country to trade in 1724, while he met with the 
Iroquois sachems later that year to gain their approval for a post at Oswego. The 
governor spent £150 on improvements to the waterway between Schenectady and 
Oswego and built a road on the major overland portion of the route, between the
33 Norton, Fur Trade in Colonial New York, 162-63. The Albany monopoly was 
finally overturned by the Supreme Court of New York in 1727 after nearly a decade 
of legal challenges by neighboring Schenectady traders. Armour, "Merchants of 
Albany," 137, 161; Norton, Ibid., 57-59.
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Mohawk River and Wood Creek, to facilitate the movement of trade goods and furs 
between Albany and Lake Ontario. By 1725, Burnet was convinced that his 
encouragement of the western trade was already vindicated in the fur export ledgers 
and set to work convincing the New York Assembly to vote the necessary funds for 
construction of a trading post at Oswego. The Assembly was far from unanimous, 
however, on the need for building a post and maintaining a garrison on Lake Ontario 
at public expense. The Albany merchants were never enthusiastic about supporting a 
trade that would inevitably rival their commerce with Canada, and the representatives 
from the southern counties, who had little to fear from the French, were even less 
convinced of the need to fund New York’s imperial pretensions on the distant 
northern frontier. Nevertheless, Burnet’s strident lobbying convinced the Assembly to 
vote £300 for the construction of Fort Oswego. Though this sum was not nearly 
sufficient to cover all the building costs-which ultimately ran to almost £1700--the 
governor lent his personal funds to assure that his brainchild saw completion. Fort 
Oswego was completed in August 1727. Built of masonry and clay, the main 
structure was a rectangular building, 60 feet long and 28 feet high, with a sloping 
roof and galleries with loopholes projecting on all sides. The entrance to the fort 
faced east onto the river, and with four foot-thick stone walls it could only be taken- 
its architects boasted--by a siege party with cannon.34
New York trade goods faced a tortuous journey of more than 160 miles from 
Albany storehouses to the shores of Lake Ontario. The merchandise was first loaded
34 Norton, Fur Trade in Colonial New York, 162-66; Cooper, "Oswego," 38-40.
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on carts, and hauled overland sixteen miles from Albany to Schenectady. Here the 
bales of goods were stowed on wooden bateaux capable of carrying four to five tons 
of cargo and crewed by three or four men. Proceeding up the Mohawk River against 
the current, the bateau-men alternately used poles and ropes to propel their craft 
through a series of rifts and rapids until they reached Little Falls, just over 50 miles 
from Schenectady. At the falls, the goods were removed from the boats and heaped 
on wagons for carriage around the rapids. The bateaux were then carefully reloaded 
and the crews continued until the river turned northward. Here they faced the longest 
portage, at what was known as the "Great Carrying Place." The bateau-men 
customarily contracted with local Palatine German settlers to haul the goods and boats 
the mile and a half over a small ridge to Wood Creek. After re-launching their craft 
for a third time, the passage became increasingly difficult, with numerous obstructions 
in the narrow creek. Though Oneida Lake was only ten miles away, the meanderings 
of Wood Creek made the actual distance traveled closer to thirty miles. Once they 
reached Oneida Lake, the bateaux had easy sailing, but stayed close to the shore to 
avoid capsizing in sudden squalls. The Oswego River flowed out of the western end 
of the lake and into Lake Ontario, so the final run down to the fort was swift, with 
only one remaining obstacle, the Oswego falls, to overcome. At the fall line, the 
merchandise was once again laboriously unloaded, carried to the base of the rapids, 
then reloaded before the final twelve-mile stretch to Fort Oswego.35
35 Francois de Marbois, "Mdmoire sur le commerce des fourrures et pelleteries 
avec les nations sauvages par la rivfere du nord dans 1’dtat de New York," American 
Historical Review, 29:4 (1924): 731-40; Philip Schuyler, Goldsbrow Banyar, and
84
Before the construction of a canal and lock system in the nineteenth century, 
the journey between Schenectady and Lake Ontario was lengthy and hazardous. The 
waterways were frequently blocked by fallen trees and brush and some became almost 
impassibly shallow during the dry summer months. There was continual danger of 
grounding on sand bars and hidden rifts, not to mention the arduous task of loading 
and reloading the bateaux countless times to bypass the series of rapids and waterfalls 
along the route. In the journal of their 1770 expedition to Toronto, New York traders 
Ferrall Wade and C. Keiuser reported that it took them nearly two weeks to reach 
Oswego from Schenectady by bateaux.36 The upshot of these transportation woes was 
a corresponding increase in the expense of shipping goods from the Albany area to 
the lakeside post, and costs were only compounded by the threat of Indian harassment 
and looting along the major portage route between the Mohawk River and Wood 
Creek. In the summer of 1755, Sir William Johnson, the newly appointed 
Superintendent of Indian Affairs, arranged to send an assortment of Indian gifts to 
Oswego. The cargo included stroud cloth, blankets, duffels, gunpowder, lead and 
shot, hose, caps, knives, tankards, tea pots, basins, porringers, brass wire, kettles,
Elkanah Watson, "The Report of a Committee Appointed to Explore the Western 
Waters in the State of New-York for the Purpose of Prosecuting the Inland Lock 
Navigation," in Documentary History of the State ofNew-York, edited by E. B. 
O’Callaghan (Albany: Weed, Parsons & Co., 1850), 3: 1087-1103; Robert E. Hager, 
Mohawk River Boats and Navigation Before 1820 (Syracuse: Canal Society of New 
York State, 1987); Milton W. Hamilton, Sir William Johnson: Colonial American, 
1715-1763 (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press/National University Publications, 
1976), 20-21; Cooper, "Oswego," 77.
36 "Journal of Wade and Keiuser’s Trading Expedition from Fonda to Toronto" 
[May 13-June 10, 1770], WJP, 7: 723-730.
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and frying pans, together worth about £295 New York currency. Wages for the 
bateau-men on the trip between Mount Johnson in the Mohawk valley and Oswego 
amounted to £10, with another £9.10s. for the hire of the bateau and the purchase of 
the necessary tools and provisions. Based on Johnson’s expenses it is reasonable to 
assume that the cost of shipping goods to Oswego generally fell in the range of 6 to 7 
percent of the value of the merchandise for each leg of the trip. Considering the 
additional cost of overland carriage between Albany and Schenectady, merchant 
expenditure for transportation might easily have reached 15 percent for a round-trip 
trading expedition.37
The English trade on Lake Ontario developed rapidly, diverting furs from the 
French at Niagara. By mid-century, in fact, it is likely that the Oswego trade was 
producing as much peltry as the Albany commerce with Canada.38 Each spring, 
Albany and Schenectady merchants sent assortments of trade goods to their factors at 
Oswego, but since no comprehensive trading records survive to detail the nature of 
transactions between Oswego traders and Indian customers, it is difficult to draw any 
certain conclusions about the rate of mark-up charged by New Yorkers on Lake 
Ontario. The Iroquois constantly complained to the Commissioners of Indian Affairs 
that they were not getting "good pennysworth" at the post and that the Oswego traders 
"do cheat them very much in the Sale of Rum instead of which they sell them their
37 "Johnson’s Account of Indian Expenses, 27 July 1755," WJP, 1: 586-88.
38 Norton, Fur Trade in Colonial New York, 172.
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own Water wch in a Day or two stinks & is noisome."39 Wraxall could barely restrain 
himself when recording the diplomatic strains exacerbated by such disreputable 
dealings. "The Indians hold the Traders in great Contempt as a Set of Mean Dishonest 
Mercenary Fellows & wch Characters they have drawn from Dear Experience," he 
charged. Peter Kalm similarly remarked that he himself had been witness to various 
shady dealings on the banks of the Oswego.40
Apart from whatever cheating and gouging may have occurred at the post, the 
normal rate of markup on goods sold by Oswego traders was likely in excess of 100 
percent over the cost of the merchandise in Albany and Schenectady, factoring in the 
expense of transportation. At the end of the Seven Years’ War, Johnson determined 
that a 100 percent gross profit was acceptable for trade at the posts of the Great Lakes 
and Ohio Valley now under his aegis. The few remaining records of goods purchased 
by Johnson at Oswego for Indian gifts suggest that this figure is reliable as an 
average, with certain items such as rum and tobacco absorbing much higher rates of 
markup (Figure 2 .1).41 The temptation for Oswego traders to shortchange their Indian 
customers was supposed to be held in check, at least in theory, by the post 
commissary appointed by the governor on the recommendation of the Commissioners 
of Indian Affairs. But, as Wraxall cynically noted, the commissary himself would
39 A1A, 166,
40 Kalm, Travels Into North America, 331-32.
41 "A Scheme for Meeting Expenses of Trade," WJP, 4: 556-563; Norton, Fur 
Trade in Colonial New York, 113. Markups in excess o f 300 percent for rum and 
tobacco were not unusual. WJP, passim.
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often bring a large quantity of goods to Oswego, despite the prohibition barring the 
post superintendent from trade. Implying that the the post superintendent routinely 
paid kick-backs to the Commissioners of Indian Affairs from the profits made in 
illegal trading, Wraxall suggested that "neither their Reports or Behaviour is to be 
depended on."42
The New York Assembly, on the other hand, was far more concerned with 
how they were going to pay the commissary’s salary and provide for the maintenance 
of a military garrison at Oswego than with allegations that the traders were watering 
rum or jacking up prices to outrageous levels. The legislature wrestled continually 
with the problem of supporting the new post at Oswego and its twenty-man garrison. 
The Board of Trade, always wary of hampering commerce and irritating the London 
fur merchants, recommended that Oswego’s costs be borne by a general revenue 
rather than a direct tax on trade. Many assemblymen disagreed, charging that it was 
the responsibility of the British government to provide for the colony’s defense. An 
early effort to raise revenue through a 2 percent import duty was disallowed by the 
Crown, so the Assembly responded by levying a direct tax on the Oswego trade.43
As one of his first acts in office in 1729, Governor Montgomerie attempted to 
bypass the legislative gridlock by appointing one private supplier to provision the 
garrison at an annually contracted rate, yet it was still unclear who was ultimately 
responsible for maintaining the post in a defensible state. The Assembly was divided
42 AIA, 188.
43 Cooper, "Oswego," 62-66.
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into three opposing factions on this issue: those with an interest in the western trade 
suggested that Oswego be supported by a general land tax spread over the entire 
colony; Albany merchants, who still had substantial interests in Canadian beaver, 
proposed that the problem could be solved by a direct tax on the Oswego trade; a 
third group of assemblymen, drawn primarily from the "lower counties," remained 
unconvinced that New York should be meddling with imperial affairs and balked at 
any levies for the dubious purpose of challenging the French in the West. With the 
failure of a short-lived, if imaginative, tax on wig-wearers in 1731, Montgomerie 
admitted that a direct tariff on the western trade was the only workable solution to the 
problem of support. From this point, all Oswego traders were required to purchase a 
license, the revenue from which was to applied to the post’s operating expenses. A 
direct tax on certain trade goods was also imposed, including 10 shillings on each 
piece of stroud cloth, and 1 shilling on every gallon of rum.44
Despite the efforts of the governor, assembly, and British authorities to agree 
on an efficient and equitable means of maintaining the post at Oswego, the 
commissary and traders constantly complained of a shortage of funds for the upkeep 
of the fort. In fact, the irregularly-paid and poorly-equipped garrison troops were 
perennially on the verge of mutiny. Oswego was unquestionably effective in offering 
at least some direct commercial competition to the Canadian fur trade, though it is 
likely that had the French decided to attack the fort before 1756-when it Finally fell 
to Montcalm’s assault—they would have found the fortifications crumbling and its
44 Norton, Fur Trade in Colonial New York, 109, 170; Cooper, "Oswego," 76.
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miserable defenders only too willing to wend their way home.45
In the wake of the debate over how the western trade was to be conducted and 
the sweeping disallowance of Burnet’s restrictive trade laws, the Albany merchants 
settled back into their comfortable old business with Montreal. Yet, ironically, the 
victory of the Dutch merchantss rang hollow, for it signalled the beginning of the end 
of the Albany-Montreal trade. By the 1730s, the French were stepping up their 
patrols along the Lake Champlain route and enjoying increasing success in stemming 
the northward flow of contraband. As well, many of the great New York shippers 
were losing interest in the fur trade, turning instead to the more lucrative business of 
supplying provisions to the sugar plantations of the West Indies.4* Now 
supplemented by the flow of western furs through Oswego, the value of New York’s 
fur exports to London remained constant until the beginning of the Seven Years’ War, 
though the relative value of furs and skins as a proportion of the colony’s total 
exports began to drop during the 1740s and 1750s.47 The "golden age" of New 
York’s fur trade was rapidly drawing to a close.
Though New York’s Indian trade was in eclipse by the 1740s, the fortunes of 
the more aggressive Pennsylvanians were manifestly on the ascendant (Figure 2.2). 
Though it has habitually been referred to as a fitr trade, the commercial relations
45 Cooper, "Oswego," 77-88; Norton, Fur Trade in Colonial New York, 173.
46 Norton, Fur Trade in Colonial New York, 171.
47 Cutcliffe, "Colonial Indian Policy," Tables 1 and 2, 240-44.
between Pennsylvania traders and Indians in the eighteenth century came to be 
characterized primarily by the exchange of European goods for deerskins, not peltry/8 
Perpetually in pursuit of a quick "buck," enterprising Pennsylvania traders supplied 
the raw material for a thriving transatlantic leather industry. Long before fashionable 
English gentlemen developed a taste for them, deerskin breeches were worn by 
artisans and laborers as daily working attire. The English leather trade, centered in 
London and Westminster, craved North American deerskin, and in these bustling 
manufactories the quarry of the skilled Indian hunters of the southern Great Lakes and 
Ohio Valley was transformed into fine gloves, jackets, vests, breeches, shoes, and 
boots. Patterns of Indian hunting and the demands of the European market happened 
to coincide neatly in the context of the deerskin trade. Fall was the prime season for 
deer hunting, when bucks were fatter and easier to take in their less cautious rutting 
period. The Anglo-American deerskin market also favored autumn, because the 
deer’s winter "blue" coat tends to be thicker than the summer "red” coat, making it 
easier to strip the unwanted hair from the valuable hide. The greater part of the 
deerskins amassed through the Indian trade was ultimately exported to England and 
Europe, but a certain amount remained in the colony, where it was consumed by the
48 Much of the historiographical confusion clouding this issue, James McClure 
argues, can be attributed both to the paucity of data on the scale of the Ohio Valley 
deerskin trade, as well as the problem of nomenclature. In the eighteenth century, he 
notes, "peltry" referred to any animal skins with fur still attached, while today the 
term is generally taken to be a synonym for "fur." McClure suggests that "skins" 
would be a more accurate eighteenth-century synonym for "peltry." James P. 
McClure, "The Ohio Valley’s Deerskin Trade: Topics for Consideration," The Old 
Northwest, 15:3 (1990): 115-16.
91
renowned leatherworkers of Philadelphia, Germantown, and Lancaster to supply the 
intercolonial market.49
Though the value of Pennsylvania’s deerskin exports did not even begin to 
rival that of New York’s beaver and peltry until the 1730s, the mid-Atlantic region 
already had a long history of Indian-European trade by the eighteenth century.50 
Before the first Quaker set foot in Pennsylvania, the game animals of the Delaware 
Valley had already been severely overhunted by the Susquehannocks in pursuing their 
trade with the Swedes and the Dutch.51 From the outset, William Penn believed that 
the Indian trade would be essential to the economic stability of the new colony, but he 
initially found it difficult to establish commercial contacts with the Indian nations of 
the area, who were already in alliance with the governments of either Maryland or 
New York. The Susquehanna Valley, nominally under the authority of the Iroquois, 
appeared the most promising arena for trade, but through the final years of the 
seventeenth century, New York successfully managed to restrain the Iroquois from 
slipping southward to deal with the upstart Pennsylvanians.52
49 McClure, "Deerskin Trade," 118-22.
50 Cutcliffe, "Colonial Indian Policy," Tables 1 and 2, 240-44.
51 Francis Jennings, "The Indian Trade of the Susquehanna Valley," Proceedings 
o f the American Philosophical Society, 110:6 (1966): 406-424.
52 Penn craved access to the Susquehanna Valley not only to establish a 
Pennsylvania fur trade, but also to extend settlement. His plans were initially 
frustrated by New York’s Governor Dongan, who feared that the Pennsylvanians 
would upset the profitable New York trade relationship with the Iroquois. Dongan 
finally ceded the Susquehanna region to Penn in 1697. Gary B. Nash, "The Quest for 
the Susquehanna Valley: New York, Pennsylvania, and the Seventeenth-Century Fur 
Trade," New York History, 48:1 (1967):
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The early Pennsylvania trade was boosted, in an ironic twist, by the efforts of 
a  handful of renegade Canadian coureurs de bois. Peter Bizaillon, Martin Chartier, 
and Jacques Le Tort had abandoned the French in the 1680s and put down roots in 
the Susquehanna Valley, supporting themselves through trade with bands of Shawnees 
who had themselves recently settled in the area. Recognizing the value of the 
relationships that these Canadian traders had already established with the Indian 
hunters of the Susquehanna Valley, James Logan, Penn’s powerful secretary and 
political agent, stabilized the colony’s lucrative Indian trade by safeguarding the 
French traders against potential competitors. Never negligent of his own interests, 
the prescient Logan used his considerable political influence-the fact that he was 
Pennsylvania’s Commissioner of Property notwithstanding-to purchase 8,000 acres of 
land in the Susquehanna Valley. When Penn was incapacitated by illness in 1712, 
Logan assumed virtually unchallenged authority over the colony’s affairs. He was 
now poised to become the single most powerful Indian trader in Pennsylvania.53
At the height of his protracted reign as importer, merchant, and speculator, 
Logan boasted that he could double his investment within two or three trading 
seasons. Each year he imported a vast quantity of merchandise for the Indian trade, 
which he then sold on credit to more modest traders. The skins he collected in 
payment were sent to his agents in England, who sold them on the London market. It 
has been estimated that Logan earned a profit of roughly 80 percent on each shipment
3-27.
53 Jennings, "Susquehanna Valley," 409-14.
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of deerskins, but the most lucrative aspect of his business involved the sale of 
merchandise to his trader clients, which he marked up by 150 percent, on average.54
As Logan singlehandedly propelled Pennsylvania full force into the lucrative 
deerskin trade, the effect of his commercial and territorial aggrandizement on the 
native population of the Susquehanna Valley was less than benign. Under Logan’s de 
facto monopoly the deerskin trade became synonymous with the relentless expansion 
of Anglo-American settlement. Logan plowed the profits from the trade into land 
speculation, driving westward the Indians who had helped him to amass his new 
fortune. Francis Jennings has gone so far as to accuse Logan of deliberately enticing 
various Indian bands to the Susquehanna Valley to trade, only to later thrust them out 
as it became more lucrative to sell their land to prospective settlers. Whatever 
Logan’s motives, the Tumerian march of farmers in the wake of traders had the 
unfortunate effect of eroding the Indians’ agricultural communities and encouraging 
them to overhunt the region’s game populations.55
Despite the steady influx of English-speaking settlers into the region, the 
Susquehanna Valley remained the locus of the Pennsylvania deerskin trade well into 
the eighteenth century. It was not until the 1730s that traders began to venture 
beyond the Alleghenies into the rich hunting territory of the Ohio Valley. The lands 
west of the Ohio River had, since the Treaty of Utrecht, been considered an 
exclusively French domain. But as the Delawares and Shawnees began their
54 Jennings, "Susquehanna Valley," 415-16.
55 Jennings, "Susquehanna Valley," 420.
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westward retreat in the face of Anglo-American expansion, the Pennsylvania traders 
remained hot on their heels. It has been estimated that before 1755, some 300 
Pennsylvania traders were operating in the Ohio Valley.56
Perhaps the most distinguishing characteristic of the Pennsylvania deerskin 
trade was the relative freedom of the individual traders, who could count on little 
intervention or support from distant Philadelphia and generally preferred it that way. 
As early as 1719, Pennsylvania’s governor, William Keith, recognized that the 
conduct of the trade was intrinsically linked to the success of Indian-colonial relations 
and thus ultimately to the Anglo-French struggle for the continent. A close friend and 
supporter of New York’s imperial-minded Governor Hunter, Keith submitted a report 
to the Board of Trade outlining his proposals for restructuring the deerskin trade to 
serve an imperial purpose. Keith suggested that the commerce be closely monitored 
to prevent the cheating of Indian customers; demonstrated the necessity of the 
westward expansion of the trade and the construction of a series of fortified posts; 
endorsed the creation of formal alliances with the Indian nations of the region; and 
solicited the extension of crown control over all aspects of the trade. Yet, as they 
had with Burnet’s efforts to draw the New York fur trade into the orbit of imperial 
policy, the Privy Council ultimately shied away from involving the crown in matters
56 Albright G. Zimmerman, "The Indian Trade of Colonial Pennsylvania," 
(Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of History, University of Delaware, 
1966), 372; Yoko Shirai, "The Indian Trade in Colonial Pennsylvania, 1730-1768: 
Traders and Land Speculation," (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of 
History, University of Pennsylvania, 1985), 7.
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it deemed best handled by local policy or private enterprise.57
Though Keith’s prescient proposals were not initially adopted, the colony did 
see the introduction in 1722 of a licensing system formulated to regulate the 
Pennsylvania Indian trade, if only indirectly. The trading licenses were not easy to 
obtain and were clearly intended to exclude all but those with the right connections 
and easy access to ample resources of capital or credit. A prospective trader was 
required to apply for an endorsement from a county court, pay a £100 bond, and 
name bondsmen before the license was finally granted by the governor himself on the 
court’s recommendation. The number of men who qualified for these licenses was 
deliberately limited, but this did not prevent others from participating in the 
potentially lucrative business. The officially licensed traders were joined by myriad 
others, with varying legal standing, in an elaborate arrangement which is still not 
entirely understood. In addition to the licensed traders were those who were officially 
registered as "unlicensed." Unlicensed traders were not considered illegal 
participants, but rather tended to be the employees of licensed traders or merchants. 
Because the permits were renewed annually, those who did not return regularly to the 
East lapsed into unlicensed status. Finally, a third group of traders were not 
registered at all. These men often operated as independent agents, or were hired on 
by licensed traders. A handful may have even been leading traders themselves or 
acted in partnership with registered traders. It has been suggested that these 
unlicensed, unregistered individuals had no official legal status but were permitted to
57 Cutcliffe, "Colonial Indian Policy," 250-51.
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engage in trade with the Indians as long as they were somehow associated with 
established traders.58
Despite the Pennsylvania government’s genuine, if bewildering, attempt to 
regulate the behavior of its Indian traders, the "free and open trade" originally 
championed by Logan in the Susquehanna Valley remained the touchstone of the Ohio 
Valley entrepreneurs throughout the eighteenth century. Far removed from the 
seaboard settlements, both geographically and temperamentally, the predominantly 
Irish and Scots-Irish traders were a hardy, independent lot, who contended with the 
constant threat of depredations by hostile French and Indian competitors with no hope 
of red-coated protection. Still, the allure of the deerskin trade was powerful enough 
to overshadow the considerable risks involved. The deerskin market was booming in 
the 1720s and early 1730s, just as the Pennsylvania traders made their way into the 
prime hunting lands of the Ohio Valley. Deerskin prices rose steadily through the 
1720s, reaching 20 pence per pound in 1725. Prices held through the end of the 
decade, peaking at 2 shillings in 1732. After a drop in the mid-1730s, when a pound 
of deerskin brought only 12 pence, the price leveled off at 20 pence by 1740, and 
remained roughly at this level through the 1750s.59
The romantic image of gaily singing voyageurs hurtling past rapids in 
birchbark canoes was far from the reality of the Pennsylvania deerskin traders, who 
led their heavily-laden pack trains through the rugged terrain of the Alleghenies into
58 Shirai, "Indian Trade in Colonial Pennsylvania," 7-8.
59 Zimmerman, "Indian Trade of Colonial Pennsylvania," 375.
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the heart of the Ohio country. Nevertheless, Pennsylvania traders were thick on the 
ground in the upper Ohio Valley by the early 1730s, as they concentrated their efforts 
on the Delaware and Shawnee villages of Kittanning, Kiskiminetas, Chartier’s Town, 
Shannopin’s Town, and Verango along the Allegheny River. By the 1740s, a few 
Pennsylvanians had ventured as far north as the shores of Lake Erie. Covering 
perhaps thirty miles a day in the best of conditions, it could take weeks to travel the 
300 or more miles from Philadelphia to the trading hubs of Logstown and 
Shannopin’s Town, near the present site of Pittsburgh, where the Allegheny and 
Monongahela flow into the Ohio River.60
One of the most flamboyant and influential, if not the most solvent, of 
Pennsylvania’s Ohio Valley traders was the legendary George Croghan. Croghan’s 
commercial ventures in the final decades of Anglo-French rivalry not only mirrored 
the course of Anglo-American western expansion, but in many respects shaped and 
guided it. Fleeing famine in his native Ireland in 1741, the young Croghan arrived in 
Philadelphia eager for opportunity. The best prospects for fortune-making in 1740s 
Pennsylvania clearly lay in the booming Indian trade. Croghan wasted no time in 
associating himself with Peter Tostee, one of the principal traders in the Indian 
country. Supplied with trade merchandise by the influential merchant-importer,
60 Zimmerman, "Indian Trade of Colonial Pennsylvania," 314-15; Shirai, "Indian 
Trade in Colonial Pennsylvania," 35-36. On an average day, a trader might cover 30 
miles by pack horse but often less. They might travel twice that distance by canoe 
when water travel was possible. Nicholas B. Wainwright, George Croghan: 
Wilderness Diplomat (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1959), 20-21.
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Edward Shippen, Croghan began his career by exchanging his wares for the deerskins 
of Shawnee, Mingo, and Twightwee hunters of the Ohio Valley and the Wyandots and 
Ottawas of the Lake Erie country.61
Within two years of his arrival in the colony, Croghan was confident enough 
in his prospects to purchase a tract of land in Lancaster. By 1744 he was in business 
for himself as a licensed Indian trader. That same year, he brought a shipment of 
goods to a Seneca village near the mouth of the Cuyahoga River on Lake Erie, 
surprising the French at Detroit by this bold incursion into what had previously been 
their unchallenged sphere of trade and influence. Canadian voyageurs operating out 
of Detroit had been drifting eastward into this area for some time and, getting wind of 
Croghan’s presence, Detroit’s post commander, Cdleron de Blainville, immediately 
dispatched a party of Ottawas to expel him from the town. The Indians were either 
distracted or had second thoughts about doing the dirty work of the French, and 
Croghan was spared the intended assault. The village on the Cuyahoga thus became 
the center of Croghan’s early trading operations, while he also sent goods down the 
Ohio and encouraged the Indians around Detroit to enter into the Anglo-American 
trade network. In 1745 another hostile party of French and Indians attempted to oust 
Croghan from the region, but he had already won the support of his Seneca neighbors 
and they refused to hand him over to the French. After narrowly escaping this last 
encounter with his scalp, he learned that Peter Tostee had also been accosted by a 
band of Shawnees friendly to the French and had lost a large number of deerskins,
61 Wainwright, George Croghan, 3-5.
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along with some beaver and raccoon pelts belonging to Croghan. This was the first 
of many losses that Croghan would suffer to the French and their Indian allies and 
which would ultimately lead him to the brink of financial ruin.62
This reversal of fortune did not deter the resolute Croghan. Later in 1745 he 
struck a partnership with William Trent, scion of a monied Philadelphia family and 
former Shippen clerk. The two bought a sizable piece of property on Conegogwinet 
Creek, near Harrisburg, from which they conducted their joint trading operation. 
Though their association soon lapsed when Trent joined the Pennsylvania contingent 
of a colonial force planning to attack Canada in 1746, Croghan continued to broaden 
his trading network in the Ohio country. His successful relations with the Senecas in 
time yielded more than merely financial gain; in 1746, he was appointed to the 
Onondaga Council, the governing body of the Iroquois nation.63
By 1747, Croghan was once again living and trading at the mouth of the 
Cuyahoga. Self-professed diplomat as well as trader, he took ample advantage of the 
temporary shortage of French trade merchandise in the pays d ’en haut, precipitated by 
the wartime interruption of their transatlantic shipping, to stir up Seneca resentment 
against the French presence at Detroit. Between the Cuyahoga River and Detroit lay 
Sandusky, site of a sizeable Indian settlement where Orontony or "Nicholas" had 
brought a splinter group of Huron-Petuns beyond the range of French influence. 
Orontony was only too eager to deal with the rival English and allowed Croghan the
62 Wainwright, George Croghan, 6-8.
63 Wainwright, George Croghan, 9-13.
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freedom to trade in his village.6*
Word of Croghan’s activities at Sandusky filtered back to the authorities at 
Detroit, who immediately recognized the danger of American traders provoking anti- 
French sentiment among the region’s Indian groups. Events on Lake Erie came to a 
head in the spring of 1747, when five French traders were seized and killed at 
Sandusky by the Wyandots with the conspicuous aid of some Senecas from Croghan’s 
village. The Sandusky Wyandots and the neighboring Miamis subsequently launched 
an uprising aimed at driving the French from the region. The revolt miscarried and 
Orontony led his followers to Kuskuskies on the Mahoning River, while the 
Twightwees settled at Pickawillany, on a branch of the Great Miami River.65 With 
his Indian customers rapidly dispersing, and a French bounty on his scalp, Croghan 
found it expedient to shift his operations to the south and to concentrate on trading 
with the Miamis at "Pick’s Town."66
64 The Huron-Petun group that migrated to Sandusky adopted the distinguishing 
name of "Wyandots," an earlier synonym of "Hurons" which had since fallen out of 
use. For the reasons underlying this resettlement, see Richard White, The Middle 
Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815 (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 193-96.
65 White, Middle Ground, 198-99.
66 In the journal of his 1752 expedition to the west, William Trent estimated the 
distance from Logstown—near Pittsburgh~to Pickawillany at 326 miles along the 
"Main Path." With an additional 300 miles from Philadelphia to Pittsburgh at a rate 
of thirty miles per day, it would take a pack train loaded with trade goods at least 
three weeks to make the arduous trek to the most distant posts of the Ohio country. 
William Trent, Journal o f Captain 'William Trent from Logstown to Pickawillany,
A.D. 1752, edited by Alfred T. Goodman (New York: Amo Press, 1971), 84n. See 
also Christopher Gist’s journal in The Wilderness Trail, or The Ventures and 
Adventures o f the Pennsylvania Traders on the Allegheny Path, edited by Charles A.
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In the wake of the failed 1747 uprising, the Pennsylvania government came to 
appreciate Croghan’s potential as an official mediator between the colony and the 
various Indian tribes of the Ohio Valley. At Croghan’s suggestion, the Pennsylvania 
legislature voted a present of £400 worth of merchandise for the Indians the next year 
and entrusted the Irishman with its delivery and distribution. Thus began Croghan’s 
long and distinguished career as diplomat. Respected by the Indians and the colonial 
authorities alike, Croghan had by this time become the most powerful and influential 
trader in the Ohio country. Though other prominent traders, including John Fraser, 
James Young, Robert Callender, Michael Teaff, and Thomas McKee, claimed their 
fair share of the deerskin market, Croghan was the unchallenged master of the 
Pennsylvania Indian trade, with perhaps a  third of the 300 traders and employees in 
the region connected to him in some way.67
Unfortunately, the success of Croghan’s far-flung trading ventures did not 
keep pace with his diplomatic accomplishments. Having gradually stretched his Ohio 
Valley operations too thin, Croghan found himself on the verge of financial ruin by 
1751. Plunged into debt and facing a downturn in the London deerskin market, 
Croghan’s waning trading empire was finally toppled when a force of Ottawas and 
Chippewas in alliance with the French attacked Pickawillany in June 1752. This 
assault, in which a trader was killed and several others were captured, marked the
Hanna (New York, 1911), 2: 278-79; Wainwright, George Croghan, 20-21.
67 Wainwright, George Croghan, 16-21; Shirai, "Indian Trade in Colonial 
Pennsylvania," 38.
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launch of a concerted French-Indian effort to drive the American traders from the 
Ohio Valley. The attackers seized vast amounts of merchandise and skins belonging 
to the Pennsylvanians and drove the fortunate survivors eastward in rout. The next 
year brought an abrupt end to the Anglo-American deerskin trade in the Ohio Valley, 
as Duquesne’s forces pushed eastward, reclaiming the Ohio country for the French. 
The western trade had ended virtually overnight in a paroxysm of bankruptcy and 
fear.68
During its brief span, the Pennsylvania trade offered a tantalizing promise of 
profits to all involved, from the largest merchant-importers in Philadelphia to the 
meanest unlicensed trader in the trans-Allegheny country. The wealthy Philadelphia 
merchants who supplied the deerskin trade, including Edward Shippen, Thomas 
Lawrence, Jeremiah Warder, Nathan Levy, and David Franks, could expect to earn 
gross profits of at least 100 percent on the sale of trade goods.69 It is more difficult, 
considering the paucity of records, to come to any certain conclusions regarding the 
rates at which Pennsylvania traders on Lake Erie and in the Ohio country exchanged 
their wares for deerskins. Taking into account the post-war trading regulations 
established by Sir William Johnson for the Ohio posts, it is likely that individual 
traders marked up goods by at least 100 percent, after deducting the costs of
68 For the grisly details of the attack on Pickawillany, culminating in the cooking
and consumption of the Miami leader, La Demoiselle, see White, Middle Groundf 
230-31.
69 Zimmerman, "Indian Trade of Colonial Pennsylvania," 102.
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transportation.70
Shipping goods as far as 600 miles inland, much of the way by packhorse, was 
a time-consuming and expensive proposition. Unlike their Canadian rivals, the 
Pennsylvanians had to travel almost exclusively by land to reach the Ohio country 
because the major eastern rivers (Delaware and Susquehanna) were unsafe for 
navigation and there was no water passage through the Allegheny mountains. Even if 
reliable riverine routes had been available, canoe birch was not native to the region 
and so the traders would have had to rely on unwieldy dugouts-difficult to maneuver 
and even harder to portage--to ship their goods west. This did not mean that the 
Pennsylvania traders were forced to hack their way through impenetrable forests, 
however, because a vast network of Indian paths already crisscrossed the province. 
These paths certainly made the westward trek easier for the traders, but overland 
travel posed its own unique difficulties. Slowed by flooded trails, swollen and 
dangerous river fords, swamps, and windfall timber blocking the paths, the packhorse 
trains had difficulty enough in the warmer months and winter conditions usually 
brought travel to a standstill.71
Considering the hazardous and lengthy nature of the westward trip, the cost of 
transporting trade goods to the Ohio Valley could easily mount to 30 percent of the
70 See note 41 above.
71 Paul A. W. Wallace, Indian Paths o f Pennsylvania (Harrisburg: The 
Pennsyvlania Historical and Museum Commission, 1965), 2-10. Wallace offers 
detailed information on dozens of Pennsylvania’s colonial Indian paths, including 
those most frequently used by the deerskin traders. See, for example, "Allegheny 
Path," 19-21; and "Frankstown Path," 49-54.
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value of the merchandise each way (Figure 2 .1).72 Losses to Indian and French 
raiding parties were an everpresent and potentially ruinous risk of the trade and by the 
1750s had reached crippling levels. In 1754, with petitions for restitution still 
pouring in to Philadelphia, it was estimated that the traders had lost goods and skins 
valued at more than £48,000 to the French and their Indian allies. Croghan alone 
suffered damages in the amount of £8,000, and as much as £16,000--a third of all 
Pennsylvania losses combined—when his many shares with trading partners were 
finally accounted for.73
Though focused on different geographic regions and commodities, the Indian 
trades of New York and Pennsylvania followed remarkably similar trajectories 
through the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Both pre-dated English 
settlement and formed the basis of the early local economy. In the 1680s, William 
Penn and Thomas Dongan simultaneously grasped the intrinsic relationship between 
trade and diplomatic relations with the powerful Indian nations neighboring each 
colony. Both sought the westward expansion of the trade: to Dongan it represented a 
desire to secure New York’s competitiveness with the French; for Penn it promised a
72 Wainwright notes that traders customarily charged 30 percent of the value of 
the goods to carry shipments of Indian gifts to the Indians of the Ohio Valley on 
behalf of the Pennsylvania government. Wainwright, George Croghan, 39. A 
number of invoices in Croghan’s accounts corroborate this claim. Croghan Section, 
Cadwallader Collection, Historical Society of Pennsylvania.
73 Shirai, "Indian Trade in Colonial Pennsylvania," 62. The total value of the 
Pennsylvania traders’ losses would have exceeded $2.5 million U.S. in 1995. See 
McCusker, How Much Is That in Real Money?, and Money and Exchange in Europe 
and America, 1600-1775: A Handbook.
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firmer economic footing for the new proprietary colony and a precursor to settlement. 
By the early decades of the eighteenth century, administrators in both maturing 
colonies attempted-albeit unsuccessfully-to harness the trade in furs and skins to 
broader imperial and diplomatic concerns. In New York, William Burnet’s lengthy 
campaign to stifle the Albany-Montreal commerce and to establish and maintain Fort 
Oswego on Lake Ontario was deliberately contrived to upset French hegemony in the 
Great Lakes trade, Burnet’s contemporary and admirer, William Keith, similarly 
sought the support of the British government in formulating a coherent imperial policy 
which sought to suborn the colony’s burgeoning deerskin trade to the cause of 
Pennsylvania’s Indian relations.74
But, as Stephen Cutcliffe has noted, shortsighted imperial administrators 
proved stubbornly reluctant to harness private enterprise to imperial ends. Not until 
the 1750s, on the eve of war with the French, did they finally fathom the need for a 
unified Indian policy to replace the ramshackle, ineffectual structure of separate 
colonial Indian treaties.75 By this time, the fur and skin trade of the northern colonies 
was in decline, Pennsylvania's cut brutally short by French and Indian aggression in 
the Ohio Valley, while New York merchants increasingly pursued more profitable 
markets and commodities. After decades of a scarcely salutary neglect, the British 
had finally grasped the link between trade and diplomacy in time to watch the French 
dismantle their once vast and vigorous North American enterprise and descend the
74 Cutcliffe, "Colonial Indian Policy," 250-53.
75 Cutcliffe, "Colonial Indian Policy,” 264-66.
imperial stage.
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FIGURE 2.1
ESTIMATED MARK-UP ON TRADE MERCHANDISE, OSWEGO AND OHIO
VALLEY (£ STERLING)
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Source: Cutcliffe, "Colonial Indian Policy," Table 1, 240-42.
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FIGURE 2.2
VALUE OF LONDON IMPORTS OF NEW YORK AND PENNSYLVANIA
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CHAPTER III
THE ECONOMICS OF RIVALRY
But as our Indian traders not only have a double Price for their Indian goods, 
but likewise buy the Goods they sell to the Indians, at half the Price the 
French Indian Traders do, the French traders must be ruin’d by carrying on 
this Trade, in Competition with the English of New-York,
Cadwallader Colden, 10 November 17241
Pray let me know if there be a possibility of Sending me a parcel of french 
Blankets, Kersey whale & lettered, such as they Send to Canada for the use of 
the Indians, also purple & white ratteen for Stocking Stuff; all wh. they have 
better than ours -- & also French Guns.
William Johnson, 22 August 17522
By most accounts, the Canadian fur trade should have been a dim memory 
long before Montcalm and Wolfe clashed on the Plains of Abraham. Throughout the 
eighteenth century, it has been widely assumed, Anglo-American traders effortlessly 
supplied their Indian customers with merchandise that was significantly cheaper and of 
better quality than the overpriced, shoddy articles offered by their Canadian
1 Cadwallader Colden, "A Memorial concerning the Furr-Trade of the Province of 
New-York," HFIN, 2:55-56.
2 William Johnson to John George Libenrood, WJP, 1: 376-77.
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counterparts.3 No wonder, for Britain’s burgeoning industrial and manufacturing 
complex had already eclipsed that of France.4 The Indian hunters and traders of the
3 E. R. Adair, "Anglo-French Rivalry in the Fur Trade during the 18th 
Century," Culture, 8 (1947): 434-55, reprinted in Canadian History Before 
Confederation: Essays and Interpretation, edited by J. M. Bumsted (Georgetown, 
Ontario: Irwin-Dorsey, 1972), 153, 154, 155; David Arthur Armour, "The 
Merchants o f Albany, New York, 1686-1760," (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Department o f History, Northwestern University, 1965), 64-65; Bruce Alden Cox, 
"Natives and the Development of Mercantile Capitalism: A New Look at Opposition 
in the Eighteenth-Century Fur Trade," in The Political Economy o f  North American 
Indians, edited by John H. Moore (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993),
88; Louise DechSne, Habitants and Merchants in Seventeenth-Century Montreal 
(Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1992), 88; Harold Adams 
Innis, The Fur Trade in Canada: An Introduction to Canadian Economic History 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930), 79, 80, 84, 85, 86, 87, 114, 395;
Francis Jennings, The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire: The Covenant Chain 
Confederation o f  Indian Tribes with English Colonies from its beginnings to the 
Lancaster Treat o f1744 (New York, W. W. Norton & Co., 1984), 284; Jean Lunn, 
"The Illegal Fur Trade Out of New France, 1713-60," Canadian Historical 
Association, Report o f the Annual Meeting, 18 (1939): 76; A. Jean E. Lunn, 
"Economic Development in New France, 1713-1760," (Unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Department of History, McGill University, 1942), 154, 157; Charles 
Howard Mcllwain, AIA, xli-xlii; Thomas Elliot Norton, The Fur Trade in Colonial 
New York, 1686-1776 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1974), 6, 90-91; 
Francis Parkman, "A Half-Century of Conflict," France and England in North 
America (New York: Library of America, 1983), 2: 346, 520; Paul Chrisler Phillips, 
The Fur Trade (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1961), 1: 314, 498, 501; 
Yoko Shirai, "The Indian Trade in Colonial Pennsylvania, 1730-1768: Traders and 
Land Speculation," (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of History, 
University of Pennsylvania, 1985), 3; Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, 
Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815 (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1991), 119, 120-21, 125, 127; Thomas Wien, "Selling 
Beaver Skins in North America and Europe, 1720-1760: The Uses of Fur-Trade 
Imperialism," Journal o f  the Canadian Historical Association (1990), 1: 296-97; 
Albright G. Zimmerman, "The Indian Trade of Colonial Pennsylvania," (Unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, Department of History, University of Delaware, 1966), 316.
4 Armour, "Merchants of Albany," 64-65, 107; Hugh M. Grant, "One Step 
Forward, Two Steps Back: Innis, Eccles, and the Canadian Fur Trade," Canadian 
Historical Review, 62:3 (1981): 309-10, 316; Innis, Fur Trade in Canada, 79, 80,
85 , 389-90, 395; Innis, introduction to Murray G. Lawson, Fur— A Study in English
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pays d ’en haut-m th  an eye for an obvious bargain-inevitably preferred English 
merchandise, which was better suited to their "simple economy and taste."5 In fact, 
had the Canadians not imported or smuggled vast amounts of English trade goods 
from Great Britain or New York, they could not have sustained their vast trading 
empire in the interior of the continent.6 The critical supply lines linking the French 
ports of La Rochelle, Rouen, and Bordeaux with the tiny colonial entrepdt at Quebec 
were severed at the whim of the Royal Navy. Dire consequences for the Canadian 
economy would ensue, including acute shortages of essential trading wares and 
crippling price inflation.7 Though a French merchantman might complete the Atlantic 
crossing unscathed, its cargo faced a long and costly trek into the North American 
wilderness before reaching the hands of Indian consumers.8 During periods of the 
most benign economic conditions, Montreal merchant-outfitters were still saddled with 
exorbitant official fees and levies, appropriated to support the colony’s unwieldy
Mercantilism, 1700-1775, University of Toronto Studies, History and Economics 
Series, Vol. 9 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1943), xx; Lunn, "Economic 
Development," 174; Norton, Fur Trade in Colonial New York, 90-91.
5 Lawrence Henry Gipson, The British Empire Before the American Revolution 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1936), 4: 63.
6 Armour, "Merchants of Albany," 107; Lunn, "Illegal Fur Trade," 76;
Mcllwain, AIA, xliin.; Norton, Fur Trade in Colonial New York, 90-91, 121, 126.
7 Adair, "Anglo-French Rivalry," 159.
8 Adair, "Anglo-French Rivalry," 149, 156, 158-59; Grant, "One Step Forward," 
317; Mcllwain, AIA, xxxv, xliin.; Norton, Fur Trade in Colonial New York, 90-91; 
Phillips, The Fur Trade, 1: 501; Wien, "Selling Beaver Skins," 296.
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military establishment.9 The arbitrary oversight of the monopoly Compagnie des 
Indes, moreover, prevented the chronically overtaxed and undercapitalized Canadian 
traders from offering as much in exchange for the furs and skins of their Indian 
partners as their irrepressibly independent Anglo-American rivals.10
Confronted with this litany of alleged disadvantages, it is incredible that 
Canadian merchants and traders did not simply throw up their hands, pack their 
valises, and catch the next ship sailing for France. Of course, they knew then what is 
apparent now only by peeling away the accumulated layers of half-truths, rhetoric, 
and misinformation obscuring the authentic nature of the Anglo-French contest for 
trade and empire in the Great Lakes and Ohio Valley: that the scenario outlined 
above, founded as it is upon an a priori assumption of Anglo-American superiority in 
virtually every aspect of the trade, is an exaggeration dangling on the brink of 
untruth.
As the lone voice raised in defense of the fundamental fact of Canadian 
competitiveness in the eighteenth-century fur trade, W. J. Eccles has long labored to 
deflate this myth of overwhelming American advantage and to depreciate the 
Anglocentric currency of conviction which has corrupted the analysis of fur-trade
9 Mcllwain, AIA, xliin.; Reuben Gold Thwaites, France in America (New York: 
Haskell House, 1969), 136; Wien, "Selling Beaver Skins," 296; Zimmerman, 
"Indian Trade of Colonial Pennsylvania," 316.
10 Adair, "Anglo-French Rivalry," 149, 150; Innis, Fur Trade in Canada, 84, 
114; Lunn, "Illegal Fur Trade," 67-68; Lunn, "Economic Development," 171; 
Mcllwain, AIA, xlii; Norton, Fur Trade in Colonial New York, 91, 125-26; White, 
Middle Ground, 120.
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rivalry. By challenging the assumption that Canadian traders were at a profound 
commercial disadvantage wherever they were met by Anglo-American competitors, 
Eccles boldly inverted the historiographical equation. With France the industrial and 
manufacturing equal of Britain throughout the first half of the eighteenth century, he 
proposed, it is likely that most French-made items were not only of better quality but 
were often cheaper as well. The Indian groups of the Great Lakes and Ohio Valley 
consistently chose to deal with the Canadians and preferred a variety of French wares, 
from the more mundane stocks of gunpowder, hardware, and tailored clothing to the 
sublime eau de vie. If they did occasionally trade with the Anglo-American upstarts 
in the pays d ’en haut, he claims, it was only to keep that option open and to ensure 
that the French were careful to maintain their competitive edge. Canadians conquered 
long trade-route distances by adopting the most efficient vehicle of wilderness 
transport, the birchbark canoe. It is inconceivable, Eccles concludes, that the 
Canadians could have captured the bulk of the furs and skins of the Great Lakes-Ohio 
Valley regions, as the export records clearly demonstrate, without beating the Anglo- 
Americans at their own economic game.11
"In treating of the fur trade down to 1763," Eccles wrote of the landmark Fur
11 Eccles first argued the revisionist case in his article, "A Belated Review of 
Harold Adams Innis’s, The Fur Trade in Canada," Canadian Historical Review, 60:4 
(1979): 419-441. A reply in defense of Innis was offered by Hugh M. Grant in,
"One Step Forward," which was in turn scathingly rebutted by Eccles in the same 
issue: "A Response to Hugh M. Grant on Innis," 323-329. For later restatements of 
Eccles’s pro-Canadian position, see "The Fur Trade and Eighteenth-Century 
Imperialism," William & Mary Quarterly, 3rd. Series, 40:3 (1983): 341-62, and 
France in America (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1990), llOn.
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Trade in Canada, "Innis had a simple, albeit erroneous, theme that gave the work 
some sort of cohesion -- namely, the superiority of British industry, organization, 
trade goods, and routes to the interior, which not only made it impossible for the 
French to compete successfully but also made the conquest of New France 
inevitable."12 Yet, as misguided and influential as his conclusions may have been, 
Innis was by no means the sole author of the myth of Anglo-American superiority in 
the eighteenth-century fur trade. The scholarship which carelessly acknowledges the 
inability of Canadian traders to compete with their English-speaking rivals is more 
prolific than Eccles’s focus on Innis might suggest. These works share an incestuous 
reliance on a narrowly circumscribed body of evidence which leads inexorably to the 
same illegitimate conclusions. A threadbare handful of statements are proffered with 
an unsettling regularity as evidence that the Canadians could not effectively compete 
with their Anglo-American rivals, neither in the quality or price of trade goods nor in 
the value offered in exchange for peltry. The few examples include a 1689 French 
list of a handful of items and their price in beaver skins at Albany and Montreal; 
occasional memoranda concerning the price of beaver set by the Compagnie des hides 
and requests for improvements in the quality of merchandise; pessimistic accounts of 
shortages and high prices at the height of the War of the Austrian Succession; and, 
most significantly, the reports on the Canadian trade drafted by Cadwallader Colden 
in aid of New York governor, William Burnet’s obsessive effort to stamp out
12 Eccles, "A Belated Review," 438.
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Albany’s customary commerce with Montreal.13
More disconcerting than the fact that such sweeping generalizations concerning 
Anglo-American advantage have been offered on the basis of a mere smattering of 
contemporary statements is the wholly uncritical manner in which they have been 
wrenched out of context and offered as conclusive evidence. Neither the occasional 
Canadian complaints of uncompetitive fur prices and costly merchandise nor Colden’s 
intimations that the Albany Dutch buttressed an otherwise insupportable French 
empire in North America should be accepted without a healthy measure of skepticism. 
For a variety of economic and political reasons, it suited the best interests of certain 
Canadian and New York factions to perpetuate the notion that the French were on the 
brink of losing the battle for the Great Lakes—and later the Ohio Valley-fur trade.
This potent blend of exaggeration and misinformation, though perversely appropriate 
to its particular political and economic context, has unfortunately been captured and 
preserved in the amber of historiography.
Thomas Wien has proposed that the merchants of Quebec and Montreal, in 
league with the colonial officials who represented their interests to the Crown, 
cynically sought to convince the French Ministry of Marine that they were being
13 For example, see: NYCD, 9: 408; Pontchartrain to Denis Riverin, 3 June 
1708, in Supplement to Dr. Brymner's Report on Canadian Archives, 1899, edited by 
Edouard Richard (Ottawa, 1901), 414; La Galissioni&re et Bigot au ministre, AN, 
C"A, 91: 67-71; Beauhamois k ministre, 19 June 1745, AN, C11/!, 83: 92-93; 
Cadwallader Colden, "The Report of a Committee of the Council held at New-York, 
November 6, 1724," and "A Memorial concerning the Furr-Trade," in HF1N, 2: 13- 
57.
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battered by ruthless Anglo-American competition.14 Such complaints consistently 
stressed the calamities that would result from the inability of Canadian fur traders to 
match the beaver prices of their English rivals. Despite their apparent interest in the 
success of French diplomacy in the pays d'en haut, Wien claims that the Canadian 
merchants were never more than "lukewarm imperialists," though they were 
admittedly quick studies in geo-political rhetoric when it promised to fill their 
pocketbooks. The profit motive, not concern with Indian relations or grand strategy, 
most concerned the Canadians, whose fortunes largely depended on the buying and 
selling of beaver pelts in a highly regulated market. Canadian sellers daily faced the 
reality that they exerted little control over the price the monopoly company paid for 
their staple export commodity. It was clearly in the interest of the monopolists to 
keep beaver prices low in Canada, not only out of a concern for their own profit 
margin, but also because the powerful Parisian hat-making interest demanded 
comparatively inexpensive supplies of pelts. The only recourse available to 
disgruntled Canadian merchants, therefore, was to petition the French government to 
intervene in the company’s pricing policy. The question that faced colonial merchants 
was how to convince reluctant imperial officials that such action was necessary.15
Finding no appreciable correlation between fluctuations in the beaver prices set 
by the Compagnie des hides and fur export levels, Wien suspects the Canadian
14 Eccles similarly raised this possibility in "A Belated Review," 425, and France 
in America, 110n.
15 Wien, "Selling Beaver Skins," 296-312.
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merchants of exaggerating the threat of Anglo-American competition for their own 
commercial advantage. If, as the merchants insisted, the amount of beaver flowing 
into Canada from the pays d ’en haut was truly dependent on its assessed value in 
Montreal or Quebec, then fluctuations in price should have been attended by 
noticeable peaks or shortfalls in Canadian beaver exports. Clearly, they were not, 
though this did nothing to prevent colonial merchants and their officials from claiming 
the contrary. The most effective way to seize the sympathetic attention of the 
ministry of marine, they grasped, was to phrase their pleas in the terms which 
anxious imperial administrators best understood. "The Canadians were most 
successful in attracting official attention," Wien notes, "when they could associate 
their demands with some grave threat to the French empire in North America. The 
possibility of Indians defecting to the enemy, a notion that had exercised French 
officials since the seventeenth century, fit the bill nicely." If the Canadians could 
draw a convincing connection between their inability to offer Indian customers "good 
measure" for their beaver and the rapid infiltration of Anglo-American traders into 
French zones of trade and influence, it was more likely that the government would 
apply pressure on the company to pay more for Canadian peltry. Indeed, such 
carefully conceived appeals bore fruit twice in the 1730s and 1740s, when beaver 
prices were raised.16
Each year, the Compagnie des Indes imported a limited range of merchandise 
for the Indian trade as a supplement to the bills of exchange paid for Canadian
16 Wien, "Selling Beaver Skins," 314.
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beaver. Quebec importers and Montreal merchant-outfitters were by necessity 
discriminating consumers themselves, realizing that successful trade relations with 
exacting Indian customer-suppliers hinged on the availability of high quality, 
dependable, and reasonably priced merchandise. It is not surprising, then, that 
Canadians were quick to point out when certain items did not meet their expectations. 
Such complaints about the quality or price of certain articles imported by the company 
have frequently been wielded to support the assumption that French trade goods were 
inferior to those arriving in American ports. For example, E. R. Adair produced a 
letter written by Governor La Galissonni&re and Intendant Bigot to the Minister of 
Marine in October 1748, citing it as evidence that the substandard quality and high 
price of French trade goods comprised a "potent disadvantage." In Adair’s telling, 
the officials straightforwardly acknowledged that "the English have the better of us in 
the quality of merchandise in two important articles. The first is kettles, the second is 
cloth."17 To begin with, this translation is misleading. What Galissonfere and Bigot 
actually wrote is more accurately rendered as "the English do not have the better of 
us in the quality of trade merchandise except in two important articles."18 The shift in 
emphasis is apparently slight, yet it distorts the meaning of the letter. Far from 
admitting defeat at the hands of better-equipped English traders, the governor and
17 Adair, "Anglo-French Rivalry," 154. In typical reflexive fashion, Adair lifted 
this citation from Innis, Fur Trade in Canada, 85-86.
18 The original French version reads: "les anglois ne l'Emportens sur nous en 
quality de marchandises de traitte que sur deux articles considerables." AN, ^ A ,  91: 
67.
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intendant believed that, except for two specific items, French goods were comparable 
or superior. Besides, the few discrepancies that did exist, they insisted, could easily 
be remedied in the next year’s shipment.19
The perennial complaints of Canadian officials concerning the poor quality or 
high price of certain trade items imported by the monopoly company should not be 
construed as an admission of a crippling disadvantage in the fur trade. The 
Compagnie des Indes was never the sole supplier of French manufactures to colonial 
merchants, but rather conducted only a "caricature1' of the trade. Problems with 
individual company shipments would thus only have had a limited effect on Canadian 
commerce.20 If anything, the fact that officials complained so frequently about 
specific shoddy or overpriced goods demonstrates that immediate measures were taken 
to rectify any disadvantage that might jeopardize the competitiveness of Canadian 
traders. This stream of commentary on the undesirability of trade goods was equally 
characteristic of the frank letters exchanged between Anglo-American merchants and 
their London agents.21 William Johnson never hesitated to demand better or cheaper 
goods from his trading contacts, often forwarding French merchandise worthy of
19 Ironically, only two years later, William Johnson complained to his London 
contacts about the cost and quality of a recent shipment of kettles. "I have recd. from 
Mr. Cromelin of Amsterdam 712 11. of Kettles," he lamented, "the Dearest, & worst 
made up of any ever come to these parts." William Johnson to Samuel and William 
Baker, 12 September 1751. WJP, 1: 347.
20 The company dealt almost exclusively in gunpowder, shot, and strouds. Wien, 
"Selling Beaver Skins," 299.
21 The correspondence of factors at Hudson’s Bay Company posts was similarly 
rife with complaints about the quality of English merchandise, from textiles to 
gunpowder. Eccles, "A Belated Review," 430-31.
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imitation.22 Nor was Johnson the only dissatisfied New York customer. "The 2 
pieces of red Stripped Duffils which you sent me Last Fall are Not Worth 40/ a 
Piece," griped Albany trader Cornelius Cuyler to his supplier. "I believe they are 
made of Dogs hair." Of course, no historian has yet claimed that New York traders 
were doomed to fail in their contention for the Indian trade simply because the 
occasional shipment from London consisted of "Course Refuse," or "old musty 
Strouds good for nothing."23
The assumption that Canadians were handicapped by poor quality, overpriced 
goods springs largely, as Eccles has noted, from an anachronistic assessment of 
French industrial and economic capacity in the first half of the eighteenth century.24 
In his peculiarly teleological style, Innis claimed that the entire history of the North 
American fur trade "depended on the manufactures of Europe and the more efficient 
manufactures and cheaper transportation of England. Control of the fur trade was an 
index of world importance from the standpoint of efficient manufactures, control of 
markets, and consumption of luxuries. The shift from Paris to London of the fur 
trade was significant of the industrial growth of France and England. "2S Though it is
22 William Johnson sent samples of French blankets and other textiles to his 
English agents so that suitable imitations might be provided. William Johnson to 
William Baker, 24 December 1752. WJP, 1: 384-85. See also William Johnson to 
Governor George Clinton, 30 May 1747. WJP, 1: 95, on the necessity of supplying 
the Indians with the same goods as the French.
23 Cornelius Cuyler to Samuel Baker, 10 June 1731 and 20 May 1732, as quoted 
in Norton, Fur Trade in Colonial New York, 112.
24 Eccles, "A Belated Review," 430.
25 Innis, Fur Trade in Canada, 389-90.
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tempting to read Great Britain’s revolutionary industrial achievements back into the 
earlier half of the eighteenth century, during the period of the most intense Anglo- 
French rivalry for the North American fur trade, the French economy was still 
growing as rapidly as the English, showing remarkable gains in manufacturing and 
trade. Until mid-century, English and French industry alike remained essentially 
"medieval" in character. Growth was characterized by an increasing concentration of 
workers rather than by great strides in technological efficiency. Though certain 
sectors of the British economy may have begun to outpace their French counterparts 
as the century progressed, it is evident that the British did not achieve the industrial 
prowess necessary to trounce their trading rivals with substantially cheaper, or better 
made, manufactures until long after the French had relinquished their North American 
empire.26
If the Canadians had a tangible economic interest in convincing their 
government that better equipped and more efficient English-speaking traders were 
poised to overrun the pays d ’en haut and hasten the collapse of their North American 
empire, then the parallel assertions of New York imperialists were the product of 
even murkier, byzantine political calculations. The most comprehensive and
26 James C. Riley, The Seven Years’ War and the Old Regime in France: The 
Economic and Financial Toll (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 18, 22-
23, 35; Pierre Ldon, "Structure du commerce extdrieur et dvolution industrielle de la 
France k la fin du XVIII6 sidcle," in Conjunctures iconomiques, structures sociales: 
Hommage it Ernest Labrousse, edited by Fernand Braudel (Paris: Mouton, 1974),
407; Roger Price, The Economic Modernisation o f France, 1730-1880 (London: 
Croom Helm, 1975), 92-93; Fernand Braudel and Ernest Labrousse (eds.), Histoire 
economique et sociale de la France (Paris: Presses universitaires de france, 1970), 2: 
527.
influential Anglo-American statement on the myriad handicaps endured by the 
Canadian fur traders came from the pen of Cadwallader Colden. As a respected 
member of the New York Council and a trusted advisor of the new governor, William 
Burnet, Colden was handed the task of drafting a memorandum to the Board of Trade 
in response to a recent petition organized by a group of London merchants calling for 
the reinstatement of the banned Albany-Montreal trade. Tensions were high in New 
York in November 1724, when Colden began work on his draft of the Council report. 
Four years after the official suspension of the Canada trade, a core of Albany 
merchants were still ignoring Burnet’s interdiction and stubbornly buying Canadian 
beaver, even though they risked being hauled into court and forced to swear an oath 
to their innocence. Panicked London fur merchants, meanwhile, were vigorously 
lobbying an ambivalent Board of Trade for disallowance of the controversial acts.
Colden had to present a convincing case to persuade the Board of Trade to 
uphold Burnet’s ban on the longstanding and lucrative trade between Albany and 
Montreal. Ironically, he did so by framing his argument to the imperial authorities in 
the same terms so effectively employed by his counterparts at Quebec. By linking the 
conduct of the fur trade with the future economic and military stability of the colony, 
Colden developed an impressive geopolitical rationale for severing all trade contacts 
with New France, a strategy, he claimed, that would virtually guarantee the collapse 
of the French empire in North America. To begin with, Colden proposed that the 
only manufactured goods suitable for the Indian trade were produced in Great Britian, 
particularly stroud cloth, a few other woolens, and rum. Shipping their inferior
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goods to Quebec also proved far more hazardous for the French, who had to contend 
with navigating the St. Lawrence River, "well known to be the most dangerous of any 
in the world," during the few months in which it was not ice-bound. The difficulties 
of transportation, combined with the inability of the French to supply the colony with 
adequate goods to conduct a profitable Indian trade, rendered it necessary for the 
Canadians to smuggle the bulk of their trade merchandise from Albany. To make 
matters worse, he added, the agents of the "French Company" arbitrarily dictated the 
selling price of all Canadian furs, ensuring that the traders could never offer a 
competitive rate of exchange to their Indian customers. It logically followed, 
therefore, that if the Albany merchants could be prevented from supplying their 
Montreal contacts with essential trade merchandise, it would only be a matter of time 
before the Canadian fur trade became insupportable.27
As propaganda contrived to discount the competitiveness of the Canadian fur 
trade and stigmatize the Albany-Montreal trade as detrimental to the greater interests 
of the British in North America, Colden’s arguments were a rhetorical tour de force. 
Without any greater knowledge of its inner workings, concerned officials at Whitehall 
would doubtless have been convinced that the Canadian fur trade was teetering on the 
brink of collapse, to be toppled only by the final shove provided by Burnet’s trade 
restrictions. Colden’s statements, however, were rife with inaccuracies, 
exaggerations, and miscalculations. Whether deliberate or simply the result of 
inaccurate information, Colden’s misleading conclusions have unduly prejudiced
27 Colden, HFIN, 13-32, 33-57.
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perceptions of the Canadian fur trade. His political opponents in the debate over the 
regulation of the Albany-Montreal trade easily picked holes in his assessment, yet 
Colden’s authority on the subject has nonetheless been accepted wholeheartedly by 
historians.28
Colden’s most enduring contribution to the myth of Anglo-American fur-trade
superiority was his declaration that access to Gloucestershire stroud cloth, above all,
dictated success or failure in the fur trade. Colden noted that it was impossible for
the French to obtain "genuine" strouds except from England, now that the Albany
trade had been restricted. "To put this out of all Controversy," he concluded,
we need only observe to your Excellency, That Strouds (without which no 
considerable Trade can be carried on with the Indians) are sold at Albany for 
10/. a Piece: They were sold at Monreal before this Act took Place, at 13/.
2s. 6d. and now they are sold there for 25/.: Which is an evident Proof, that 
the French have not, in these four Years Time (during the Continuance of this 
Act) found out any other Way to supply themselves with Strouds, and likewise 
that they cannot trade without them, seeing they buy them at so extravagant a 
Price.29
It is unclear how Colden obtained this price information, but it does not accord 
with what is known about the export of English strouds to Canada during the years in
28 Jennings, for example, cribs from Colden on this issue: "Albany had a 
superior source of trade goods," he echoes. "Certain of the preferred trade goods-- 
especially the woollens called shrouds-were made only in England, English-made 
goods were usually cheaper than the French, and the Hudson stayed navigable through 
winters when ice blocked traffic on the St. Lawrence. English manufacture and 
conditions of English transportation were so greatly superior to the French that 
English traders could sell their goods at half the French price and still make twice the 
French profit. This was the basic English advantage that the French could never 
really overcome, no matter how brilliantly they administered their colonies."
Jennings, Ambiguous Iroquois Empire, 284.
29 Colden, HFIN, 22.
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which Albany goods were not readily available. Colden was correct in stating that 
the French sought European sources for English strouds. Even before Burnet’s 
restrictive trade legislation was introduced, the French government had attempted to 
interest La Rochelle merchants in purchasing strouds for export to New France. In 
1722, the Compagnie des Indes began to supply the colony with English woolens and 
would continue to do so for the next decade. In the first year, 100 pieces (each 
between 17 and 18 aunes in length) were sold in Canada at either 11 livres, 11 livres 
10 sous, or 12 livres per aune. The following year the price was lowered to 10 livres 
10 sous, dropping again in 1724 to 9 livres, and finally to 7 livres 10 sous in 1725, at 
which level it remained until 1731.30 Contrary to Colden’s claims, the price of 
strouds imported to Canada was steadily dropping at the time he was writing, not 
doubling. But how did these prices compare to those in New York? If, as Colden 
noted, the cost of a piece of stroud in Albany was roughly £10 New York currency, 
the Canadians were spending roughly the same for the woolen cloth as their New 
York neighbors during the years in which the Montreal-Albany trade was prohibited. 
When the appropriate conversions are made to correct for differing units of 
measurement and currencies, it appears that the French did not pay more than 15 
percent extra for strouds in these years, hardly enough to run the Canadian traders out 
of business. Colden would also have been dismayed to learn that in 1723,
Montrealers actually paid less for strouds than their Albany counterparts (Fig. 3.1).
Colden’s pride in English manufactures was commendable, but it appears to
30 Lunn, "Economic Development," 159-61.
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have prevented him from recognizing that France had an equally flourishing woolen 
industry, centered in Normandy, Picardy, and Champagne. As it continued to grow 
throughout the eighteenth century, the production of wool cloth accounted for fully 20 
percent of French industrial output.31 Though their attempts to imitate English 
strouds-particularly the popular icarlatines, or scarlet variety—may have met with 
mixed results, there was certainly no shortage of other high quality woolens suitable 
for export to the colony, including molton, mazamet, and dourgne cloth. There was 
clearly a constant Canadian demand for strouds throughout the eighteenth century, yet 
certain contemporary observers remained unconvinced that the fur trade would wither 
if deprived of Gloucestershire cloth. For their part, La Galissoni&re and Bdgon 
supposed that the widespread assumption in Montreal merchant circles that the Indians 
of the pays d ’en haut would tolerate only English woolens was perpetuated by 
smugglers, who had an obvious interest in boosting sales of the wares they 
"imported" from Albany. Furthermore, they added, if good quality and reasonably 
priced French textiles were squeezing their English equivalents out of the Levant 
market, there was no reason why they could not hold their own in North America as 
well.32
Though it is evident from the disgruntled correspondence of New York 
merchants that the famed English strouds and other woolens did not always live up to 
their inflated reputation, it is unlikely that any definite conclusions concerning the
31 Riley, Seven Years’ War, 18-19.
32 La Galissonifere et Bdgon au ministre, 15 October 1748, AN, 0 lA, 91: 69-70.
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relative merits of English or French woolen cloth can ever be reached.33 Yet, even if 
Indian consumers of the Great Lakes and Ohio Valley did tend to favor stroud cloth 
over French alternatives, it was always possible for Canadians traders to obtain 
sufficient quantities of the English cloth at reasonable prices, whether imported from 
Europe or smuggled from Albany.34
Dean Anderson’s examination of the ledgers of Montreal merchants reveals 
that bulk cloth was the single most significant category of trade goods shipped to the 
western Great Lakes, accounting for just over 29 percent of all merchandise 
purchased for re-sale by Montreal merchant-outfitters. But stroud cloth, obviously, 
accounted for only a portion of this total.35 By analyzing the itemized records of 
trade goods exchanged at the French post at Niagara between 1729 and 1738, it is 
possible to offer a more detailed picture of Indian expenditure on cloth.36 The
33 The Bakers informed Johnson that it was difficult for them to ensure the quality 
of the strouds they shipped to New York: "the Strouds we have bought we hope will 
prove as good as those sent you last Spring, but not at all Cheaper," they admitted. 
"We cannot be exact as to the quality or price till they come from Dying, which must 
be some time. . . . "  Samuel and William Baker to Johnson, 22 January 1750. WJP, 
1: 259. Johnson had too much experience with substandard English woolens to share 
in Colden’s Anglocentric boosterism. Ordering imitations of French blankets,
Johnson advised his agent that he hoped the next shipment would be an improvement 
over the last, which had included poorly dyed and woven items. Johnson to William 
Baker, 24 December 1752. WJP, 1: 384.
34 Eccles, "A Belated Review," 433-34.
35 Dean Lloyd Anderson, "Documentary and Archaeological Perspectives on 
European Trade Goods in the Western Great Lakes Region," (Unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Department of Anthropology, Michigan State University, 1992), Table 
30, 143.
36 "Etat des effets vendOs & Niagara depuis le deux May 1729 jusqu'au dernier 
Juin 1738," AN, C*lA, 73: 310-12.
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Niagara figures happen to accord almost exactly with Anderson’s findings in terms of 
the relative proportion of bulk textiles traded. Approximately 28 percent of the 
trading income at Niagara was derived from the sale of linen, cotton, and woolen 
fabric. Warm woolens such as molton, mazamet, dourgne, and strouds were clearly 
the most popular of these, making up about 77 percent of the value of all textiles and 
nearly 22 percent of the total worth of all goods exchanged at the post. In terms of 
the sheer volume traded, strouds comprised only a quarter of all bulk textiles, though 
they accounted for nearly half (46.5 percent) of the income from cloth due to their 
relatively high cost (Fig. 3.2). Overall, the exchange of stroud cloth accounted for 
roughly 13 percent of the gross profits at Niagara during the 1730s (Fig. 3.3).37
Selling for upwards of $30 per yard in 1995 U.S. dollars, stroud was a costly 
item which would have been traded in relatively small amounts.38 Textiles, including
37 Anderson’s work demonstrates that the proportion of bulk cloth in the total 
assortment of trade merchandise could vary significantly from post to post in the 
western Great Lakes, depending largely on the needs and demands of the Indian 
consumers at various times and in different regions. The relative proportion of bulk 
textiles sold at Niagara in the 1730s, however, matches Anderson’s aggregate total so 
closely that the sale of stroud cloth at Niagara is probably reflective of overall trends 
in consumption throughout the West. Dean Anderson, "Merchandise for the Pays 
d ’en Haut: 18th Century Trade Goods and Indian Peoples of the Upper Great Lakes," 
Paper presented at the Canadian Archaeological Association Annual Meeting, April 
24th-27th, 1986, Toronto, Ontario. Similarly, Johnson predicted that strouds would 
account for about 14 percent of the value of all merchandise sold in his Northern 
Indian Department in the mid-1760s. Johnson, "A Scheme for Meeting Expenses of 
Trade," WJP, 4: 559.
38 Based on the average cost of stroud cloth sold by Monfere in 1735 (Table 3.1). 
The final cost in the pays d ’en haut could have been significantly higher. See John J. 
McCusker, How Much Is That in Real Money? A Historical Price Index fo r  Use as a 
Deflator o f Money Values in the Economy o f the United States (Worcester: American 
Antiquarian Society, 1992).
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finished blankets, clothing, and bulk fabrics, were clearly perennial staples of the 
Canadian fur trader’s assortment of goods. Though he exaggerated for effect, Colden 
was on the right track in claiming that "the most considerable and most valuable Part 
of their Cargo consists in Strouds, Duffils, Blankets, and other Woolens."39 
Considering the relatively limited profits derived from the sale of strouds alone at 
Niagara, however, Colden appears to have vastly overestimated their importance in 
the Canadian trade. The French easily supplied the majority of necessary textiles 
from their own domestic sources. Even with access to strouds completely restricted— 
a feat which the New Yorkers could never achieve-it is unlikely that the French 
trading system would have buckled.40 What Colden neglected to mention was that 
Indian consumers in the pays d ’en haut craved a wide variety of non-woolen 
merchandise as well, including gunpowder, shot, kettles, awls, axes, knives, 
vermilion, mirrors, and an array of clothing items. If La Galissoni&re and Bdgon are 
to be believed, they would hardly have refused proffered French woolens, particularly 
as the snow began to fall.
39 Colden, HFIN, 42.
40 The marchands-voyageurs who purchased smuggled strouds in Montreal may 
actually have wielded a certain advantage over New York traders. The duties levied 
on all trade goods in New York after 1726 included a tax of either 15 or 30 shillings 
per piece of stroud, depending on its destination. "There is reason to think," Colden 
acknowledged, "that all the strouds sent to Canada, are exempted from this duty, 
whereby the French gain a great advantage over the English fair Traders, for those 
goods sold to Frenchmen are not subjected to the duty, whereby the French are 
enabled to sell the goods which they buy at Albany cheaper to the Indians, than the 
English can do at Oswego." Colden to Governor Clinton, 8 August 1751, NYCD, 6: 
740-41.
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"Generally, all the goods used in the Indian trade, except Gun-Powder and a 
few trinkets," Colden trumpeted, "are sold at Montreal for twice their Value at 
Albany."41 As a result of the New Yorker’s dubious brand of salesmanship, the 
assumption of overpriced Canadian trade merchandise has been deeply embedded in 
the historiography of Anglo-French fur-trade rivalry. Characteristically, Eccles was 
the first to chip away at this shibboleth, arguing that it defied both the facts and 
common sense. "That the prices of such goods in both colonies were approximately 
the same should occasion no surprise," he quipped. "There is no discernible reason 
why they should not be."42 Eccles’s suspicions were, he was the Erst to admit, based 
more on qualitative evidence than a rigorous analysis of Canadian and Anglo- 
American trade-good prices.43 Yet, given the rough parity of English and French 
industrial and manufacturing capacities and an equally risky and expensive 
transatlantic passage, it is certainly conceivable that a kettle, a knife, or a pound of 
vermilion would have cost roughly as much in Montreal as in Albany or Philadelphia.
It has been tempting for scholars to accept Colden at his word on the relative 
cost of English and French merchandise in large part because it is so difficult to 
answer this question with absolute certainty. The documentary evidence is slim, with 
only a handful of Montreal, Albany, and Philadelphia account books having survived
41 Colden, HFIN, 42.
42 Eccles, "A Belated Review," 435.
43 Nonetheless, Eccles has called repeatedly for a comprehensive analysis of 
English and French trade-good prices. See "A Belated Review," 435; France in 
America, llOn.
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the ravages of time. Those that do remain offer only a glimpse at market conditions 
over brief periods, detailing the prices of only a few of the many types of goods that 
exchanged hands in the fur trade. Above all, the proverbial "apples and oranges" 
scenario poses the most overwhelming difficulty for credible comparison. Lacking 
the physical evidence to compare such intangibles as size, shape, quality, appearance, 
durability, and effectiveness--the qualities by which all trade merchandise was 
scrupulously judged in the pays d ’en haut—it is impossible to determine precisely 
whether individual French or English articles were ultimately the better bargain. An 
analysis based solely on price offers some clue, but admittedly not the complete 
answer. Certainly cost was often a deciding factor in the continuing process of 
exchange and use, but this determination clearly was-as it is today-infinitely variable 
by time, location, and the particular needs and tastes of the consumer. A French 
blanket may have cost less than its English equivalent, but might also have thinned 
and fallen apart more quickly. New York rum that cost half as much French brandy 
might have been equally intoxicating, yet could also have been adulterated with river- 
or trader-water. The true measure of the relative value of the array of English and 
French manufactures which traded hands in the eighteenth century fur trade was 
subjectively determined by the consumer and thus remains unquantifiable.
Nonetheless, it is still possible to offer some insight into the cost of rival trade goods 
at Montreal, Albany, Philadelphia, and points beyond.
Though individual entries in the tattered pages of merchant accounts offer only 
snapshots of unseen goods at fixed moments in time, when carefully compared and fit
132
into the broader context of qualitative evidence they have the potential to offer some 
interesting and often startling implications for the debate over Anglo-American 
mercantile superiority. In fact, the bulk of the extant price evidence detailed in the 
ledgers and correspondence of Montreal, Albany, and Philadelphia merchants tends to 
confirm what Eccles has perennially professed: that during the years of most intense 
trade rivalry in North America, trade goods in Montreal cost roughly what they did in 
Albany and Philadelphia.
The early months of 1735 proved busy for Alexis Lemoine Monibre of 
Montreal and Hendrick Van Rensselaer of Schenectady. England and France were at 
peace and both merchants profited from a flourishing trade with the Indians of the 
pays d ’en haut. As the days grew longer and the snow began to melt, Monibre 
hurried to assemble canoe-loads of merchandise for voyageurs headed west to the 
distant post at Michipicoton on the north shore of Lake Superior. Van Rensselaer, 
taking advantage of the recently revoked Albany trading monopoly, passed his hectic 
spring days haggling with traders over the price of the textiles, hardware, and spirits 
they needed for a successful summer of barter in the shadow of the new fort at 
Oswego. As they packed and sold bolts of woolen cloth, sets of nested kettles, and 
twists of tobacco, both merchants carefully itemized the cost and amount of each 
item, duly noting the sum their customers would owe them when they returned, laden 
with furs and skins, at the end of the summer, or, in Monfere’s case, the following
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year,44
Of the wide array of trade merchandise sold by Moni&re and Van Rensselaer 
in 1735, more than two dozen items can be matched for comparison, from awls to 
wine (Table 3.1, Columns I-II). To facilitate this comparison, a mean price based on 
the relative quantity of each sub-type was determined for each category of item listed 
in Table 1. For instance, Monidre sold a variety of different styles of knives, from 
small clasp knives to large butcher knives, duly noting the different price of each.
Van Rensselaer, by contrast, did not always refer so precisely to the type or size of 
each item. Thus, the mean price calculated for Monifere’s "couteaux" does not 
necessarily reflect the cost of a specific type of knife, but is rather suggestive of a 
price range in which most of his knives fell. The same holds true for all other items 
variegated by price, size, or style, including axes, blankets, combs, guns, linen, 
mirrors, shirts, stockings, and wine.
The prices are also presented in terms of the quantities in which these items 
were typically sold by both merchants. The systems of weights and measures 
employed by Monidre and Van Rensselaer were parallel, yet not identical. The 
appropriate conversions have thus been made, and, for the sake of uniformity, the
44 For Monidre’s 1735 accounts see "Journal #3, Monidre, 1731-1737, Ventes: 
crddit et ddbit," M848, vol. 4 [microfilm reel 2], MMR. Van Rensselaer’s ledgers 
are also available on microfilm: see the "Account Book of Hendrick (Henry) Van 
Rensselaer," in the collection of the New-York Historical Society, Miscellaneous 
Manuscripts, reel 63.
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final prices listed have been calculated in terms of the more familiar English units.45 
Finally, all prices were converted from French livres and pounds New York currency 
to pounds sterling at the rate of exchange current in 1735.4(5
The results of these calculations would undoubtedly have confounded Colden, 
for they clearly suggest that, with a few noteworthy exceptions, Monidre sold his 
goods for the same, if not lower, price than his counterpart in Schenectady. (Figs. 
3.4a,b,c). The Montrealer clearly had an advantage in the sale of awls, gunflints, 
gunpowder, trade guns, lead and ready-made shot, shirts, thread, vermilion, wine, 
and various essential foodstuffs necessary for provisioning the paddlers, including 
bacon, Indian com, and pease. Other items such as blankets, brass kettles, linen, 
"Jesuit" rings, glass beads, and tobacco were virtually identical in cost to Van 
Rensselaer’s merchandise. In the case of knives, combs, mirrors, and stockings, the 
Montreal prices are so much lower than their Schenectady equivalents that the 
discrepancy is almost certainly due to a substantial difference in the quality or style of 
the items being compared. Monifcre, for example, may have dealt primarily in 
smaller, cheaper knives, and Van Rensselaer possibly stocked larger, costlier mirrors 
in more elaborate leather frames or cases. Conversely, the same phenomenon may
45 An invaluable and comprehensive source for eighteenth-century weights and 
measures is Lester A. Ross, Archaeological Metrology: English, French, American 
and Canadian Systems o f Weights and Measures fo r  North American Historical 
Archaeology, History and Archaeology Series, Number 68 (Ottawa: Parks Canada, 
1983).
46 All currency conversions have been calculated at the annual rates of exchange 
in John J. McCusker’s, Money and Exchange in Europe and America, 1600-1775 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1978).
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apply to Van Rensselaer’s apparently cheaper axe blades, which may have been more 
modest than Monifcre’s hefty haches de service. For the most part, however, the 
Montreal and Schenectady prices are similar enough to suggest that the quality, style, 
and size of most of the items were essentially comparable.
Van Rensselaer appears to have had a decisive advantage in the sale of only 
two items: rum and strouds. That Albany and Schenectady merchants should have 
procured cheap rum is not surprising, considering New York’s burgeoning role in 
provisioning the sugar plantations of the Caribbean. Reaping the benefits of 
"triangular" trade with the British West Indies, New Yorkers distilled increasingly 
large quantities of rum from imported molasses. Though less palatable than the 
preferred West Indian potable, domestic American rum possessed the potent 
advantage of cheapness.47 Similarly, the fact that stroud cloth cost somewhat more in 
Montreal was not so much a testament to British manufacturing prowess as a 
reflection of the higher transportation costs involved in shipping strouds to New 
France via Europe or smuggling them from Albany in the canoes of Caughnawaga 
Mohawks. Interestingly, it appears from the surviving accounts of New Yorkers who 
traded with Canada that Montreal smugglers typically restricted their Albany
47 John J. McCusker, Rum and the American Revolution: The Rum Trade and the 
Balance o f Payments o f the Thirteen Continental Colonies (New York: Garland 
Publishing, 1989), 1: 469-70. John J. McCusker and Russell R. Menard, The 
Economy o f British America, 1607-1789 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1985), 289-90.
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purchases to strouds and wampum.4® In fact, Golden’s perception of the importance 
of stroud cloth in the Canadian fur trade may well have been skewed by his 
observation that woolens figured so prominently in the shipments of Albany merchants 
bound for Montreal. This detail merely confirms, however, what an examination of 
the account books of Moni&re and Van Rensselaer suggests: that Montrealers could 
readily obtain the vast majority of necessary trade goods at competitive prices from 
their own French suppliers.
But if cheaper and arguably superior English strouds had a ready market in 
Montreal, why did Canadian merchants pass up the opportunity to smuggle 
inexpensive rum from Albany? It would have been no mean feat for Caughnawaga 
paddlers to spirit heavy, awkward kegs past vigilant French patrols along Lake 
Champlain; yet if  Canadians had truly coveted New York rum, the resourceful 
contrabandiers would undoubtedly have made the attempt. A likelier explanation for 
their forgoing the challenge has to do more with delectation than detection: the
48 The most important extant record of the Albany-Montreal trade is the 
Letterbook of Robert Sanders (1752-1758) in the collection of the New-York 
Historical Society [Miscellaneous Microfilms, Reel #3], Sanders dispatched a large 
amount of wampum and some strouds to Canada, but little else. Similarly, Norton 
admits that on the whole, strouds and wampum were essentially the only commodities 
smuggled northward. Norton, Fur Trade in Colonial New York, 126. For a 
discussion of the importance of New York wampum, see Norton, Ibid., 89-91. In a 
telling use of synecdoche, Albany merchants habitually referred to the commerce with 
Montreal as the "stroud trade." Commenting on the recent restriction of the Canadian 
commerce to his father, Philip Livingston speculated that only an oath could prevent 
the "Angry Stroud Company" from sending "what strouds they please" to Canada. 
Philip Livingston to Robert Livingston, 20 February 1721, quoted in Lawrence H. 
Leder, Robert Livingston, 1654-1728, and the Politics o f Colonial New York (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1961), 253.
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French, as well as their Indian trading partners, simply preferred the pricier and more 
palatable eau de vie or brandy.
A spirited debate over the relative merits of brandy and rum has raged since 
the eighteenth century.49 Canadian officials boasted that the Indians preferred eau de 
vie, though this claim may have been at least partly colored by their desire to see the 
restrictions on its sale lifted.50 More suggestive, perhaps, is the fact that Hudson’s 
Bay Company traders to the north found it difficult to convert their Indian customers 
into rum drinkers because they had already cultivated a taste for the costlier brandy 
dispensed by rival French traders. The English could never consistently obtain 
adequate supplies of the French product which, in 1735, was also more than three
49 Proponents of a disconcerting "drunken Indian" school of interpretation 
generally admitted the superiority of French brandy, though failed to agree on the 
reason: "It can be doubted that the savage had a sufficiently sophisticated palate to be 
influenced by the subtleties of taste," Lunn suggested, "but since he drank to get 
drunk he doubtless soon discovered the greater potency and the more rapid effects of 
brandy." Lunn, "Economic Development," 170. Conversely, Francis Parkman 
admitted that the Indians "liked the taste of French brandy mor& than than of English 
rum; yet as their chief object in drinking was to get drunk, and as rum would 
supply as much intoxication as brandy at a lower price, it always found favor in their 
eyes." Parkman, France and England in North America, 2: 520. Eccles has long 
been the champion of eau de vie, however, and has rarely referred to English rum 
sans the acid adjectival adjunct "rot-gut." "Fur Trade and Eighteenth-Century 
Imperialism," 349-50; France in America, llOn. Eccles is, perhaps, the most 
reliable modem witness, having had ample opportunity to savor both varieties at first 
hand. Personal communication, 14 October 1994.
50 For example, see Vaudreuil et B6gon au ministre, 20 September 1714, AN,
4, 34: 236. Lobbying for the lifting of the ban on the sale of eau de vie at the
posts, the governor and intendant warned that the Indians were increasingly taking 
their trade to the English, who provided ample amounts of alcohol. Since the Indians 
were well aware of the superiority of the French libation, they claimed, it would be 
an easy matter to lure them back should brandy be re-introduced in the trade.
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times as expensive as rum. Despite the marked difference in price, however, the Bay 
traders were reduced to fiddling with a dubious gin-like distillation to make it appear 
more like brandy.51 That they retained their preference for French spirits, even when 
presented with a substantially cheaper alternative, suggests that Indian tipplers could 
and did distinguish between cheap hooch and the genuine article. Whether they were 
always willing to pay a higher price for the French libation must ultimately have 
depended—as did the exchange relationship itself-on the exigencies of personal 
preference, availability, local competition, and the irresistibility of any one particular 
item in the total complement of goods exchanged. It is worth noting, though, that 
while French and American rum was readily available in New France by the middle 
years of the eighteenth century, the Canadians consumed most of it themselves, 
saving brandy almost exclusively for the Indian trade.52 That the Canadians chose to 
"export" a relatively expensive liquor to the pays d'en haut, despite the availability of 
other less costly varieties, suggests that there was a perenially eager and well- 
cultivated market for French brandy in the Great Lakes-Ohio Valley region.
A comparison of the prices of various trade goods drawn from the accounts of 
two merchants in a single year does not conclusively disprove the longstanding
51 In 1735, the HBC paid 2s. 3d. per gallon for rum, 7s. 6d. for brandy, and 2s. 
for "clove water," a type of raw gin, also known as "English brandy." The Bay 
traders first used a tincture, then molasses, to color their "brandy" to ressemble 
authentic French version. E. E. Rich, Hudson’s Bay Company,
1670-1870 (New York: Macmillan, 1961), 1: 544-45.
52 Rum from the French West Indies was available as early as the 1680s, and by 
the 1740s was consumed in Canada in large quantities. McCusker, Rum and the 
American Revolution, 1: 52In.
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assumption that New Yorkers possessed a strong material advantage over their 
Montreal rivals throughout the lengthy course of the eighteenth-century fur trade. 
Considering the relatively closed and competitive nature of both the Montreal and 
Albany fur markets, it is highly unlikely that the prices quoted by Monifere or Van 
Rensselaer diverged much from the norm. But did the conditions of price competition 
as witnessed in 1735 extend beyond that particular year? Without a more complete 
series of prices for a wide variety of goods~an undertaking severely limited by the 
uneven nature of the sources-it is only possible to offer some tentative judgments 
based on the most readily available evidence.
Data extracted from Monifere* s accounts allow a year-by-year reconstruction of 
the movement of the prices of a wide range of trade items through the 1730s and 
1740s. The price curves for virtually all items sold by Monifere share a similar 
trajectory: holding relatively steady through the 1730s, prices began to rise rapidly 
beginning in 1744, before levelling off, and finally dropping again in the late 1740s 
(Fig. 3.5). The curves of the handful of goods illustrated in Figure 3.5 match the 
curve of the standard bfenfefice, or retail mark-up rate, charged by Monifere and his 
associates during the same period (Chapter 1, Fig. 1.2). This correspondence 
suggests that rising bfenfefice levels were largely responsible for the increased cost of 
goods sold in Montreal for the western trade. The reason for the sudden hike in 
bfenfefice rates is no mystery. Wartime shortages precipitated by the harassment of 
French shipping, culminating in the capture of Louisbourg, the bustling Cape Breton 
commercial entrepdt, by an Anglo-American force in 1747, severely disrupted the
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normal pattern of French transatlantic shipping to Canada.53 The sudden and acute 
dearth of trade merchandise was quickly translated into higher rates of mark-up by 
Quebec importers, in turn boosting the prices charged by Montreal merchant- 
outfitters.
Though the sudden increase in trade-good prices cut deeply into trader profits 
during these years, the repercussions of this rapid inflation were relatively limited.54 
After the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle was signed in 1748, French shipping quickly 
returned to normal pre-war levels, and continued to expand over the next decade.55 
With the outbreak of Anglo-French hostilities in the mid-1750s, French merchantmen 
once again began to fall prey to the Royal Navy and privateers. The British blockade 
of French channel ports and prohibitively high commercial insurance rates compelled 
many French merchants to abandon the Canada trade, though the quantity of 
merchandise leaving French ports appears to have increased until the final stages of 
the Seven Years’ War.55
53 "The war between France and England declared on 15 March 1744," Miquelon 
notes, "transformed the orderly trade of the Atlantic into a lottery." Dale Miquelon, 
Dugard o f Rouen: French Trade to Canada and the West Indies, 1729-1770 (Montreal 
and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1978), 119.
54 Michilimackinac’s commander reported in 1749 that the post was so flooded 
with trade merchandise that the traders were forced to sell at a loss. Brandy and 
tobacco, he noted, were particularly cheap that year. Jonquifere h ministre, 20 
September 1749, AN, <f}A, 93: 101-2.
55 See Table 3, "Merchantment Sailing Between La Rochelle and New France, 
1748-1759," in Gilles Proulx, Between France and New France: Life Aboard the Tall 
Sailing Ships (Toronto and Charlottetown: Dundum Press, 1984), 26.
56 J. F. Bosher, "Success and Failure in Trade to New France, 1660-1760," 
French Historical Studies (1988), 15(3): 447-48.
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Notwithstanding the wartime aberrations of the late 1740s and late 1750s, it 
appears that, on the whole, the prices of Canadian trade goods remained relatively 
constant throughout the eighteenth century. When the prices of selected goods sold in 
Schenectady are compared with their Montreal equivalents during this period, it 
appears that New York prices also tended to remain relatively constant, though they, 
too, were not immune to the fluctuations associated with normal shifts in the levels of 
supply and demand (Figs. 3.6a,b,c,d).57 Over time, as Montreal prices dropped and 
New York prices rose, the gap between the prices of various goods might narrow 
considerably. Though far from comprehensive, when interpreted in the context of 
contemporary accounts of Anglo-French competition, the data suggest that the detailed 
1735 price comparisons are at least indicative of general trends in the relative cost of 
goods in New York and Montreal, a pattern which was skewed only briefly during the 
isolated wartime shortages characteristic of the late 1740s.
Unfortunately, no trading records detailing the rates of exchange of peltry and
"Even if the traffic did remain relatively similar in wartime as in peacetime," Proulx 
writes, "the same did not apply to the quantity of merchandise transported." Between 
1755 and 1760 the gross volume of trade between France and Canada rose 
dramatically. Proulx, Between France and New France, 28. This apparent growth 
may not have reflected a boom in private commerce, as much as an increase in 
government shipments of materiel. Jacques Mathieu, Le commerce entre la nouvelle- 
france et les antilles au XVHT stecle (Montreal: Fides, 1981), 148.
57 Sources for New York trade-good prices before the 1750s are frustratingly 
scarce and incomplete. The scattered prices (indicated in figs. 3.6a,b,c,d) for the 
1730s and 1740s have been culled from the "Account Book of Hendrick Van 
Renselaer," New-York Historical Society, Miscellaneous Manuscripts [Microfilm reel 
#63]; the Letterbook of Robert and John Sanders, 1742-43, NYHS, Misc. MSS [Reel 
#3]; and WJP, 1: passim.
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merchandise at Oswego are presently available. It is only possible to speculate as to 
the cost of English goods on Lake Ontario after the fort’s completion in 1727. 
Contemporary accounts set the costs of round-trip transportation between Albany and 
Oswego at around 15 percent.58 A direct, albeit artificial, comparison between the 
known cost of trade items at Niagara in 1735 (Table 3.1, Column III) can be 
accomplished by arbitrarily increasing the cost of all merchandise sold by Van 
Rensselaer in that year by 15 percent (Table 3.1, Column IV). Even taking into 
account the fact that the Niagara prices represent the final retail price of goods traded 
to Indian customers, while the Oswego prices represent only estimates of their base 
"wholesale" cost, before the addition of goverment duties or final trader markup, it 
appears that certain French goods-including bacon, combs, com, gunpowder, trade 
guns, knives, lead and shot, shirts, stockings, stroud, thread, and vermilion-actually 
cost less at Niagara than they did at Oswego (Figs. 3.4a,b,c). A variety o f other 
items, such as awls, axes, blankets, glass beads, kettles, linen, mirrors, pease, 
pepper, rings, tobacco, and wine, cost the same (or only slightly more) retail at 
Niagara than they did wholesale at Oswego.
In fact, the only item which was considerably more expensive at Niagara 
appears to have been brandy, and much of this difference might have been eroded by 
the inevitably exorbitant markup on alcohol at Oswego. Again, some of the 
discrepancies in price may be the result of significant differences in the type or 
quality of certain items. The price differential in stroud cloth, however, is
58 See Chapter 2, note 37.
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particularly noteworthy because it suggests the official manipulation of prices at the 
King’s post to effectively meet potential Anglo-American competition. The cost of a 
piece of stroud at Niagara was substantially lower than in Montreal that year, 
indicating that the cloth was being sold, if not at a loss, then without the standard 
margin of profit to be expected on the retail sale of this item. This is also the case 
with axes and com. The discrepancies between the Montreal cost and sale price at 
Niagara suggest that before the post was privately leased in 1742, the Canadian 
government subsidized the sale of certain attractive trade essentials, passing the 
savings on to the Indian consumer in an effort to preserve their commerce and loyalty 
in the face of trade competition from the eastern end of Lake Ontario. Without a 
comprehensive set of price data from Oswego during these years, it is impossible to 
determine with any certainty whether Niagara prices were competitive across the 
board with those at Oswego. It seems likely, however, that given the intervention of 
the Canadian government in the sale of merchandise before the early 1740s, the 
Oswego traders would have been hard-pressed to consistently beat the prices offered 
by their French rivals at Niagara.59
59 A decade after the privatization of the Niagara post, Oswego traders 
complained that their business was being siphoned off by the French at the western 
end of Lake Ontario. "Your favour I recd. Yesterday together with the Goods Sent 
me by Johne," wrote Thomas Butler to William Johnson. "But I fear they are come 
to a bad Markett. We have had but one Atowawa Cannoe here this year. What 
hinders their Coming I cant lem — but that the new French Fort at Nigra will stop 
much of this Trade is Certain. As they have all Sorts of Goods & have orders from 
the Govr. o f Cannada to Sell Cheap." Thomas Butler to Johnson, 29 May 1751,
WJP, 1: 338. Similarly, the Iroquois customers who traded regularly at Oswego 
remarked to Governor George Clinton in 1744 that "the first Two years after that 
Trading House was settled Goods were sold cheap & it was a pleasure to Trade there,
Admittedly, Niagara-not to mention Detroit and Michilimackinac—was 
considerably further from Montreal than Oswego was from Albany. Colden was on 
firmer factual ground in claiming that the Canadian traders were faced with greater 
logistical problems arising from long trade-route distances, but once again he overshot 
his mark. In 1724, the English had not yet established a permanent presence on the 
Great Lakes, and the vast majority of furs exported from New York came either from 
Montreal, the neighboring Iroquois nations, or the occasional ’’far Indians" who came 
to Albany to trade. Before the establishment of Oswego, there was no parallel 
between the activities of the Canadian traders, who paddled hundreds of miles to the 
posts of the western Great Lakes where they effectively avoided all English 
competition, and the traders at Albany, who were content to passively gather 
whatever peltry drifted down the Mohawk River or Lake Champlain.60 Inevitably, the 
expenses incurred by Montreal merchants shipping goods to Detroit, Michilimackinac, 
or Green Bay clearly exceeded those of their Albany counterparts, yet the French 
were at no such disadvantage when they encountered growing English competition 
closer to home. Colden’s contention that it took the Canadians 20 to 40 days to 
journey the 180 miles from Montreal to the post at Fort Frontenac (present-day 
Kingston) is absurd.61 Canadian paddlers could easily move goods upriver from
but they have since been sold so dear that they do not now think that Place any 
Advantage to them." Wraxall, AIA, 234.
60 See Wien’s discussion of the significance of Canadian "monopoly trading 
zones," in "Selling Beaver Skins," 316.
61 Colden, HFIN, 41. By contrast, Adair noted that it took the French "anything 
from twenty to forty days" (apparently a popular time-frame for French paddlers) to
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Montreal to Frontenac in twelve to fifteen days, and make the return trip in only four 
or five.62 And, with a freightage rate of roughly twelve percent of the value of the 
merchandise, the cost of transporting goods to Fort Frontenac was comparable, if not 
lower, than that incurred by the Oswego traders.63
Colden’s connection between the higher price of French trade goods and the 
pattern of transatlantic shipping must also be discounted as his own invention. Noting 
that French ships made only a single trip to Quebec during the summer months, while 
both a summer and winter voyage was possible from the port of New York, Colden 
inexplicably leaped to the conclusion that "it is not in the power of the French to 
import any Goods near so cheap to Canada, as they are imported to New-York.1,64 
Since it is clear that, barring disruptions to shipping during wartime, New France 
received all the supplies and trade merchandise necessary for the entire year in its
travel from Montreal to Niagara, at the opposite end of Lake 
Ontario. Adair, "Anglo-French Rivalry," 156.
62 Richard A. Preston and Leopold Lamontagne (eds.), Royal Fort Frontenac 
(Toronto: The Champlain Society, 1958), 66.
63 During 1725 and 1726, the Canadian government shipped 12,219 livres worth 
of supplies from Montreal to Fort Frontenac for the construction of two barques. The 
freightage rate between the town and the Cote de Chine was 6 livres per 1,000 
pounds of cargo, and 50 livres per 1,000 pounds from the C6te de Chine to Fort 
Frontenac. The total cost of tranporting these goods amounted to 1,484 livres, or
12.15 percent of their value. The cost o f supplying trade merchandise and supplies to 
the post would undoubtedly have been comparable. See the "Extrait de ce qui a dt6 
delivrfe des Magazins du Roy k Montreal et du fort frontenac k l’occasion et pour la 
Construction et Armement des deux barques qui ont etfes faittes au d. fort pour Le 
Service de sa Majestd depuis le Sept may Mil sept cent vingt Cinq, jusques au dix 
aoust 1726," Montreal, 26 January 1730. AN, C"A, 53: 33-37.
64 Colden, HFIN, 21-22.
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summer cargoes, it is unclear how Canadian prices might have been adversely 
affected by the colony’s characteristic pattern of shipping. The Canadian fur trade 
clearly suffered the ill effects of interrupted transatlantic shipping during the 1740s 
and 1750s. Without the harassment of the Royal Navy, however, the French had to 
contend only with occasional losses from shipwreck and the tedium of a long, quiet 
winter. Colden was correct to note the inherent dangers of the final passage up the 
St. Lawrence faced by all merchantmen bound for Canada, but this was just another 
of the many difficulies of Canadian life which its colonists resolutely overcame. As 
hostile English fleets would discover, the St. Lawrence passage was fraught with 
various riverine perils, including reefs, islands, and sand bars. The journey from the 
Gulf of St. Lawrence to the cliffs of Quebec typically took ten or twelve days, with 
ships dropping anchor each evening. French pilots had, of necessity, become familiar 
with the hazards of the route in the seventeenth century, and while Colden penned his 
"memorial," the Canadians were undertaking the first systematic exploration of the St. 
Lawrence under the authority of the Quebec harbormaster. By this time, French 
merchants could rely on professional Canadian pilots to guide their ships safely to 
their inland destination. Though shipwrecks were not unknown, the hazards of the St. 
Lawrence route were routinely bypassed in the course of trade between France and 
the colony. Contrary to Colden’s claim, the river was a lifeline, not an impediment, 
to the Canadian fur trade.65
"We now enjoy the most favourable Time, that at any time can be hoped for,
65 Proulx, Between France and New France, 76-80.
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in order to extend the British Commerce in North-America," Colden proposed, "while 
the French not only labour under the Difficulties which I have shown to be 
inseparable from the Situation of their Colony, but likewise under another 
Disadvantage, . . .  by the Furr-Trade of Canada being restrained to one Company."66 
Of all the evidence he cited to demonstrate the inherent fragility of the Canadian fur 
trade, Colden’s assessment of the Canadian fur market was most faithful to the facts. 
Because the Compagnie des Indes was required to pay "heavy duties" in France, he 
noted, it was in the monopolists’ interest to keep Canadian beaver prices artificially 
low. While the merchants of Albany could offer 5 shillings, New York currency or 3 
shillings sterling for a pound of beaver, the Canadian company paid only 2 livres, or 
18 pence sterling, per pound. "Therefore it plainly follows," he crowed, "that our 
Indian traders could undersell the French Traders, tho’ they were to give as great a 
Price for European Goods as the French do."67
It is true that, in 1724, the company did pay only 2 livres per pound (or 
slightly less, in fact, when the difference in English and French weights is 
considered), yet this price applied only to the less valuable castor sec, or parchment 
beaver. The company paid double that sum for coat beaver, the castor gras most 
prized by French hatters. Coat beaver, in fact, was actually worth slightly more per
66 Colden, HFIN, 54-55.
67 Colden, HFIN, 55.
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pound in Montreal than in New York, according to the price Colden quoted.68 In 
1724, albeit an atypical year, significantly more castor gras than sec was imported at 
La Rochelle. Over the entire period between 1718 and 1761, approximately 63.7 
percent of the value of all beaver received at La Rochelle was comprised of sec, 
while 36.3 percent was gras.69 Colden may have been correct in asserting that the 
bulk of Canadian beaver was purchased in Canada at a lower rate than was offered in 
Albany, though he overemphasized the extent of the difference by ignoring the 
significant difference in price between parchment beaver and the more valuable castor 
gras. The fact that Albany merchants tended to accept most grades of beaver at a 
uniform price would have encouraged Montreal smugglers to dump their less valuable 
pelts on the New York market, while dutifully bringing their remaining gras to the 
Company. Content with Canadian cast-offs, most New Yorkers, Colden included, 
appear not to have fully grasped the complexities of the rival beaver trade nor 
understood the limitations of the monopoly company, which had authority only over 
the marketing of beaver.
Beaver prices extracted from Montreal and Albany sources for 1735 and 1754
68 For 1724 beaver prices see Lunn, "Economic Development," 459. The price 
of 4 livres per French pound in Canada would have been equivalent to 3.7075 livres 
per English pound in Albany. At the rate of exchange current in 1724, the price for 
one English pound of castor gras was £ 0.1564 sterling (nearly 3s. 2d.), 
approximately 4 percent more than Colden’s stated New York price of £ 0.15 sterling 
(or 3s.).
69 In 1724, the Archives de la Chambre de commerce in La Rochelle recorded the 
arrival of castor sec valued at 77,550 livres, and 97,875 livres worth of castor gras. 
The proportion of sec to gras over the whole period was calculated from the import 
records in Lunn, "Economic Development," 464-65.
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corroborate Colden’s contention that New Yorkers paid higher prices for beaver than 
the monopoly company, but the differences were not necessarily as great as he 
claimed (Table 3.2, Fig. 3.7).70 Though the price of parchment beaver in Albany was 
twice that in Montreal in 1735, New York merchants paid only about 17 percent more 
for coat beaver, a difference hardly worth the cost and risk of sending those pelts 
southward. In 1754, when coat and parchment beaver were accepted at the same rate 
by the Compagnie des Indes, the price difference favored the New Yorkers by some 
40 percent. Though of small consolation, perhaps, to Montreal merchants, the 
Canadian beaver company at least offered the assurance of relatively stable beaver 
prices, while the New York rates could rise and fall unpredictably in response to 
shifting conditions on the local or London fur markets.71 Occasionally, the price of
70 Montreal beaver prices for 1735 are cited in Thomas Wien, "Castor, peaux, et 
pelleteries dans le commerce canadien des fourrures, 1720-1790," in "Le Castor Fait 
Tout": Selected Papers o f the Fifth North American Fur Trade Conference, 1985, 
edited by Bruce Trigger, Toby Morantz, and Louise Dechfine (Montreal: Lake St. 
Louis Historical Society, 1987), 91; Schenectady prices are taken from the "Account 
Book of Hendrick (Henry) Van Rensselaer," New York Historical Society, 
Miscellaneous Manuscripts [Microfilm reel #63]. The source for Montreal beaver 
prices in 1754 is H. A. Innis, The Fur-Trade o f Canada (Toronto: Oxford University 
Press, 1927), 153; Albany/Schenectady prices were extracted from the "Letterbook 
of Robert Sanders, 1752-58, NYHS, Misc. MSS. [reel #3], and the "Letterbook of 
John Sanders, 1749-73," NYHS, Misc. MSS., [reel #3].
71 "Our Markets for Furs we think are like to Continue much as of late," wrote 
London factors Samuel and William Baker to Johnson in July 1750. "Now & then 
some particular sorts rise & others fall, according as the Quantity of each sort 
happens to be more or less on the Importation, sometimes also fashion alters, but in 
general Furs find a pretty good Demand— Beavor is by no means so certain a 
Commodity, But we dont see any Reason to fear its falling for some time, the last 
price was 4/6 per 11. If yours proves good we will try to make more of it, this is 
what we reckon here a very good price, & in a Course of great many years we have
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beaver in Albany dwindled so low that it was no longer profitable for Montrealers to 
ship any beaver south.72
The intervention of the monopoly Compagnie des Indes probably encouraged 
smuggling by maintaining beaver prices at levels that were generally uncompetitive 
relative to the New York market. The constant complaints of Montreal merchants 
and Canadian officials were generally drowned out by the warnings of the powerful 
Parisian hatmakers, though on occasion, declining fur receipts prompted the company 
to heed the advice of the colonists and raise beaver prices to counteract the alleged 
repercussions of Anglo-American competition. Whether the Indian trading partners of 
the French ever suffered from the regulated marketing of beaver in Canada, however, 
is doubtful. The low correlation between price and levels of production noted by 
Wien suggests that Canadian traders compensated for lower beaver prices, at least in 
part, by accepting diminished profits and continued to accept peltry from their Indian 
trading partners at established, competitive rates.73
Just as Colden restricted his discussion of fur marketing to the price of castor 
sec, there has been a persistent and misleading tendency in the historiography of
seen it much lower, & very seldom higher, but at present Consumption is pretty 
quick. Samuel and William Baker to Johnson, 23 July 1750, WJP, 1: 292. See also: 
Thomas Armstrong to Johnson, 13 January 1748, WJP, 1: 127-28; Armstrong to 
Johnson, 31 August 1748, WJP, 1: 181; Johnson to Captain John B. Van Eps, 6 
September 1748, WJP, 1: 183; Samuel and William Baker to Johnson, 22 January 
1750, WJP, 1: 250, 259.
72 Wien, "Selling Beaver Skins," 307.
73 Wien, "Selling Beaver Skins," 307-12.
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Anglo-French trade rivalry to equate "beaver" with "fur." Fully half the value of all 
peltry exported to France over the course of the eighteenth century came from sources 
other than beaver, including deerskins, moose hides, and a variety of other fur- 
bearing animals, which the French termed "menues pelleteries”14 Though it has 
generally been allowed that the French possessed an inherent advantage in the 
marketing of these "other" furs in Europe, Wien has tendered significant evidence to 
the contrary. Tracing the re-export of the majority of such furs from Britain and 
France to other European nations, he demonstrates that there was a relatively 
"unified" European market for North American peltry. Furs originating in Canada, 
Hudson Bay, New York, or Pennsylvania thus wound up side by side in the shops of 
European furriers. Clearly, then, the French had no inherent "special deal" in selling 
their furs abroad. By comparing the selling price of Hudson’s Bay Company furs on 
the London market, and Canadian furs at La Rochelle, Wien discovered that—with a
74 Based on the import figures cited by Lunn, 56.95% of the value of all furs 
arriving in La Rochelle between 1718 and 1761 was attributable to menues pelleteries. 
Lunn, "Economic Development," 464-65. Thomas Wien has suggested that furs and 
skins probably amounted to slightly less than half of the value of Canadian fur exports 
during the eighteenth century. "Peaux and pelleteries could account for more than 
half of the value of official fur exports from Qufebec," he admits, "but this 
predominance was usually illusory, as clandestine shipments of beaver to Albany and 
Oswego were not counted in the official totals." Wien later admits, however, that 
French customs officials often paid little attention to furs other than beaver, because 
most were simply being held in bond for re-export and so were not subject to import 
duties. The result, he notes, was substantial and consistent underreporting of menues 
pelleteries. Thomas Wien, "Exchange Patterns in the European Market for North 
American Furs and Skins, 1720-1760," in The Fur Trade Revisited: Selected Papers 
of the Sixth North American Fur Trade Conference, Mackinac Island, Michigan, 1991, 
edited by Jennifer S. H. Brown, W. J. Eccles and Donald P. Heldman (East Lansing: 
Michigan State University Press, 1994), 20, 34n., 23.
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few exceptions—English furs consistently fetched a higher price. Wien concludes that 
the quality of the pelts rather than their source ultimately determined the final selling 
price in Europe. In this case, the Hudson’s Bay Company possessed a material 
advantage over its Montreal rivals: "the Canadians, after all, purchased many of their 
furs from Indians living and hunting south of the Great Lakes, whose wares were of 
lower quality than most of those delivered to the Hudson Bay posts," Wien claims.75
If the Canadians were hampered by the quality of their more "southerly” fur 
supply, then by the same reasoning the New Yorkers should have been even worse 
off. The Canadians may not have monopolized the source of the best northern peltry, 
but at least they had relatively easy access to such furs through their trade in the 
northwestern Great Lakes and the hinterland of Hudson and James Bay. At Oswego 
and certainly at Albany, however, the New York traders were at the mercy of their 
Indian suppliers, whose pelts were arguably of the lowest possible quality.76 The 
price data for Montreal and Albany furs in 1735 and 1754, in fact, bear out this 
conclusion (Table 3.2, Figs. 3.7-3.8). With virtually no exceptions, the Canadian 
traders appear to have sold their menues pelleteries at prices comparable with, and 
frequently higher than, those received by their New York counterparts. If Wien is 
correct, the French may have had no "special deal" that made their peltry inherently
75 Wien, "Exchange Patterns," 32.
76 Eccles notes that in the early 1750s, the expansionist impulses of the French 
military in the Ohio Valley were not shared by Canadian traders, who recognized that 
they had little to gain from access to the poor quality peltry of the region. Eccles, 
"Eighteenth-Century Imperialism," 356.
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more valuable in Europe. They did, evidently, have access to better quality furs and 
skins than their neighbors to the south. Albany merchants and Oswego traders may 
have profited more from the marketing of beaver; but, since approximately 54 
percent of the total value of New York peltry consisted of furs and skins other than 
beaver during the period 1718 to 1758, in no sense could New York be said to have 
cornered the market on gross fur profits.77
The sharp increase in Canadian trade-good prices in the mid-to-late 1740s was 
potentially most damaging to the French trade on the western perimeter of the Ohio 
country. At precisely the moment when the Canadians were losing their competitive 
edge as trade-good prices skyrocketed in response to wartime scarcities, Pennsylvania 
traders were beginning to make inroads into the Ohio Valley, for the first time 
competing directly for the trade and loyalty of the motley new Indian villages of the 
region. When George Croghan arrived laden with English merchandise at Sanduskey 
in the mid-1740s, he found Orontony and his fellow Wyandots eager to welcome a 
potential trade rival to the French. Only a few years before, the French ministry 
leased the posts at Miami, Green Bay, and Ouiatenon to private traders, hoping to 
lessen the crown’s diplomatic expenses in the West. As a result, the prices of trade 
merchandise had begun to creep upward even before the wartime interruption of
77 This value was calculated from the British Customs Office export figures in 
Stephen H. Cutcliffe, "Colonial Indian Policy as a Measure of Rising Imperialism: 
New York and Pennsylvania, 1700-1755," Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine, 
64:3 (1981): Table 1, 240-42.
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French shipping began. This trend was exacerbated by the advent of war.78
At the war’s end, however, Canadian officials took various steps to prevent a 
recurrence of the severe shortages and price increases that had strained trade and 
diplomatic relations with their Indian allies in the pays d ’en haul. Governors La 
Galissonifere and La Jonquifere successively sought to curb the most blatant abuses of 
the western trade by abandoning the leasing system at several critical posts in the 
region. Similarly, they urged the Compagnie des Indes to boost the price of beaver, 
encouraged the traders at Detroit, Niagara, and Frontenac to hold prices down to 
competitive levels, and made attempts to discourage the cheating of Indian 
consumers.79
Yet, just as the French suffered the commercial and diplomatic repercussions 
of trade disruptions in the late 1740s, Pennsylvania merchants and traders were 
themselves not entirely immune from similar wartime woes. New York’s economy 
may have been stimulated by profits from Anglo-American privateering during King 
George’s War, but Philadelphia merchants had little stake in raids on French shipping 
and may actually have lost more ships than they seized. When war broke out in 
1744, Philadelphia merchants predicted that the conflict could only injure their trade.
78 Having watched merchandise prices climb following the privatization of several 
western posts, Indian customers were skeptical when the French traders blamed 
wartime shortages for increased costs. White proposes that the root of Indian 
discontent in the pays d ’en haut involved more than dissatisfaction with higher trade- 
good costs, but was rooted in a deeper fear that the French were abandoning their 
customary role as mediators of the western alliance. White, Middle Ground, 199- 
200.
79 White, Middle Ground, 210.
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Their fears were soon realized when shipping and insurance rates began to rise the 
following year. Merchandise grew increasingly scarce and prices climbed steeply.
The total value of British imports in 1745, in fact, was 40 percent less than in 1741. 
Though the threat to Philadelphia’s merchant shipping ceased with the capture of 
Louisbourg, the postwar business climate remained remarkably dismal. An economic 
slump late in 1749, followed by another "cyclical downturn” in 1753-54, drove a 
significant number of Philadelphia mercantile into bankruptcy. Facing aggressive 
French and Indian competition in the West and uncertain business prospects in the 
East, the Pennsylvania traders who entered the Ohio trade in the 1740s and early 
1750s were hardly guaranteed commercial success.80
If the Canadians had not been temporarily handicapped by high wartime 
prices, it is doubtful that the Scots-Irish traders who appeared in the Ohio country 
would have wielded much commercial advantage over them. Scattered throughout 
George Croghan’s business correspondence are several itemized invoices of trade 
goods purchased from Philadelphia merchants.81 When the mean prices of a number 
of important trade items purchased by Croghan in 1744 are compared with similar
80 Anne Bezanson, Robert D. Gray and Miriam Hussey, Prices in Colonial 
Pennsylvania (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1935), 273-78; Gary 
B. Nash, The Urban Crucible: The Northern Seaports and the Origins o f the American 
Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1986), 110, 111.
81 Several lists of his 1744 purchases can be found among the eight cartons of 
Croghan’s papers, in the Croghan Section of the Cadwallader Collection at the 
Historical Society of Pennsylvania. See, in particular, invoices for goods "Bott o f  
Rebecca Edgell, 23 July 1744 and 25 October 1744; Jeremiah Warder, May-July (?), 
1744; and Joseph Shippen, 22 October 1744.
156
articles sold by Monifere that same year, the results once again favor the Canadian in 
many instances. (Table 3.3, Figs. 3.9a,b,c).82 A variety of goods, including awls, 
beads, gunflints, gunpowder, handkerchiefs, hatchets, knives, mirrors, vermilion, and 
even stroud cloth, were cheaper in Montreal. Again, it is possible that some of the 
discrepancies in cost, particularly in the case of handkerchiefs and knives, may have 
been due to variations in quality or materials. But on the whole, it is clear that 
similar goods sold at comparable prices in both towns. Not surprisingly, rum and 
tobacco appear to have been the only noteworthy items that cost significantly more in 
Canada. Like their New York counterparts, Philadelphia merchants had abundant 
sources of relatively cheap West Indian, New England, and local rum, as well as 
direct access to Maryland and Virginia tobacco via intercolonial trade.83
In contrast to their New York neighbors, Pennsylvanians vying for the Indian 
trade of the Ohio Country dealt primarily in deerskins. Though beaver made up 
roughly half of New York’s and Canada’s total fur production, beaver was 
insignificant to Pennsylvania’s export economy, comprising only about 1 percent of 
Pennsylvania’s fur and skin exports, on average, between 1718 and 1758 (Fig.
3.10).84 Deerskins, however, accounted for fully 63 percent of Pennsylvania’s total 
profits from the Indian trade, and other furs-the French menues pelleteries—neax\y 36
82 In 1744, Monifere outfitted trading ventures to Green Bay, Rainy Lake, and 
Michilimackinac. See "Monifere, Journal No. 4: 1737-1748, Ventes: Crfedit et dfebit," 
MMR, M849, [Microfilm reel 3].
83 Bezanson et al., Prices in Colonial Pennsylvania, 79, 84, 186, 207-8, 210.
84 Calculated from import records in Cutcliffe, "Colonial Indian Policy," Table 1, 
240-42.
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percent.85 Though the Pennsylvanians were clearly most dependent on deerskins, 
they appear not to have possessed any appreciable advantage over the Canadians in 
the price of this commodity. In fact, price information from the mid-1730s and the 
mid-1750s suggests that deerskins may have even brought a slightly higher price in 
Montreal than in Philadelphia (Fig. 3.11).86
The only distinct advantage the Pennsylvania traders might have enjoyed was 
the potentially shorter distance between Philadelphia and the peripheral regions of 
trade. Certainly, while the Pennsylvania trade was focused on the Susquehanna 
Valley, transportation costs remained comparatively low. When the traders finally 
began to expand their operations into the trans-Allegheny country in hot pursuit of
85 Calculated from data in Cutcliffe, "Colonial Indian Policy," Table 1, 240-42.
86 Montreal deerskin prices for 1735 are taken from Wien, "Castor, peaux, et 
pelleteries," 91. These were compared with the 1732 price of skins in Philadelphia 
(the closest available year) cited by William H. Guthman, "Indian Trade Documents," 
Museum o f the Fur Trade Quarterly, 7:2 (1971): 10. Montreal deerskin prices in 
1754 are found in Innis, Fur-Trade o f  Canada, 153. For accounting and credit 
purposes, Croghan used an arbitrary standard value for deerskins of 7s. 6d. (£ 0.375) 
Pennsylvania currency, or roughly 4s. 6d. (£ 0.2227) sterling. Croghan Section, 
Cadwallader Collection, Historical Society of Pennsylvania. Deerskins varied 
considerably in weight: Richard White noted that skins traded by the Choctaws 
averaged 2.5 lbs., while James McClure posited a lesser weight of 2 lbs. Richard 
White, The Roots o f Dependency: Subsistence, Environment, and Social Change 
among the Choctaws, Pawnees, and Navajos (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 
1983), 93; James P. McClure, "The Ohio Valley’s Deerskin Trade: Topics for 
Consideration," The Old Northwest, 15:3 (1990): 128n. The average weight of 
deerskins purchased by John and Robert Sanders in the early 1740s was 
approximately 2.18 lbs. "Letterbook of John and Robert Sanders, 1742-43," NYHS, 
Misc. MSS [reel #3]. For the sake of comparison, the average weight of Croghan’s 
deerskins was assumed to be 2 lbs., which produced a final price of 2s. 3d. (£0.1135) 
sterling per pound.
their Delaware and Shawnee suppliers, however, the expense of shipping goods 
increased considerably. Unlike the Canadian voyageurs, who had virtually 
uninterrupted canoe routes through the Great Lakes to Detroit and the other posts 
south of the Great Lakes, the Pennsylvania traders faced long overland treks into the 
pays d ’en haut, hauling their goods less efficiently by pack-horse much of the way.87 
The experience of the French in the Ohio Valley in the period following the expulsion 
of the Anglo-American traders also gives some indication of the hardships faced by 
the English who pursued trade in the region. Even in a newly captive market, the 
French still found it difficult to adequately supply the trade in the Ohio country. 
Moving large quantities of merchandise in the region proved to be no easy matter. 
Forced to abandon their trusty canoes in favor of clumsy pirogues and frustrated by 
long, blistering portages, the French soon grasped that the business of supplying trade 
merchandise to the Ohio Valley was laboriously slow, as well as financially and 
diplomatically costly.88
With an "effective and well-established" supply network in the lower Great 
Lakes and a longstanding—if often tenuous-network of alliances with the various
87 The difficulties and expense of overland carriage from Pennsylvania may also 
have limited the types of goods brought to the Ohio country. For example, Edmond 
Atkin noted that the large amount of lead the Indians needed for shot was not only 
difficult to transport but also unprofitable, with "a Horse Load but of small value." 
South Carolina traders, he remarked, "naturally consulting their own greatest profitt, 
have carried but scanty supplies of that Article, and in a great measure left it to the 
French." Edmond Atkin, The Appalachian Indian Frontier: The Edmond Atkin Report 
and Plan o f 1755, edited by Wilbur R. Jacobs (Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press, 1967), 11.
88 Eccles, "Eighteenth-Century Imperialism," 358; White, Middle Ground, 211.
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Indian groups of the region, the French commercial presence in the western Ohio 
country was never seriously jeopardized by the presence of Anglo-American traders. 
Very few Indians ever abandoned their trade with the French, even during the worst 
periods of wartime price inflation.89 If Croghan and his fellow Pennsylvanians 
succeeded briefly in gaining a foothold in the Ohio Valley, it was largely because the 
French trade in the pays d ’en haut had been momentarily thrown off balance. In the 
absence of any extensive records of Anglo-American trade in the Ohio country in the 
late 1740s and early 1750s, it is impossible to determine whether the Canadians or the 
Pennsylvanians had any significant advantage in the terms of exchange once French 
prices returned to pre-war levels. Given more time and increasingly large shipments 
of cheap rum, the Pennsylvanians may well have been able woo more Indian 
customers away from the French. This question, however, is merely academic.
Within a few short years, the English-speaking traders had been driven eastward by 
an aggressive French-Indian campaign to rid the region of British influence. With 
panicked and penniless traders streaming back over the Alleghenies, it was clear who 
had won the contest for the trade of the Ohio country.
Despite the fact that virtually all his assertions contain a potent blend of 
exaggeration, half-truth, and obvious error, Colden’s statements in the "Report of the 
Committee of Council of the Province of New-York," and "A Memorial Concerning
89 Of their Indian allies, only the Mississaugas did not respond favorably to 
French post-war concessions. White, Middle Ground, 211.
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the Furr-Trade of New-York," have been accepted, in lock-step, by credulous 
scholars. Colden’s analysis has come to assume the weight of historical authority. It 
has fundamentally shaped the manner in which the Canadian fur has been interpreted, 
and essentially precluded debate over the viability of the Canadian fur trade in the 
face of Anglo-American competition.90
As New York’s surveyor-general and a prominent member of the governor’s 
council, Colden arguably had better access than most to information concerning the 
Anglo-French contest for commerce and empire. But the budding scientist’s 
disparaging commentary on the Canadian fur trade was no disinterested treatise, 
marred by a few excusable inaccuracies. Rather, it was a masterfully contrived 
propoganda piece, carefully crafted to serve a purpose which can only be grasped by 
delving into the murky realm of New York politics in the early decades of the 
eighteenth century. Colden’s critique of the Canadian fur trade was the product of a 
political moment, written with the patent purpose of justifying Governor Burnet’s 
legislative efforts to severe trade between Albany and Montreal. The rationale 
underpinning the ban on the Canada trade was ostensibly logical. Granted the 
assumption that Montreal merchants depended almost wholly on English trade goods 
smuggled from New York, it followed that, if this supply route were to be cut off, it
90 For a recent genuflection before Colden’s dogma, see White, Middle Ground, 
120-21: "By 1720 New York officials were confident enough of success in securing 
direct trade to outlaw the smuggling of furs between Montreal and Albany, thus 
striking at the French source for what had become the most important manufactured 
good in the western trade- English strouds. The high quality and low price of 
English blankets and strouds and the Indian demand for them," he echoes, "gave the 
English perhaps their greatest advantage over the French."
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would be only a matter of time before the Canadian fur trade was "starved" into 
exhaustion and eventual collapse. In order to argue this case most effectively, Colden 
found it necessary to characterize the Canadian trade as inherently weak and 
insupportable: hence, his emphasis on the poor quality and exorbitant price of French 
goods, the detrimental monopoly of the Compagnie des 1 rides, and the resultingly low 
price paid for furs, not to mention the manifold difficulties involved in transporting 
goods from France to Canada and finally to the pays d ’en haut. In Colden’s scenario, 
the Canadian fur trade of the early 1720s was teetering on the brink of collapse and 
the ban on the Montreal-Albany trade was the measure perfectly calculated to lay it in 
its grave.
But did Colden, or his activist governor, truly believe this to be the case? It is 
ultimately impossible to know, but there is significant evidence to suggest that Colden 
and his fellow imperialists entertained specific political motives which had little to do 
with stemming French expansion in North America but were rooted in ardent local 
political antagonisms traceable back as far as the seventeenth century. In April 1730, 
only a few months after Burnet’s restrictive legislation had finally been repealed, the 
Albany merchant Cornelius Cuyler reflected on the political events of the past decade 
in a letter to his London supplier. "I was Very glad to here [sic] that the act 
Imposeing Dutyes fines etc. was Repealed," admitted Cuyler, who had been deeply 
involved in the Canada trade. "The Making of those unjest acts," he went on to 
speculate, "was Done out of Envy and Malice with Self Interest by Some ill
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Designing persons here. "9l Flushed with the recent victory of the Canada traders, 
Cuyler might simply have lashed out at some imagined conspiracy concocted to 
punish the Albany merchant community. But how could Cuyler and his colleagues 
not have recalled the bitter invective New York imperialists with little affection for 
the Albany Dutch? Not surprisingly, these same men had been the most enthusiastic 
supporters of Burnet’s ban, fully realizing the devastating financial toll it would take 
on the Dutch traders whose livelihoods depended on Canadian beaver.
One of the earliest and most persuasive advocates of challenging French 
hegemony in the western trade was Robert Livingston, the self-made merchant- 
proprietor who, with an estate of more than 160,000 acres, had risen to become one 
of the most influential spokesmen of New York’s "landed" interest.92 Throughout his 
long career, Livingston had prospered by his alliance with a series of colonial 
governors, and he naturally adopted their imperial and inherently anti-French 
perspective.93 Despite his concerns about the influence of Canadian traders among the 
Iroquois and the tribes of the western Great Lakes, Livingston was never wholly 
averse to treating with his northern rivals. In the late 1690s, he made preparations to 
enter into commercial relations with Montreal. He also sent several of his sons to 
learn French in the Huguenot community of La Rochelle in the expectation that they,
91 Cornelius Cuyler to Samuel Baker, 11 April 1730, quoted in Norton, Fur Trade 
in Colonial New York, 148.
92 Patricia U. Bonomi, A Factious People: Politics and Society in Colonial New 
York (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), 69; Norton, Fur Trade in 
Colonial New York, 155.
93 Bonomi, Factious People, 73; Leder, Robert Livingston, 47.
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too, would one day enter the Canada trade.94 Despite his fur-trade background and 
his powerful colonial allies, however, Livingston seems never to have been fully 
accepted by the close-knit Albany trading community and was clearly more 
comfortable associating with other "upriver" traders, such as the Van Rensselaers, 
who operated outside the pale of the Albany monopoly.95
As early as 1699, Livingston had successfully lobbied Governor Bellomont to 
support a program of expansion into the Great Lakes country. He recommended the 
construction of a chain of forts linking Albany with Detroit and the strengthening of 
alliances with the Iroquois and other western Indians. Acknowledging the unqualified 
success of the French coureurs de bois in cementing friendly relations with their 
Indian trading partners, Livingston recommended that young New Yorkers should also 
take to the woods as rival "bushlopers. ',96
94 Leder, Robert Livingston, 126; Cynthia A. Kiemer, "Family Values, Family 
Business: Work and Kinship in Colonial New York," Mid-America, 71:2 (1989): 57- 
58. The young Livingstons later profited from their early bilingual education, trading 
regularly with Canada. One son, John, tangled with an Admiralty Court after a sloop 
of which he was part-owner ran aground on Long Island on a return trip from 
Quebec. The cargo of French goods, including brandy, wines, furs, and textiles, was 
confiscated, and the vessel seized for violation of the Navigation Acts. Leder, Ibid., 
175-76.
95 Bonomi, Factious People, 73.
96 "Mr. Robert Livingston’s Report of his Journey to Onondaga" (April 1700), 
NYCD, 4: 648-52; Norton, Fur Trade in Colonial New York, 155-56. Livingston 
inadvertently acknowledged the superiority of French trade goods while 
recommending that young New Yorkers be encouraged to live among the tribes of the 
western Great Lakes. It was necessary, he counselled, "that our men have passes to 
go a hunting and trading towards Corlaers Lake and the eastward, as well as the 
French, who trade all the bever and peltry from our river Indians and decoy them to 
Canada, lying on every Creek upon the Lake with Brandy and other goods, by which 
means they spoyl us of all that trade. But it would not be advisable that they be
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For a number of reasons, the Albany Dutch vigorously opposed Livingston’s 
aggressive strategy. They feared that antagonizing the French would lead either to a 
renewal of the vicious border raids that they had only recently endured during King 
William’s War, or at least the contraction of their lucrative Montreal trade.
Similarly, Livingston’s proposals conspicuously ignored Albany’s 1686 charter, which 
granted the town a monopoly over the colony’s fur trade. Though the Albany 
merchants could easily comprehend the need for western defense, they shied away 
from Livingston’s deliberately provocative policy.97 With the onset of Queen Anne’s 
War, however, the attention of the colony was soon diverted from Livingston’s 
ambitious and potentially costly program. Not until the arrival of Governor Robert 
Hunter in 1710 would Livingston once again receive a sympathetic hearing.
A distinguished veteran of Marlborough’s army, Hunter arrived in New York 
with an aggressive anti-French attitude that naturally drew him into association with 
like-minded imperialists.98 If Hunter hoped to pursue an expansionist policy in New 
York, however, he soon realized that he would be hampered by the quotidian 
bickering of an assembly that refused even to grant him the customary revenue for his 
salary. Inevitably, perhaps, Hunter immediately came into conflict with prominent 
members of New York’s mercantile faction. The new governor unashamedly
permitted to go and trade with the Five Nations; there they lead a lazy life, and sell 
their goods dearer than the French do at Cadaracqui [Frontenac] where the goods are 
better." NYCD, 4: 651.
97 Norton, Fur Trade in Colonial New York, 221-23.
98 Mary Lou Lustig, Robert Hunter, 1666-1734: New York’s Augustan Statesman 
(Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1983), 74-75.
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gravitated to the colony’s landed "aristocracy," and it was apparent that he shared 
their haughty disdain for the merchant community." Frustrated by the legislative 
obstinacy of the merchant-assemblymen, the whiggish Hunter could also not have 
failed to note their support for the same Tory party that would soon "betray" Britain 
with the "pro-French" Treaty of Utrecht.100 By the time Hunter met Livingston, the 
new speaker of the house, the governor was easily persuaded that French expansion in 
the West should be stifled and that the allegedly pro-French handlaers, who also 
happened to be fervent supporters of his downstate political enemies, could be 
simultaneously restrained.101
Considering the initial hostility of the merchant faction, Hunter’s tenure as 
governor was remarkably successful; he managed, at least, to preside over an 
unseasonable "surface calm" in New York’s perpetually turbulent political 
atmosphere.102 Nonetheless, a number of his mercantile opponents, most notably 
Peter Schuyler and Adolph Philipse, remained entrenched in the council. By the time
"  Hunter believed merchants to be "self-serving boors," Lustig claims, "inimical 
to Augustan tastes in manners and morals and to the attitudes of the imperial, landed 
ruling class of which Hunter was so prominent an example." Lustig, Robert Hunter, 
78.
100 Lustig, Robert Hunter, 114, 139.
101 Michael Kammen has proposed that the "process of anglicization" in 
eighteenth-century New York took on "a special Scottish hue." Kammen, Colonial 
New York: A  History (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1975), 179. Bonomi 
further suggests that Hunter’s suspicions of the predominantly Dutch merchant faction 
were inflamed by the ethnic antipathies he shared with his fellow prominent Scots. 
Bonomi, Factious People, 96.
102 Bonomi, Factious People, 87.
166
he returned to England in 1719, Hunter had not succeeded in implementing 
Livingston’s proposals for western expansion nor in executing his latest strategy of 
stifling the Montreal-Albany trade. Hunter did play a significant role in the selection 
of William Burnet as his successor, however, and cannily briefed the sympathetic 
incumbent administrator on the need to pursue Livingston’s imperial agenda.
In the interim, tensions mounted in New York. As president of the Council, 
Peter Schuyler--the powerful Albany merchant, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, and 
Canada trader—had assumed the post of acting governor in anticipation of Bumet’s 
arrival. One of his first official acts was to replace Robert Livingston’s nephew with 
one of his own relatives as mayor of Albany. He further exercised Hunter’s 
supporters by ignoring the former governor’s designee for mayor of New York City 
and by freely granting land to his friends and political supporters.103 The battle lines 
in the debate over restricting commercial contact with Montreal were also being 
drawn even before Burnet set foot in the colony. Livingston was now the leading 
advocate of the ban on the Canadian trade, and Schuyler, his political nemesis, one of 
its most vocal opponents. The Hunter-Livingston faction had also found willing 
support for their anti-Albany program among the merchants of Schenectady. 
Brandishing their forty-year-old charter, the handlaers had made it clear that the 
western Indians should, by law and custom, come to trade within city limits. The 
Schenectady traders, who were increasingly interested in supplying these same 
customers, clearly resented Albany’s stranglehold on the colonial fur trade. They
103 Bonomi, Factious People, 87-88; Leder, Robert Livingston, 249-50.
167
were only too eager to join the ranks of the imperialists, who similarly sought to 
expand the western trade and demolish the Albany monopoly.104
Burnet’s arrival in 1720 merely heightened the mood of suspicion and 
antagonism in the colony. The new governor, already steeped in Hunter’s prejudices, 
immediately alienated the merchant faction by refusing to call the traditional assembly 
election. He speedily ushered an act to seal off the Montreal-Albany trade through 
the legislature and then replaced Peter Schuyler and his ally Adolph Philipse on the 
council with the more tractable Cadwallader Colden and James Alexander. In one 
stroke, Burnet had delivered a staggering blow to his political opposition, purging the 
leading members of the merchant faction from the government while effectively 
knocking out the underpinnings of their prosperity.105
With opposition mounting to Burnet’s restrictive trade legislation, the 
responsibility for articulating the dubious premise underlying the ban to a confused 
Board of Trade devolved to Colden. Though he had only been in New York a short 
time, the immigrant Scot was no disinterested observer in this debate. After a brief 
stint in Philadelphia, Colden had caught the attention of Governor Hunter, who 
promised him the post of surveyor general in New York. When Colden arrived 
expectantly in the colony, he was dismayed to discover that Hunter had already set 
sail and that Schuyler had bestowed the surveyorship on a political crony. Though 
Schuyler’s appointment was later quashed, Colden never forgave this slight. Already
104 Norton, Fur Trade in Colonial New York, 135.
105 Bonomi, Factious People, 90.
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eager to win his new patron’s favor, Colden’s epistolary assault on the Canada trade 
conceivably had a personal edge as well.106
It is certainly possible that New York’s imperial spokesmen may actually have 
believed that Albany strouds were the sine qua non of the Canadian fur trade. They 
had, admittedly, consistently advocated undercutting French hegemony by promoting 
Anglo-American trade in the Great Lakes region. Examined in the light of the 
ruthless political battle they waged against the embattled merchant faction through the 
1710s and 1720s, however, their rationale for severing the Albany-Montreal trade--as 
most eloquently articulated by Colden—appears glaringly disingenuous and self- 
serving. Perhaps the most damning evidence of the political reality underlying the 
imperial rhetoric of the restrictive legislation was the governor’s own ambivalent 
actions. At the height of the ban, while accused Albany smugglers were being hauled 
into court and forced to swear oaths in their defense, Burnet blithely permitted his 
political allies to profit in Canadian pelts.107 Thus, when Cornelius Cuyler and his 
associates protested that the restrictive acts were "Done out of Envy and Malice with 
Self Interest by some ill Designing persons," they were probably not far from the
106 "Colden neither forgave nor forgot," in the judgment of his biographer, Alice 
Mapelsden Keys. "Years after Schuyler’s death he transmitted to his son, in the hope 
that it might meet the eye of the future historian, a description of his old enemy full 
of unalloyed bitterness, while at the same time he flung himself into an arraignment 
of Schuyler’s administration of the Land Office that helped largely to bring about his 
suspension from the council." Alice Mapelsden Keys, Cadwallader Colden: A 
Representative Eighteenth Century Official (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1906), 108.
107 Norton, Fur Trade in Colonial New York, 139.
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mark.
The influence of this partisan propaganda campaign on subsequent scholarship 
has been vastly out of proportion to its objective historical worth. It was clearly in 
Colden’s best interest to convince the Board of Trade that the Canadian fur trade was 
so inherently unstable, so utterly dependent on English manufactures smuggled from 
New York, that the restriction of the Albany-Montreal commerce would result in 
nothing short of the collapse of the French regime in North America. In this context, 
the argument of New York imperialists curiously echoed the equally self-interested 
claims of their Canadian rivals. Just as Wien has shown that Montreal merchants 
benefitted from the appearance of uncompetitiveness in their rivalry with the Anglo- 
American traders, so it appears likely that Colden and his fellow imperialists had 
much to gain from an identical illusion. If the Canadian fur trade was inherently 
weak, then the Albany Dutch were all the more villainous for propping it up. And if 
the handlaers’ commerce could be ruined in the name of securing Britain’s North 
American empire, neither the imperialists nor the Schenectady traders would mourn 
the loss.
"Each party," Colden later wrote of New York politics in these years, "as they 
were at different times favoured by several Governors, opposed all the Measures 
taken by the other, while each of them were by Turns in Credit with the People or the 
Governor, and sometimes even prosecuted each other to Death. The publick 
Measures were by these Means perpetually fluctuating, and often one Day
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contradictory to what they were the Day before."108 In an irony that would not have 
been lost on the percipient Scot, the greatest legacy of Colden’s rhetorical effort was 
not so much political as it was historiographical. Though their efforts to revile and 
reduce their Albany rivals ultimately misfired, the imperialists’ greatest success was 
the establishment of a myth of Anglo-American superiority in the eighteenth-entury 
fur trade, a legacy which has proved far more enduring than the petty colonial 
antagonisms which engendered it.
108 Quoted in Kammen, Colonial New York, 127.
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FIGURE 3.1
PRICE OF A "PIECE" OF STROUD CLOTH IN MONTREAL AND ALBANY
(£ STERLING)
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FIGURE 3.2
VALUE OF BULK TEXTILES TRADED AT NIAGARA, 1729-1738, RELATIVE
TO TOTAL SALES
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FIGURE 3.3
VALUE OF ENGLISH STROUDS TRADED AT NIAGARA, 1729-1738, 
RELATIVE TO TOTAL SALES
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TABLE 3.1
PRICES OF SELECTED TRADE GOODS AT MONTREAL, SCHENECTADY,
NIAGARA, AND OSWEGO, 1735 (£ STERLING)
I II 111 IV
ITEM
Montreal Albany Niagara Oswego
[estimated]
awls (doz.) 0.0195 0.0464 0.065 0.0533
axes (ea.) 0.1424 0.0909 0.13 0.1045
bacon (lb.) 0.0161 0.0227 0.014 0.0261
blankets (ea.) 0.3463 0.3144 0.4044 0.3616
combs (doz.) 0.0118 0.0303 0.0163 0.0348
corn (bushel) 0.0783 0.0884 0.0682 0.1017
glass beads (lb.) 0.0651 0.053 0.0603 0.0609
gunflints (100) 0.0325 0.1196 0.2167 0.1375
gunpowder (lb.) 0.0563 0.0991 0.0803 0.114
guns (ea.) 0.7803 0.8578 0.9103 0.9865
kettles (lb.) 0.1205 0.0909 0.1205 0.1045
knives (ea.) 0.0065 0.0317 0.0154 0.0365
lead/shot (lb.) 0.0181 0.0354 0.0301 0.0407
linen (yard) 0.0714 0.0727 0.1 0.0836
mirrors (ea.) 0.0126 0.0709 0.0704 0.0815
pease (bushel) 0.0783 0.0909 0.1565 0.1045
pepper (lb.) 0.1004 0.0923 0.1205 0.1061
rings (doz.) 0.0217 0.0216 0.0325 0.0248
rum/brandy (gallon) 0.1985 0.0765 0.397 0.088
shirts (ea.) 0.1235 0.1705 0.15 0.1961
stockings (pair) 0.1951 0.3939 0.1951 0.453
stroud (yard) 0.2795 0.2147 0.1334 0.2469
thread (lb.) 0.1032 0.1724 0.1205 0.1983
tobacco (lb.) 0.0201 0.0196 0.0401 0.0225
vermilion (lb.) 0.3565 0.4848 0.4821 0.5575
wine (gallon) 0.1103 0.2424 0.2646 0.2788
Sources: “Journal #3, Monifere, 1731-1737, Ventes: credit et d£bit,"
M848, reel 2, vol. 4, MMR\ "Account Book of Hendrick (Henry) Van
Rensselaer," NYHS, Misc. MSS., reel #63; AN, (*lA, 73: 310-12.
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FIGURE 3.4a
PRICES OF SELECTED TRADE GOODS AT MONTREAL, SCHENECTADY,
NIAGARA, AND OSWEGO, 1735 (£ STERLING)
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FIGURE 3.4b
PRICES OF SELECTED TRADE GOODS AT MONTREAL, SCHENECTADY,
NIAGARA, AND OSWEGO, 1735 (£ STERLING)
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FIGURE 3.4c
PRICES OF SELECTED TRADE GOODS AT MONTREAL, SCHENECTADY,
NIAGARA, AND OSWEGO, 1735 (£ STERLING)
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FIGURE 3.5
PRICE FLUCTUATIONS OF SELECTED GOODS AT MONTREAL (LIVRES)
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FIGURE 3.6a
PRICE OF BLANKETS AT MONTREAL AND SCHENECTADY/ALBANY
(£ STERLING)
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+  Albany
Sources: "Journal #3, Monibre, 1731-1737, Ventes: credit et ddbit," 
M848, reel 2, vol. 4, MMR; "Journal No. #4, Monifere, 1737-1748, 
Ventes: Credit et ddbit," M849, reel 3, vol. 8, MMR; "Account Book 
of Hendrick (Henry) Van Rensselaer," NYHS, Misc. MSS., reel #63.
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FIGURE 3.6b
PRICE OF KETTLES (PER LB.) AT MONTREAL AND
SCHENECTADY/ALBANY (£ STERLING)
0.22
0.2 - 
0.18- 
0.16- 
0.14- 
£  0.12-
0.1 -
0.08-
0.06-
0.04-
1731 1735 1740 1745
Legend 
—  Montreal 
+  Albany
Sources: "Journal #3, Moni&re, 1731-1737, Ventes: credit et ddbit," 
M848, reel 2, vol. 4, MMR; "Journal No. #4, Monifere, 1737-1748, 
Ventes: Credit et ddbit," M849, reel 3, vol. 8, MMR; "Account Book 
of Hendrick (Henry) Van Rensselaer," NYHS, Misc. MSS., reel #63.
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FIGURE 3.6c
PRICE OF BRANDY/RUM (PER GAL.) AT MONTREAL AND
SCHENECTADY/ALBANY (£ STERLING)
0.5-
0.45-
0.4-
0.35-
£
0.25-
0.2 -
0.15-
0.05-
1731 1735 1740 1745
Legend 
—  Montreal 
+  Albany
Sources: "Journal #3, Monifere, 1731-1737, Ventes: crddit et ddbit," 
M848, reel 2, vol. 4, MMR; "Journal No. #4, Monifcre, 1737-1748, 
Ventes: Crddit et ddbit," M849, reel 3, vol. 8, MMR; "Account Book 
of Hendrick (Henry) Van Rensselaer," NYHS, Misc. MSS., reel #63.
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FIGURE 3.6d
PRICE OF STROUD CLOTH (PER YD.) AT MONTREAL AND
SCHENECTADY/ALBANY (£ STERLING)
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Sources: "Journal #3, Moni&re, 1731-1737, Ventes: credit et ddbit," 
M848, reel 2, vol. 4, MMR; "Journal No. #4, Monfere, 1737-1748, 
Ventes: Crddit et ddbit," M849, reel 3, vol. 8, MMR; "Account Book 
of Hendrick (Henry) Van Rensselaer," NYHS, Misc. MSS., reel #63.
TABLE 3.2
PRICES OF SELECTED PELTRY AT MONTREAL AND
SCHENECTADY/ALBANY (£ STERLING)
1735 1754
NY Montreal NY Montreal
bear 0.1818 0.1734 0.2833 0.4365
beaver, coat (lb.) 0.165 0.1406 0.2274 0.1618
beaver, parchment (lb.) 0.165 0.0804 0.2274 0.1618
cat 0.0758 0.0975 0.1109 0.1746
deerskin (lb.) 0.1215 0.1205 0.1252 0.1214
fisher 0.1879 0.1951 0.2782 0.3274
fox 0.1245 0.1746
marten 0.1061 0.1084 0.1329 0.1528
mink 0.0515 0.0433 0.0867 0.1091
muskrat 0.0076 0.0108 0.0203 0.0109
otter 0.1684 0.1734 0.3519 0.4365
raccoon 0.0627 0.0607 0.0698 0.0917
wolf 0.0909 0.13 0.1013 0.2183
1735 sources: Wien, "Castor, peaux, et pelleteries," 91; "Account 
Book of Hendrick (Henry) Van Rensselaer," NYHS, Misc. MSS., reel 
#63. 1754 sources: Innis, Fur-Trade o f Canada, 153;"Letterbook of 
Robert Sanders, 1752-58," NYHS, Misc. MSS., reel #3; "Letterbook 
of John Sanders, 1749-73, NYHS, Misc. MSS., reel #3."
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FIGURE 3.7
PRICE OF BEAVER AND DEERSKINS AT MONTREAL AND
SCHENECTADY/ALBANY (£ STERLING)
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1735 sources: Wien, "Castor, peaux, et pelleteries," 91; "Account Book of Hendrick 
(Henry) Van Rensselaer," NYHS, Misc. MSS., reel #63. 1754 sources: Innis, Fur- 
Trade o f Canada, 153; "Letterbook of Robert Sanders, 1752-58," NYHS, Misc. 
MSS., reel #3; "Letterbook of John Sanders, 1749-73, NYHS, Misc. MSS., reel 
#3."
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FIGURE 3.8
PRICE OF SELECTED PELTRY AT MONTREAL AND
SCHENECTADY/ALBANY (£ STERLING)
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1735 sources: Wien, "Castor, peaux, et pelleteries," 91; "Account 
Book of Hendrick (Henry) Van Rensselaer," NYHS, Misc. MSS., reel 
#63. 1754 sources: Innis, Fur-Trade o f Canada, 153; "Letterbook of 
Robert Sanders, 1752-58," NYHS, Misc. MSS., reel #3; "Letterbook 
of John Sanders, 1749-73, NYHS, Misc. MSS., reel #3."
TABLE 3.3
PRICES OF SELECTED TRADE GOODS AT MONTREAL AND
PHILADELPHIA, 1744 (£ STERLING)
I II
ITEM Montreal Philadelphia
awls (doz.) 0.0145 0.06
beads (lb.) 0.0758 0.105
gunflints (100) 0.0254 0.075
gunpowder (lb.) 0.042 0.054
guns (ea.) 0.6973 0.63
handkerchiefs (ea.) 0.0317 0.12
hatchets (ea.) 0.0679 0.075
kettles (lb.) 0.0994 0.067
knives (doz.) 0.1176 0.255
lead (lb.) 0.0164 0.012
mirrors (ea.) 0.0217 0.04
rings (doz.) 0.125 0.06
rum/brandy (gal.) 0.2421 0.13
soap (lb.) 0.042 0.0144
stroud (yard) 0.2408 0.2609
tobacco (lb.) 0.021 0.007
vermilion (lb.) 0.3084 0.54
Sources: "loumal No. #4, Monifere, 1737-1748, Ventes: Crddit et
d6bit," M849, reel 3, vol. 8, MMR; George Croghan Section,
Cadwallader Collection, HSP.
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FIGURE 3.9a
PRICES OF SELECTED TRADE GOODS AT MONTREAL AND
PHILADELPHIA, 1744 (£ STERLING)
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Sources: "Journal No. #4, Monifere, 1737-1748, Ventes: Credit et
d£bit," M849, reel 3, vol. 8, MMR; George Croghan Section,
Cadwallader Collection, HSP.
188
FIGURE 3.9b
PRICES OF SELECTED TRADE GOODS AT MONTREAL AND
PHILADELPHIA, 1744 (£ STERLING)
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Sources: "Journal No. #4, Monifere, 1737-1748, Ventes: Crddit et
ddbit," M849, reel 3, vol. 8, MMR; George Croghan Section,
Cadwallader Collection, HSP.
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FIGURE 3.9c
PRICES OF SELECTED TRADE GOODS AT MONTREAL AND
PHILADELPHIA, 1744 (£ STERLING)
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Sources: "Journal No. #4, Monifcre, 1737-1748, Ventes: Credit et
d^bit," M849, reel 3, vol. 8, MMR; George Croghan Section,
Cadwallader Collection, HSP.
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FIGURE 3.10
NEW YORK AND PENNSYLVANIA PELTRY EXPORTS, 1718-58
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Source: Cutcliffe, "Colonial Indian Policy," Table 1, 240-42.
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FIG U R E3.il
DEERSKIN PRICES AT MONTREAL AND PHILADELPHIA (£ STERLING)
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Sources: Montreal, 1735: Wien, "Castor, peaux, et pelleteries," 91. 
*Philadelphia, 1732: Guthman, "Indian Trade Documents," 10. 
Montreal, 1754: Innis, Fur-Trade o f Canada, 153. Philadelphia, 
1754: Croghan Section, Cadwallader Collection, HSP.
CHAPTER IV 
INDIAN AGENDAS
ACT I
SCENE I 
An Indian Trading House.
Enter McDoIe and Murphey, Two Indian Traders, 
and their Servants.1
In the drawing rooms and coffee houses of fashionable London, Robert 
Rogers’s homespun art breathed new life into the fabled characters of the eighteenth- 
century frontier. The noble and vicitimized Indian savage, the shamelessly rapacious 
Scots-Irish trader, the recently deposed yet still menacing Frenchman: all eased into 
their familiar roles as into a well-worn pair of moccasins, enacting an allegory of the 
simmering hatreds and botched relations that culminated in the shedding of real blood 
on the fringes of the new Anglo-American empire. For all its suspect fusion of fact 
and myth, Rogers’s tale of Pontiac and his failed uprising nonetheless opens a window 
onto a swirling scene of perceptions, prejudices, and daily transactions between 
Indians and Europeans which, far more than the abstractions of merchant markup or 
peltry prices, dictated the ultimate success of the French and English in their rivalry
1 Robert Rogers, Ponteach: Or, The Savages o f America, A Tragedy (London: J. 
Millan, 1766).
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for the Great Lakes-Ohio Valley fur trade before 1760.
A seasoned veteran of three ferocious wars for control of the "Old 
Northwest," Rogers was no stranger to the fluid and often lethal world of the fur 
trade frontier. If he tended to paint his characters with a broad brush, it was perhaps 
because his real-life subjects lived so assiduously up-or, more commonly, down—to 
type. In Rogers’s fictional world, at least, the lineage of Anglo-Indian conflict was 
not difficult to discern. Heading the long list of native grievances were the traders, 
frontier confidence men and rogues who, through greed and guile, had poisoned the 
Indians against the English long before the first land-hungry settlers broke through the 
Alleghenies. If  bitter Anglo-Indian conflict for control of the West was inevitable, 
Rogers implied, the frauds and deceits of the wily, grasping traders only portended 
more insidious usurpations to come.
Rogers’s indictment of the Anglo-American traders is embodied by McDole 
and Murphey, their names alone a powerful allusion-in an eighteenth-century ethnic 
shorthand-to inevitable fraud. As the curtain rises, the veteran McDole initiates a 
naive Murphey into the "secret Arts" of the "Indian Commerce," quickly disabusing 
him of any earnest expectations of making "an honest Living." Inspecting the 
newcomer’s merchandise, McDole pronounces: "’Tis very well: your Articles are 
good:/ But now the Thing’s to make a Profit from them,/ Worth all your Toil and 
Pains of coming hither./ Our fundamental Maxim then is this,/" he confides, "That 
it’s no Crime to cheat and gull an Indian" [4]. Murphey’s bewildered protest in 
defense of the Indians’ "natural rights” raises little sympathy in the hardened dealer.
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"Ah!" McDole counters. "If you boggle here, I say no more,/ This is the very 
Quintessence of Trade,/ And ev’ry Hope of Gain depends upon it;/ None who 
neglect it ever did grow rich,/" he remarks with finality, "Or ever will, or can by 
Indian Commerce" [5].
With the inherent justice of the trade immediately called into question, McDole 
proudly relates the sordid details of his practiced deceptions. "A thousand 
Opportunities present/ To Take Advantage of their Ignorance/" he admits;
But the great Engine I employ is Rum,
More pow’rful made by certain strength’ning Drugs. 
This I  distribute with a lib’ral Hand,
Urge them to drink till they grow mad and valiant; 
Which makes them think me generous and just,
And gives full Scope to practice all my Art.
I then begin my Trade with water’d Rum,
The cooling Draught well suits their scorching Throats. 
Their Fur and Peltry come in quick Return:
My Scales are honest, but so well contriv’d,
That one small Slip will turn Three Pounds to One; 
Which they, poor silly Souls! ignorant of Weights 
And Rules of Balancing, do not perceive [5],
When three Indians conveniently arrive on the scene eager to trade their 
beaver pelts for rum, McDole demonstrates his dubious skills to his skeptical 
companion. The fraudulent transaction comes off without a hitch, with McDole 
garnering an astounding ninety pounds of beaver for a mere six quarts of watered 
rum.2 A duly impressed Murphey thanks his colleague for the lucrative advice, but
2 The tragicomic nature o f this transaction would have been even more striking to 
contemporaries familiar with current rates of exchange. Assuming a generous price 
of 5 shillings per pound of beaver and 15 shillings per gallon of rum, the Indians
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ponders the potentially brutal repercussions of this sharp brand of dealing. But to 
McDole this is only business. "Can’t you avoid them?" he asks. "Let their Ven­
geance light/ On others Heads, no matter whose, if you/ Are but secure, and have 
the Gain in Hand," he counsels. With the trader vanished, the Indians will vent their 
anger on "a Stranger" or an "honest Peasant." And so the pair take their leave with a 
final, premonitory quip from McDole: "Such let them murder, if they will a Score," 
he says. "The Guilt is theirs, while we secure the Gain,/ Nor shall we feel the 
bleeding Victims Pain" [8].
Like the violence that threatens to erupt in response to English avarice and 
insult, a profound nostalgia for the French presence in the pays d ’en haul, all the 
more acute for its freshness, pervades each scene of Rogers’s drama. The context of 
Pontiac’s first appearance, in fact, is a telling commentary on the fragility of Anglo- 
Indian relations with the French subtracted from the imperial equation. Addressing 
the impossibly haughty Colonel Cockum, Pontiac alludes to an ongoing, if one-sided, 
dialogue with the newly empowered English. "You give no Answer yet to my 
Complaint;/” he charges. "Your men give my Men always too much Rum,/ Then 
trade and cheat ’em. What! d’ye think this/ right?" [14]. Cockum’s dismissive
spent the equivalent of £22,5 for rum worth just over £1 at a vastly inflated frontier 
cost. For beaver prices, see Yoko Shirai, "The Indian Trade in Colonial 
Pennsylvania, 1730-1768: Traders and Land Speculation" (Ph.D. dissertation, 
Department of History, University of Pennsylvania, 1985), 116, 145n. The price of 
rum in the Ohio country was always variable. Worth about 3 shillings per gallon in 
Philadelphia, it sold at Fort Pitt in the mid-1760s for between 15 and 20 shillings per 
gallon. "Account with the Crown (Croghan and Cole), 1766" in the microfilm edition 
of the Boynton, Wharton, and Morgan Papers in the Pennsylvania State Archives 
(MG 19), Accounts Current, 1766-1771, Volume 7: 375-425.
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answer provokes another Indian chief to remark: "I thought the English had been
better Men," to which his companion pointedly replies: "Frenchmen would always
hear an Indian! speak,/ And answer fair, and make good Promises." Overhearing this
exchange, Cockum rankles at the comparison. "You may be d— d," the colonel
retorts, "and all your Frenchmen too" [15].
Fortunately, cooler heads prevail when Sharp, a colonial governor who
happens to be present, promises to make Pontiac’s grievances known to the king.
"Your Men make Indians drunk, and then/ they cheat ’em," Pontiac repeats. "I tell
you plainly this will never do," he cautions, "We never thus were treated by the
French." A conciliatory Sharp reminds him that "there’s good and bad, you know, in
every/ Nation. You must not mind the Conduct of a few,/ Nor judge the rest by what
you see of them." Pontiac’s answer is terse: "If you’ve some good," he suggests,
"why don’t you send them here?" [20].
With the English at a safe distance, Pontiac and his cohorts later reflect on the
alteration in their circumstances precipitated by the expulsion of the French from the
pays d ’en haut. "Where are we now?" Pontiac asks.
The French are all subdued,
But who are in their Stead become our Lords?
A proud, imperious, churlish, haughty Band.
The French familiarized themselves with us,
Studied our Tongue, and Manners, wore our Dress,
Married our Daughters, and our Sons their Maids,
Dealt honestly, and well supplied our Wants,
Used no one ill, and treated with Respect 
Our Kings, our Captains, and our aged Men;
Call’d us their Friends, nay, what is more, their 
Children,
And seem’d like Fathers anxious for our Welfare [32-33].
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These are Rogers’s words, not Pontiac’s, but springing as they do from the 
pen of one who had battled his share of Frenchmen, they are essential to 
understanding the greater success of his enemies in establishing and perpetuating an 
enduring and mutually profitable trade founded on respect and compromise, not greed 
and deceit. The importance of Rogers’s dramatic portrait of Pontiac has little to do 
with his inventions of plot or dialogue or with his elevation of the Indian leader to the 
status of tragic hero. Rogers’s work is remarkable as perhaps the most eloquent 
affirmation that the Anglo-American fur trade had essentially failed, not necessarily in 
financial terms, for clearly many traders, merchants, and agents had profited 
handsomely by their exchange of English manufactured goods for beaver, deerskins, 
and other peltry, but rather because English administrators and Americans traders 
blindly refused to integrate the purely pecuniary interests of the trade into a broader 
imperial program that recognized the fundamental unity of trade and alliance in the 
realm of Indian-European relations.
Rogers’s Ponteach was a caustic commentary on the misconduct of English 
officers and traders in the period following the expulsion of the French and lent 
dramatic color to a specific set of concerns that had plagued colonial officials since 
the beginnings of Anglo-Indian trade. The stock characters who inhabited Rogers’s 
fictional frontier stood as testament to the extent to which the stereotype of the 
unabashedly corrupt Anglo-American trader had already slipped into the colonial 
cultural vernacular. In a pattern all-too-familiar to his audience, Rogers’s traders 
cheated and stole from the Indians, then blithely ignored the bloody issue of their
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illegitimate dealings. Rogers was hardly the first to recognize the nexus of trade and 
alliance in European-Indian relations, nor was he unique in admitting that American 
traders had performed abysmally alongside their Canadian rivals. But in portraying 
Pontiac and his people as the long-suffering victims of wanton abuse at the hands of 
the English, Rogers unabashedly affirmed that the Indian trade, despite its potential 
for ensuring a peaceful coexistence, had been perverted into a breeding ground for 
hatred and violence.
The full extent to which the English failed to harness the fur trade to greater 
imperial purposes can be grasped only in reference to the relationship of commerce 
and alliance in the Algonquian societies of the Great Lakes-Ohio Valley region.
Though it is as hazardous to posit generalizations about "Indians"—whether Ojibwas, 
Ottawas, Delawares, or Miamis-as to conflate the motives and methods of 
"Europeans," it is evident that Indians were on the whole less likely to understand the 
exchange of pelts and skins for manufactured goods as an exclusively "economic" 
transaction. As Richard White has suggested, the native conception of material 
exchange was enmeshed in a web of social, cultural, political, and military 
associations that did not allow for easy translation into the traditional European terms 
of markets, price, and profit. Trade satisfied far more than the basic material needs 
of its Algonquian participants. "The goal of the transaction was not necessarily 
profit— securing the maximum material advantage," White suggests. Of greater 
importance was the need to "satisfy the besoins, or needs of each party." As such, 
the context in which the two parties interacted took on far greater significance than
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what was actually exchanged; if no previous relationship existed between trading 
partners, one had to be created. The buyer’s demands thus often overshadowed the 
opportunistic advantage of the seller. "The greater the need-provided a social 
relationship had been established," White notes, "the greater the claim of the buyer on 
the seller." In this sense the Indian conception of exchange was virtually the inverse 
of the European: far more than a series of self-interested transactions between virtual 
strangers, the fur trade implied a socially and culturally mediated exchange of 
material items that manifested a more complex and continuous relationship in which 
"buyer" and "seller" were encouraged, indeed required, to sustain a mutual respect 
for one another’s welfare.3
The apparent divergence of Indian economic behavior from the ostensibly 
"rational," "buy cheap and sell dear" European norm has fueled what most scholars 
now consider to be a defunct dispute between a "substantivist" position that argues for 
a "culturally relative" approach to understanding the trade in which non-economic 
motives take precedence over simple calculations of profit, versus a "formalist" model 
in which all humans are assumed to approach the same problems of subsistence and 
exchange in a universally "logical" and calculating manner. This rather artificial 
dichotomy is not particularly useful in describing Indian-European relations in the fur 
trade because it slights the complexity of the ongoing process of contact and 
accommodation within various regions and between different groups, as well as
3 Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the 
Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 94- 
98.
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overlooking the fact that each party could subsequently reformulate or modify its 
conception of exchange in order to better serve its own interests. White, for 
example, deliberately steers clear of the substantivist-formalist debate by 
acknowledging that both the Indians and the French were forced to seek a "middle 
ground" that privileged the Indian conception of trade as symbolic of alliance and 
mutual responsibility as well as the French desire for profits. The Indians were thus 
drawn as much into a new world of transatlantic merchant capitalism as were the 
French into the realm of native tradition and practice.4 Similarly, Bruce Trigger blurs 
the lines between "rational" and "culturally contingent" conceptions of exchange by 
asserting that Indian groups with little or no experience with European technology 
nonethless underwent a rapid "cognitive reorganization" that allowed them to 
rationally assess the usefulness of European material culture and subsequently to 
influence the process of exchange in order to maximize their own advantage. 
Fundamentally, Trigger posits a "transcendant" human reason equally operative within 
Indian and European modes of exchange.5
Though Indians and Europeans alike may have acted in an similarly rational
4 White, Middle Ground, 95-96.
5 Bruce Trigger, "Early North American Responses to European Contact: 
Romantic versus Rationalistic Interpretations," Journal o f American History, 77:4
(1991): 1195-1215. Similarly, Bruce White demonstrates that the Ojibwas and 
Dakotas adopted French material culture to suit their own specific needs, regardless 
of whether such goods were deemed "utilitarian" or "nonutilitarian" by European 
standards. Bruce M. White, "Encounters with Spirits: Ojibwa and Dakota Theories 
about the French and Their Merchandise," Ethnohistory, 41:3 (1994): 369-405.
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manner to satisfy their own distinctly different needs, this does not mean that most 
Indians ever fully accepted what Europeans considered to be normative economic 
behavior. In fact, there is much evidence to suggest the contrary. Though 
increasingly implicated in the European mercantile system, the Algonquians of the 
pays d'en haut resolutely clung to certain fundamental notions that frequently baffled 
English and French observers. The first was a belief in the inherent, fixed value of 
goods that has been compared to the earlier European conception of a "just price." 
Though the Indians did gradually accede to the idea of "unit prices" for trade goods 
as expressed in skins or peltry, they remained generally unwilling to recognize that 
such prices might fluctuate in response to the unseen forces of supply and demand. 
And just as their conception of inherent value was uncompromising, so too did their 
craving for European merchandise remain relatively inelastic as well. The reasons 
underlying the unbudging nature of native consumer demand are indistinguishably 
cultural and pragmatic. The accumulation of personal property was generally 
frowned upon within Algonquian groups; rather, status was measured by generosity 
and the redistribution of wealth, a fact which inevitably put a fixed ceiling on 
consumption. Indians were also typically less concerned with stockpiling goods 
against future wants than their European counterparts and tended to restrict their 
purchases solely to those goods necessary to satisfy immediate needs. The static level 
of Indian demand was not solely the product of social encouragements or sanctions, 
however, for the simple reason that such semi-nomadic peoples were ultimately
202
constrained by the limits of what they could efficiently transport.6
In analyzing the eighteenth-century trading accounts of the Hudson’s Bay 
Company, Arthur Ray and Donald Freeman have statistically demonstrated the 
financial consequences of a characteristically "Indian" economic mentality by plotting 
the correlation between fluctuations in the price of beaver and fur receipts. Noting 
that price and production levels at the Hudson Bay posts appear to have been 
inversely related, they determined that the Indians’s response to improved prices was 
best described by a "classical backward sloping supply curve." Quite simply, when 
the price the company paid for beaver rose, an individual Indian consumer could 
supply his relatively static needs by trading fewer pelts. In so doing, native 
consumer-producers did not act according to company expectations. While the 
Europeans expected the incentive of greater "profits"—i.e. higher beaver prices-to 
spur an increase in fur production, the Indians failed to take advantage of the 
beneficial terms of trade by purchasing more goods.7
In attempting to explain to his confused Hudson’s Bay Company superiors why 
raising the price offered for beaver would not result in greater fur receipts, the trader 
Andrew Graham remarked that
6 White, Middle Ground, 115-16, 129-131; Arthur J. Ray and Donald B. 
Freeman, "Give Us Good M e a s u re A n  Economic Analysis o f Relations Between the 
Indians and the Hudson’s Bay Company Before 1763 (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1978), 161-62, 222-23.
7 Ray and Freeman, ' Give Us Good Measure," 218-19; E. E. Rich, "Trade 
Habits and Economic Motivation Among the Indians of North America," The 
Canadian Journal o f Economics and Political Science, 26:1 (1960): 45-49.
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if  the trading standard was enlarged in favour of the natives, would 
ruin it all; for I am certain if the natives were to get any more for 
their furs, they would catch fewer, which I shall make plainly appear 
viz. one canoe brings down yearly to the Fort one hundred made 
beaver in different kinds of furs, and trades with me seventy of the said 
beaver for real necessaries. The other thirty beaver shall so puzzle him 
to trade, that he often asks me what he shall buy, and when I make an 
answer, Trade some more powder, shot, tobacco and hatchets, etc., his 
answer is, I have traded sufficient to serve me and my family until I 
see you again next summer; so he will drink one half, and trade the 
other with me for baubles.8
Efforts to introduce novel items to the standard assortment of trade 
merchandise in hopes of inflating native consumption usually proved futile. Once 
their basic needs had been met, the Indians simply refused to trade their excess furs 
for items they considered superfluous and would probably bring fewer pelts or skins 
to trade the following year. Graham quickly discovered that virtually the only way to 
coax Indian consumption upward was to provide ample supplies of tobacco and 
particularly alcohol. These two commodities consistently found an eager market, 
because of their addictive potential and because both could be consumed in large 
quantities on the spot, precluding the need to transport it over long distances. Of 
course, the extent to which various Indian groups reacted to the availability of these 
products varied greatly. Ample supplies of alcohol, tobacco, or any other 
merchandise did not necessarily transform Indians into unrepentant consumers.9
8 Andrew Graham, Andrew Graham’s Observations on Hudson’s Bay, 1767-91, 
edited by Glyndwr Williams, Publications of the Hudson’s Bay Record Society, Vol. 
27 (London: The Society, 1969), 263.
9 Ray and Freeman, "Give Us Good Measure," 128-35, 225; Rich, "Trade 
Habits," 45, 49-50; Arthur J. Ray, Indians in the Fur Trade: Their Role as Hunters,
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Though it has been frequently acknowledged that the Indians of the pays d ’en 
haut had a relatively stable and limited demand for European goods, the question of 
native "dependency" in the fur trade still pervades the discussion of Indian-European 
commercial relations in the eighteenth century. Scholars have for the most part 
abandoned the earlier formulation that Indian groups succumbed swiftly and inevitably 
to the allure of superior European technology, in so doing becoming irrevocably 
dependent for their survival on English or French traders. This position, Toby 
Morantz insists, is inherently anachronistic because it reads the social, cultural, and 
economic dissolution of twentieth-century Indian societies into a period in which no 
such patterns yet existed.10 Morantz further notes that it is impossible to generalize 
about Indian dependence in the eighteenth-century fur trade because the rate at which 
different Indian groups developed trading relationships with Europeans or integrated 
manufactured goods into their own material culture varied considerably. "It is 
erroneous to assume that all Indian societies were affected in the same way," Morantz 
notes, "or that the fur trade was the single cause of social transformation." Regional 
studies have tended to show that each native group developed its own "special social 
and cultural accommodations or forms of adaptation" in the trade, and in most cases 
the new commercial relationships may simply have reinforced "certain societal
Trappers and Middlemen in the Lands Southwest o f Hudson Bay, 1660-1870 (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1974), 142-44; White, Middle Ground, 131.
10 Toby Morantz, "Old Texts, Old Questions: Another Look at the Issue of 
Continuity and the Early Fur-Trade Period," Canadian Historical Review, 73:2
(1992): 167, 185-86.
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tendencies already in existence."11
The emphasis that Morantz places on the persistence and continuity of Indian 
societies when confronted with the changes wrought by new choices is echoed by 
Richard White, who argues that the Indian peoples of the Great Lakes did not become 
"dependent" on European goods during the period of Anglo-French rivalry if 
dependency implies the "possibility that without European goods and the fur trade the 
Algonquians would no longer be able to feed, clothe, or house themselves."12 The 
besoins of the Algonquians may indeed have been limited and the demands of 
subsistence would always take priority over the acquisition of trade merchandise, but 
White feels that perhaps the strongest argument against the possibility of Indian 
dependency in this era is the relatively limited extent of the French trade. Given the 
cargo capacity of Canadian canoes and the strictly regulated number of congis granted 
for trading expeditions to the pays d ’en haul, White concludes that the volume of 
trade merchandise entering the Great Lakes region in the first half of the mid­
eighteenth century was simply too modest to have triggered an insatiable demand for 
European goods. Though he admits that the scale of the fur trade undoubtedly 
expanded after the 1720s, it was probably the greater demand for woolens and cloth 
that fuelled the increased consumption. Despite their convenience, textiles alone 
could not draw Indian consumers helplessly into the snare of commercial capitalism, 
and French Canadians were simply not able to supply enough merchandise of any
11 Morantz, "Old Texts," 167-68, 186.
12 White, Middle Ground, 128.
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kind to sustain native dependence. As a result, "a preexisting native technology 
survived for a remarkably long time alongside the new technology," White proposes. 
"Kettles boiled water, knives cut meat, and guns killed game, but they did not chain 
their users inevitably, inexorably, and immediately to the will of the suppliers. A far 
less efficient, but still serviceable, native technology remained available if trade goods 
were lacking."13
The rate at which an Indian group acquired and assimilated European 
merchandise varied in response to a number of conditions, including the frequency of 
European trade contact, the amount of goods available, and the degree to which a 
particular consumer population developed a need or desire for the new merchandise. 
Though it is impossible to describe with any accuracy the precise nature of individual 
Indian consumption of trade goods in the eighteenth century, some admittedly limited 
generalizations can be drawn on the basis of the few records that document Indian 
trading habits. One such source was unwittingly furnished by George Croghan and 
his trading associates William Trent, Robert Callender, and Michael Teaffe. Croghan 
and his fellow traders lost a considerable amount of trade merchandise and skins to 
the French and allied Indians in the chaotic conditions of the early 1750s. Hounded 
by creditors demanding payment, Croghan and his agents swore to a series of 
affidavits in the spring of 1756 describing the extent of their losses and noting the 
debts that their Indian customers had accrued before the French incursions. These 
documents are uniquely revealing because they record the names of individuals
13 White, Middle Ground, 132-33.
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indebted to Croghan along with the sum they owed, expressed both in deerskins 
(arbitrarily valued by Croghan at 7 shillings, 6 pence per skin) and Pennsylvania 
currency.14
On the basis of these records it is possible to draw some tentative conclusions 
concerning the purchasing patterns of Croghan’s Indian customer-suppliers in the 
Ohio country.15 The mean debt owed to Croghan and company by the 311 individuals 
identified in the lists was approximately 28 deerskins, or £10.67 Pennsylvania 
currency (£6.18 sterling). Because the customers are identified by a hodgepodge of 
names including anglicized forms ("Delaware George," "Robin Hood"), descriptive 
identifiers ("the Pockmarked Fellow," "the Blind Captain"), English renderings of 
what were probably Indian titles ("the White Elk," "the Bear"), and attempted 
transcriptions of native names ("Bucksenutha," "Porquenish") it is often difficult to 
ascertain whether the individual was male or female. That women were indebted to 
Croghan and company is clear from these accounts, however. Somewhat less than a
14 These affidavits are filed together in the George Croghan Section of the 
Cadwallader Collection at the Historical Society of Pennsylvania. The total value of 
the traders’ losses, including merchandise, skins, peltry, and Indian debts, was listed 
at £6,511 5s. 9d. Pennsylvania currency.
15 Analysis of these records is complicated by the fact that only one of the six lists 
was compiled by Croghan himself; the others were drawn up and sworn to by one of 
Croghan’s agents, including Thomas Ward, Patrick Mullen, Samuel Chambers, John 
Maynard, and David Handpicks. As a result, it was necessary to collate the six lists 
to determine whether more than one agent had "trusted out" merchandise to the same 
Indian customer, a process which is further confused by the tendency of various 
traders to have rendered what appear to be the same Indian names in different, though 
phonetically similar, forms (e.g. "Wageleme," "Wegalame," and "Weygelami").
When it seemed warranted, such variants were assumed to refer to the same 
individual and the separate debts were collapsed into a single entry.
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quarter of the debtors are referred to not by their own name, but rather in reference 
to another individual ("the White Mingo’s brother," "the Big Homini’s friend"). It is 
possible that others with ambiguous or Indian names might have been women, but at 
least twelve individuals (slightly less than 4 percent of all customers) can be identified 
with certainty as female because they are denoted as someone’s mother, sister, or 
daughter. The mean debt of these women, 8 skins or £3.1875 (£1.85 sterling), was 
significantly less than the overall average. The fact that at least a handful of women 
kept their own individual accounts with Croghan, however, is telling in its own right, 
particularly since the role of native women in the eighteenth-century fur trade is still 
not well understood. White speculates that the amount of time native women spent 
making clothing would have been substantially reduced by the availability of European 
textiles and finished clothing items, though to what extent this surplus time and 
energy would have been channeled into preparing the greater number of skins and 
pelts necessary to supply such cloth and woolens is unclear.16 Though the women 
trading with Croghan would not have hunted deer, they nonetheless appear to have 
wielded at least some degree of personal autonomy in the realm of European-Indian 
exchange. Indian women of the western Great Lakes often snared small fur-bearing 
animals, the pelts from which they were free to trade themselves. Croghan and his 
agents might have credited such peltry to their accounts at a fraction of the rate for 
deerskins, which may partly explain why the women’s debts were significantly lower
16 White, Middle Ground, 132.
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than the men’s.17
Certain potential problems of interpretation arise in assessing Croghan’s Indian 
debts. Since the debts were compiled in the form of affidavits attested to by several 
different traders, it is apparent that a significant number of Indians purchased goods 
on credit from more than one of Croghan’s agents. In fact, 46 of the 311 individuals 
mentioned in the accounts (almost 15 percent) had commercial ties to at least two of 
the traders. This fact underlines the possibility that Croghan’s debt records do not 
necessarily offer an entirely accurate picture of individual consumption patterns 
because Croghan or his agent may have been only one of several Anglo-American or 
French traders with whom an Indian dealt. The Moravian missionary David 
Zeisberger estimated that a single Indian hunter in the Ohio country could kill 
between 50 and 150 deer each year.18 Given this rate of potential production, the 
relatively large number of skins owed to Croghan by certain Indians suggests that 
some, at least, must have traded almost exclusively with Croghan and company. 
Forty-eight of the 311 debtors (15.4 percent) owed 50 or more skins, while some 20 
individuals (6.4 percent) had debts in excess of 100 skins. These comparatively high 
figures might suggest that Croghan and his agents allowed certain individuals’ debts to 
accrue over a period of several seasons, but this is unlikely since Croghan and his 
fellow traders—themselves indebted to Philadelphia merchants—generally expected all
17 Sylvia Van Kirk, "Many Tender Ties": Women in Fur-Trade Society in Western 
Canada (Winnipeg: Watson & Dwyer, 1980), 58-59, 71-73.
18 James P. McClure, "The Ohio Valley’s Deerskin Trade: Topics for 
Consideration," The Old Northwest, 15:3 (1990): 116.
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advances on merchandise to be repaid immediately after the next hunting season.
Many of the Indians who owed fewer than 50 deerskins might not have concentrated 
on hunting or had less desire or need for goods, and so it is possible that they still 
may have traded exclusively with Croghan despite their relatively small debts. But it 
is ultimately impossible, based on the scant sources detailing Indian purchasing 
patterns, to determine whether Croghan’s debt records are representative of broader 
patterns of native trade-good acquisition or deerskin production. If, as Croghan’s 
accounts suggest, the mean debt of Indian hunters in the Ohio country in the 1750s 
was about 28 skins, the level of native consumption was relatively moderate and 
would not have entailed significant alterations to the hunting or subsistence patterns of 
Indian groups. Evidence submitted by William Johnson in the early 1760s, however, 
points to the contrary.
Though Croghan and his agents did not itemize the purchases of individual 
consumers in their accounting of Indian debts, it is still possible to offer a suggestive 
picture of annual Indian consumption for a slightly later period. In an effort to 
determine the value of duties he could collect from the sale of trade goods in his 
northern Indian Department, Johnson estimated the amount and value of all trade 
merchandise necessary to supply roughly 10,000 Indian hunters, and their wives and 
children, for an entire year.19 When Johnson’s suggested quantities of trade goods are 
divided by 10,000, the results represent what each hunter and his wife could be 
expected to purchase, on average. This included:
19 Johnson, "A Scheme for Meeting Expenses of Trade," WJP, 4: 559.
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2 blankets
3 strouds
4 shirts
4 pairs of stockings
1 lap
3 pieces of gartering
2 pounds of vermilion
2,000 grains of black wampum 
500 grains of white wampum 
2 knives 
6 awls
1 pound of brass wire 
0.5 pound of beads 
1 looking glass 
1 razor
5 gallons of rum
8 pounds of gunpowder 
16 pounds of lead 
(0.3 trade guns)
(0.5 beaver traps)
1 axe
(1 pound of kettles)
and a small number of miscellaneous items, including hair plates, "silver 
trinkets," calicoes and calimancoes, ribbons, and silk handkerchiefs20
Johnson predicted that the wholesale value of the merchandise supplied to the 
Indian hunters of the Great Lakes and Ohio Valley would amount to £179,594
20 Obviously, no Indian would have purchased one third of a trade gun, half a 
beaver trap, or a one-pound kettle. Rather, these fractions represent Johnson’s belief 
that Indian hunters would typically purchase a new gun every three years and a beaver 
trap biennially. English and French kettles were available in a variety of different 
sizes, but the Indians generally preferred them smaller and lighter for ease of 
mobility. The median weight of eighteenth-century trade kettles discovered in the 
course of underwater archaeological investigations at rapids along canoe routes is in 
the range of three pounds, eight ounces. According to Johnson’s figures, it is 
reasonable to assume that a kettle might be replaced every three or four years. See 
Dean Lloyd Anderson, "Documentary and Archaeological Perspectives on European 
Trade Goods in the Western Great Lakes Region," (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Department of Anthropology, Michigan State University, 1992), 130-31.
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sterling. Assuming, as did Johnson, that the traders earned 100 percent profit on the 
sale of these goods, the average annual purchase of each Indian "head of household” 
would have amounted to £36 sterling, six times more than the mean debt owed to 
Croghan a decade before. Using Croghan’s standard of 7 shillings, six pence (£ 
0.2169 sterling) per deerskin, each hunter would have been required to hunt about 
166 deer to supply his family with trade merchandise, somewhat beyond the upper 
limit of Zeisberger’s estimate of their annual potential. Johnson may have been 
overly optimistic about the purchasing power of the Indians in his northern 
department, but if his calculations were accurate they suggest that by the 1760s, at 
least, the Indians of the pays d'en haut were necessarily more reliant in the fur/skins 
trade than they had been earlier in the century.
Johnson’s assumptions about Indian consumption otherwise hold few surprises. 
He reasonably expected that each year an Indian family would need a few articles of 
clothing, a couple of blankets, and some new tools. But two items, rum and guns, 
warrant greater attention because of their salience in the debate surrounding the issue 
of native dependency and the fur trade. Considering the extent to which both English 
and French observers in the eighteenth century remarked on the widespread nature of 
Indian alcohol abuse, Johnson’s estimates of alcohol consumption seem remarkably 
low. If a "family" of two adults together consumed five gallons of alcohol per year, 
they drank less than one ounce per day each, hardly enough to sustain rampant or 
prolonged alcholism. In fact, the amount of rum Johnson expected to be sold to each 
Indian was probably less than the average consumption of their Anglo-Americans
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neighbors.21 Taking into account the litany of abuses that attended the widespread use 
of rum in the Indian trade and his own personal desire to carefully regulate its sale, 
Johnson almost certainly undervalued the amount of alcohol that ultimately reached 
the trading posts of the Northwest. But even had far greater quantities of alcohol 
flowed into the pays d ’en haut, it is unlikely that the majority of Indians consumed 
more alcohol per capita than their hard-drinking American neighbours.
Native drinking practices, particularly the unrestrained "bingeing" that was 
generally thought to be characteristic of Indian groups, has elicited intense scrutiny 
from outside observers, whether European colonists and missionaries or modem 
ethnohistorians, anthropologists, and sociologists.22 Indian alcoholic behavior has 
been variously explained as the mimicking of the traders’ own drinking patterns, a 
means to attain heightened spiritual awareness, a response to internal group tensions, 
and the expression of the frustration and anxiety associated with the breakdown of 
"traditional" native social and cultural life. In his analysis of the journal of Frangois 
Victor Malhiot, an early nineteenth-century trader in the western Great Lakes region, 
Jack Waddell measured the quantity, frequency, variability, rate, duration, and
21 During the colonial period the annual per capita consumption of hard liquor 
(primarily rum) increased gradually to 3.7 gallons just before the Revolution, and 
peaked at 5 gallons in the 1820s. These figures do not include significant quantities 
of beer, wine, and cider. W. J. Rorabaugh, The Alcoholic Republic: An American 
Tradition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 7-9.
22 Perhaps the most thorough contemporary analysis of Indian alcohol abuse was 
offered by the Sulpician missionary Frangois Vachon de Belmont at the end of the 
seventeenth century. Belmont’s original text, Histoire de I’Eau-de-Vie en Canada, is 
translated in "Belmont’s History of Brandy,” edited by Joseph P. Donnelly, Mid- 
America, 34:1 (1952): 42-63.
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context of Chippewa alcohol behavior. Waddell notes that the per capita level of 
alcohol consumption is less revealing than the nature of the drinking itself. Alcohol 
was more likely to be consumed in several concentrated episodes, not gradually over 
an extended period of time. Such binges heightened the potential for social disruption 
and violence, but only until the limited supply of liquor was exhausted. Waddell 
concludes that the Chippewa, at least, "were no more or no less abusive in their uses 
of alcohol, when it was periodically available, than any other population—including 
Malhiot’s own workers, under similar circumstances."23 As in the case of the 
Chippewa, the prevalence of social disruption and addiction in any other Indian group 
would ultimately have hinged on the availability and cost of alcohol, in addition to a 
variety of other social, cultural, and practical considerations, not the least of which 
involved the potentially negative influence of European traders.
In the popular imagination, at least, the Indians’ craving for guns is believed 
to have been nearly as potent as their unquenchable thirst for alcohol. Despite the 
fact that guns, gunpowder, lead, flints, and all the peripheral equipment necessary for 
the use and maintenance of firearms were perennial staples of the trade, it appears 
that even by the early 1760s Indian hunters were hardly helpless in their absence. 
According to Johnson’s accounting each native hunter might purchase roughly eight 
pounds of gunpowder annually. Firing a single shot with the standard eighteenth- 
century British military musket-the lethal, if wildly inaccurate, "Brown Bess"—
23 Jack O. Waddell, "Malhiot’s Journal: An Ethnohistoric Assessment of 
Chippewa Alcohol Behavior in the Early Nineteenth Century," Ethnohistory, 32:3 
(1985): 246-68.
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expended 100 grams of powder, though trade guns may have required somewhat less 
depending on their size and the load used.24 Eight pounds of powder might therefore 
have supplied the purchaser with no more than 40 or 50 shots at best. Even if he was 
a crack shot, an Indian primarily hunting deer could not have taken more than a third 
of the skins necessary to purchase Johnson’s reputed "average" supply of trade goods 
using his gun. It is more likely that Indian consumers arrived to trade with a variety 
of different furs and skins, many of which had been snared in the beaver and brass- 
wire traps noted in Johnson’s list of essential merchandise. Bow-hunting must also 
have continued to supplement guns notoriously prone to misfire and breakage and 
which rapidly exhausted costly powder supplies. Indian gun use, it appears, may 
have loomed larger in the anxieties of frontier settlers than in the mundane reality of 
production for the fur trade.23
24 Operating any type of firearm in the eighteenth century was a potentially costly 
proposition, and gunpowder was the most expensive component of the hunter’s 
arsenal. Depending on the gauge of the gun and the type of shot, 12 to 18 balls 
might be cast from a pound of lead. Gunflints were also essential to the effective 
operation of the firearm; though they were relatively inexpensive, they were rapidly 
depleted. It has been estimated that in ideal conditions a flintlock user could expect a 
misfire rate in the range of 20 to 25 percent if the flint was replaced after 15 shots, 
with proportionately better reliability if changed after 10 or fewer firings. See Brian 
J. Given, A Most Pernicious Thing; Gun Trading and Native Warfare in the Early 
Contact Period (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1994), 98, 109, 110.
25 'Tt is evident that in terms of accuracy," Given claims, "rate of fire, misfire 
rate, availability and repairability, the bow is clearly superior to the musket." An 
experienced bowman might get off five to twelve times the number of shots as a 
proficient gun user, and the bow itself was easier to obtain, repair, and supply with 
ammunition. The bow was lighter, easier to transport, and had the advantage of 
"reliability and silence." A Most Pernicious Thing, 109-110. Conversely, Ray 
suggests that the gun might have been more efficient in forest hunting because of its 
greater "stopping power," which precluded the lengthy pursuit of wounded game.
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Whether purchasing alcohol, the accoutrements necessary to operating a gun, 
or the countless other manufactured items supplied by European traders, Indians soon 
became critical consumers by even the strictest European standards, carefully noting 
the quality, durability, and effectiveness of each item and demanding that they be 
given "good measure," or what they understood to be a fair price. When Johnson 
ordered blankets from his London supplier William Baker, for example, his niggling 
precision echoed the exacting standards of his Indian customers. "Please to observe 
the greatest fault of the Blankets formerly sent me," he warned, "was that they were 
woven too Cloose, & the Wool too Short & Coarse, besides the letters, and other 
marks, Selvage &ca were not exactly the same of the Pattern, nor so neat, all which 
the Ind“ . are verry [sic] curious In."2fi With well-defined expectations of both cost 
and value, the native consumer, far more than the merchant or trader, dictated the 
type and style of goods that were consumed in the trade and to some extent the rates 
of exchange. From the Indian perspective, the cessation of trade involved merely the 
inconvenience of a resort to less efficient technology, but to the trader or merchant 
Indian dissatisfaction spelled financial disaster. This fact was foremost in the minds 
of frustrated Canadian and Anglo-American merchants and colonial officials who 
lodged regular complaints with their suppliers concerning the minutest stylistic or 
technical flaws in their merchandise. Aside from whatever unique cultural and
Regardless, once guns had been incorporated into the hunt, they became increasingly 
essential as Indians gradually lost their skill with bows. Ray, Indians in the Fur 
Trade, 73.
26 Johnson to William Baker, 24 December 1752. WJP, 1: 384.
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economic assumptions the Indian consumers brought to the fur trade, they acted as 
"rationally" as any European consumer in assessing the value of manufactured goods 
in light of their own particular needs and experience.27
Because of the distinctive language or behavior individual Indians were likely 
to use in the context of trade, however, an inexperienced observer of such 
transactions could easily have overestimated Indian dependence on the trader when the 
reverse was actually the case. Though Ray interprets the typical Indian plea in the 
Hudson Bay trade to "take pity on us" as mere politeness, Mary Black-Rogers 
suggests that the self-deprecating language commonly used by Indians as a precursor 
to trade carried more subtly encoded meanings. Noting the frequency of recorded 
instances in which Indians referred to themselves as "starving," or asked for "pity" 
from traders, Black-Rogers understands such language in the context of a variety of 
different linguistic functions. Using similar phraseology, Indians could literally 
describe conditions of deprivation with specific reference to the disadvantageous terms 
of trade which forced them to neglect subsistence activities in order to produce 
sufficient pelts or skins for trade. But in many cases such pleas expressed more than 
a literal description of want. In many Indian groups the process of self-humbling was 
actively encouraged, while boasting of one’s relative power or prestige was frowned 
upon as "ignoble" and, in the context of fur-trade negotiations, imprudent. If  Indian- 
European exchange implied the creation of a relationship of mutual support, the 
appearance of humility or weakness had a distinct advantage to an Indian "whose
27 Ray and Freeman, "Give Us Good Measure, " 226-27.
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cultural wisdom taught him long ago to appear powerless in order to wield power." 
Finally, Black-Rogers does not discount the possibility that such self-deprecatory 
remarks may also have been merely examples of native humor misunderstood by 
somber Europeans.2®
An individual Indian’s use of a "ritual" humility may have served the 
pragmatic purposes of negotiating better terms of trade, but it is also clear that similar 
conceptions of dependency and mutual obligation were translated into far broader and 
inclusive appeals in the course of Indian-European diplomatic and military relations.
As viewed by White, the alliance of the French and Algonquian peoples and 
Europeans in the "middle ground" of the Great Lakes and Ohio Valley was 
formulated in terms of the relationship between a French "father" or "Onontio" and 
his Indian "children." The exchange of material goods thus necessarily become a 
crucial component of their mutual responsibility. Because these obligations were met 
through a variety of channels besides straightforward trade, including gift-giving and 
other diplomatic exercises, the Algonquians conceived of the fur trade not so much as 
a discretely commercial relationship, but rather as a thread in the complex fabric of 
relations which bound the two parties together in alliance. Thus, when Indians 
expected to receive "good measure" or bon marcte, they embedded their own 
conception of exchange into the very core of political and diplomatic relations.
28 Arthur J. Ray, "Indians as Consumers in the Eighteenth Century," in Old Trails 
and New Directions: Papers o f the Third North American Fur Trade Conference, 
edited by Carol M. Judd and Arthur J. Ray (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1980), 253; Mary Black-Rogers, "Varieties of "Starving": Semantics and Survival in 
the Subarctic Fur Trade, 1750-1850," Ethnohistory, 33:4 (1986): 353-83.
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"The idea of a bon march# was flexible enough to encompass both a French 
profit and the Algonquian notion of a father’s generosity to his children," White 
proposes, "but the room to maneuver within it remained limited. To violate the 
compromise worked out for exchange on the middle ground and exact excessive 
prices threatened the entire structure of relations."29 From the French perspective, the 
perpetuation of an equitable and mutually beneficial trade relationship was critical to 
the continued profitability of the trade. If traders violated the precepts of bon 
march#, they risked both the loss of commerce and the possibility of violence.30 But 
the true engine that drove the often tenuous process of accommodation in the fur trade 
was not profit but rather the overarching fact of Anglo-French competition for the 
allegiance of the Indians of the Great Lakes and Ohio Valley. Without a properly 
sanctioned trade, there was no possibility of a reliable alliance with the Indians, and 
without alliance there was a greatly diminished chance of diplomatic or military 
success.
No one recognized this fundamental fact of the "middle ground" more than the 
Indians involved in the eighteenth-century trade, who consistently employed the fact 
of Anglo-French rivalry to their own advantage. Whether in the hinterlands of the 
northwestern Great Lakes or the hunting territories of the Ohio country, Indian groups 
consistently exploited the competition between rival European traders both to 
ameliorate the terms of trade and to ensure that the quality of manufactured goods
29 White, Middle Ground, 97-119; quotation at 119.
30 White, Middle Ground, 57.
remained high. Those Indians with ready access to both Canadian and Anglo- 
American trading centers were best able to profit from competitive conditions, but 
usually the mere threat of taking their commerce to the "opposition" had the desired 
effect. If Indian consumers told the French that English woolens were superior or 
complained to the English that French powder was cheaper and more effective, it was 
because such complaints, whether true or not, made good economic sense. As long 
as Canadian and Anglo-American traders kept a watchful eye on the quality and price 
of their competitors’ merchandise and accordingly strove to improve the quality of 
their own goods, Indian consumers gladly reaped the ultimate reward.31
31 Ray, "Indians as Consumers," 267.
CHAPTER V 
FURS AND SKINS, HEARTS AND MINDS
The most inveterate enemies of Anglo-American officials in the eighteenth 
century did not speak French. In fact, far more imperialist ink was spilled decrying 
the misdeeds of New York and Pennsylvania traders than damning their foreign 
rivals. Even at the height of the European contest for trade and empire in the Great 
Lakes and Ohio country, the most rabidly anti-French Americans grudgingly admitted 
that the French Canadians had enjoyed significantly more success in reaping the 
benefits of an "enlightened" trade: a coherent and well-regulated enterprise directed 
to serve a greater diplomatic end that was notably free of the sabotaging effects of 
fraud and abuse so familiar in the context of the English commerce.
Those Anglo-American officials most steeped in Indian affairs-William 
Johnson, Cadwallader Colden, Edmond Atkin, and Peter Wraxall, among others— 
recognized that the French had always enjoyed every possible advantage over them in 
the conduct of the trade and would continue to do so after the Conquest. These men 
had long been suspicious of the motives and means of the French enterprise in North 
America but had learned to respect its results. "Far from approving all the inhuman, 
mean & infamous Methods they have taken to establish their present extensive
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Influence in these parts of the World," Wraxall allowed, "it is however to be wished 
that we had looked forwards as much as they have done & been as industrious to lay 
a foundation for our future Security and Commerce."1 It was apparent to American 
imperialists that, in the words of the Pennsylvanian Charles Thomson, "the English 
might easily have engrossed the Trade, and secured the Affections, of many of the 
Indian nations; whereas, by neglecting this, and suffering a Parcel of Banditti, under 
the character of Traders, to run up and down from one Indian Town to another, 
cheating and debauching the Indians, we have given them an ill Opinion of our 
Religion and Manners, and lost their Esteem and Friendship."2
The reasons underlying French superiority seemed obvious to those who had 
any experience in the conduct of Indian relations. For all their boasts of superior 
manufactured goods, shorter trade routes, and higher peltry prices, the colonial 
Americans themselves offered the most exacting and damning account of their failure 
to effectively challenge the French for the western trade. Even after the creation of 
the Indian superintendencies in 1756, the seaboard provinces patently failed to 
effectively regulate either their trade or their traders. In this vacuum of authority, too 
many self-interested and unlicensed agents had ruthlessly pursued profits at the 
expense of their Indian customers, flooded the frontier with rum, and brazenly 
ignoring the inevitable political fallout of their misconduct. Even when they did
1 Peter Wraxall, AIA, 180n.
2 Charles Thomson, An Enquiry Into the Causes and Alienation o f the Delaware 
and Shawanese Indians from the British Interest, and Into the Measures Taken fo r  
Recovering Their Friendship (London: J. Wilkie, 1759), 75.
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occasionally acknowledge the intertwined nature of commerce and alliance, the traders 
showed a disturbing tendency to take diplomatic matters into their own hands and act 
at cross-purposes to their disheartened governments. Too often the trade was 
relinquished, by default or design, to ill-educated and overzealous underlings with 
little to lose and much to gain from illegitimate business practices. When not 
tampering with fraudulent weights and measures or championing the cause of Indian 
intoxication, some reckless traders used the liberal extension of credit to draw Indian 
customers into a web of perpetual debt before stepping casually aside when native 
resentment flared.
The French, meanwhile, appeared to have overcome their "inherent" economic 
liabilities by efficiently employing the trade to ensure the loyalty of their Indian 
trading partners. "We must look . . . into the Conduct and Management of the 
French," warned Edmond Atkin, the southern Superintendent of Indian Affairs, in his 
1755 report to the Board of Trade. Only by practicing analogous "Arts," he 
professed, could the English hope to gain any measurable competitive advantage. 
"Under a Commerce clogged with a most hazardous Navigation & expensive 
Transportation of Goods, with the additional load of paying all the Charges of their 
Government, and under a total inability at any rate of supplying all the wants of the 
Indians," Atkin allowed, "they [the French] have still gain’d their Affections, and 
consequently that surprising Influence which we have felt."3 Atkin may have
3 Edmond Atkin, The Appalachian Indian Frontier: The Edward Atkin Report and 
the Plan o f 1755, edited by Wilbur R. Jacobs (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 
1967), 9.
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exaggerated the handicaps facing the French, but he certainly did not overestimate 
their successes. Even if the New Yorkers and Pennsylvanians could somehow 
consistently supply better goods at cheaper rates--an unlikely supposition in itself—this 
ability alone hardly guaranteed the continuing commerce or ardent allegiance of native 
customers who were perennialy cheated and scorned by unscrupulous vendors.
Unwilling to forsake the hoary doctrine that New Yorkers possessed "many 
natural and constitutional advantages over the French," Wraxall determined that only 
the "Base and Artful Measures" of the French could have enabled them to sustain a 
stranglehold on the trade of the western Great Lakes. "More honesty & Generosity 
on our side," he granted, "would have in great measure defeated the whole System of 
French Policy, but on the contrary we have aided their Views by our Dishonesty & 
Oppression with regard to our Trade with the Indians. "4 Atkin similarly concluded 
that the fraudulent dealings of English traders probably obliterated any potential 
commercial advantage they might have wielded over the French. Though the South 
Carolinian accepted the dubious premise that his New York brethren could easily 
furnish goods "at near half the price that the French can from Montreal," whether any 
savings were actually passed on to the Indians, Atkins allowed, remained "a 
Question."5
Years after the French had been "subdued" on paper, Anglo-American 
merchants and officials remained haunted by the specter of French success in the
4 Wraxall, A1A, 205n.
5 Atkin, Appalachian Indian Frontier, 14.
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West. Describing the Illinois trade in 1765, Johnson lamented that the Indians
persisted in dealing almost exclusively with French-speaking traders. This dogged
commercial loyalty, he speculated, was compounded by the failure of the new
American traders to earn the trust of the local Indians. "His Majesties Subjects in
this Country," he noted,
seem very ill Calculated to Cultivate a good understanding with the 
Indians, and this a Notorious proof of it, for notwithstanding the 
Expence of transporting Goods from New Orleans to the llinois is 
greater than by the Lakes, and Consequently French Goods are in 
general dearer than ours, yet such is the Conduct of all persons under 
the Crown of France whether Officers, Agents, or Traders that the 
Indians will go much farther to buy their goods and pay a much higher 
price for them. This all persons acquainted with the Nature of the 
Commerce to the Westward can fully Evidence.6
Just as the wily McDoIe and Muiphey took center stage in Rogers’s dramatic 
portrayal of Pontiac’s uprising, the notoriously unreliable trader figured prominently 
in the imagination of frustrated officials grappling with the manifold challenges of 
Anglo-Indian relations. Those few well-connected traders such as Croghan with 
considerable investments in the frontier trade were probably more scrupulous in their 
treatment of Indian customers. The frequency and acrimony with which American 
officials complained of their behavior, however, suggests that the myth of the
6 Johnson to the Lords of Trade, 16 November 1765,1HC, 11: 117-18.
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dishonest trader was unfortunately grounded more in fact than fiction.7 In Johnson’s 
opinion, the men who gravitated to the trade were those sufficiently fluent in Indian 
languages but uncertain enough in their financial prospects to be attracted by cheap 
credit and the promise of quick and easy profits. Unfortunately, they also tended to 
be, in Atkins’s description, "the loosest kind of People" and were accordingly 
"despis’d and held in great Contempt by the Indians as Liars, and Persons regarding 
nothing but their own Gain."8
English traders had not always been so universally unsavory. Johnson dated 
the precipitous decline of collective commercial character from the later 1740s, since 
few experienced traders had returned to the business after the disruptions of King 
George’s War. Since that time, however, "the profits made by a few" in the trade 
had "induced such Numbers to embark in it, amongst Whom were the very Dregs of 
the people, such as discharged Provincial Soldiers, Batteaumen &ca."9 But most of
7 "That Croghan followed honest trading methods did not necessarily connote an 
innate streak of nobility in his character," Wainwright allows. "If for no other 
reasons, he preferred legitimate trading because it would not have paid him to indulge 
in sharp practices." But, if Croghan was as well-loved by the Indians as Wainwright 
suggests, his popularity merely underlines the unattractiveness of his fellow traders. 
Nicholas B. Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1959), 67. Jacobs agrees that most established 
traders were less aggressively opportunistic than their employees or unlicensed 
competitors, but even the most respected traders were not always above suspicion. 
“Most traders seemed to have accepted the premise," he suggests, "that the Indian 
trade permitted ethical standards other than those used in transactions with whites." 
Wilbur R. Jacobs, Dispossessing the American Indian; Indians and Whites on the 
Colonial Frontier (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1972), 32, 33-34.
8 Johnson, "Review of the Trade and Affairs in the Northern District in 
America," 22 September 1767,1HC, 16: 25; Atkin, Appalachian Indian Frontier, 8.
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the problem of personnel predated this period; Johnson and others pointed to the fact 
that it had always been a relatively easy matter to obtain trade merchandise on credit 
and set up shop as an Indian trader, regardless of attitude or aptitude. In many 
instances, Atkin noted, even the established, trustworthy traders habitually left their 
affairs in the hands of ill-qualified servants and even "Pack horse Men," whose 
unsupervised behavior was easier "conceived than described."10
Most disparaging Anglo-American observers (with the emphasis on "Anglo") 
implied that the ethnicity of the traders was tantamount to fraud. They never failed to 
note that the Dutch, rivaled only by the Scots-Irish, had been among the worst 
offenders in the trade and were accordingly responsible for any lingering native 
resentment of the English. Notoriously hostile to the Albany Dutch, Wraxall 
peppered his abridgment of the minutes of New York’s commissioners of Indian 
affairs with scathing rebukes of his neighbors, blaming their characteristically sharp 
trading practices for New York’s checkered history of Indian relations.11 From the 
earliest days of the trade, when the Iroquois and "western" tribes travelled to Albany 
with their furs, the handlaers had taken every possible advantage of their native
9 Johnson, IHC, 16: 38; Thomas Elliot Norton, The Fur Trade in Colonial New 
York, 1686-1776 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1974), 214.
10 Atkin, Appalachian Indian Frontier, 22.
11 "The Complaints of the Indians upon the dearness of Goods & the unfair 
treatment they meet with from the Traders," Wraxall reported, "are so very frequent 
thro-ought the whole Records that tho I have several times noted ’em in these 
Abstracts I have more frequently omitted them." For all his self-professed restraint, 
however, Wraxall’s anti-Dutch editorial remarks border on the pathological. Wraxall, 
AIA, 205n.
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customers, he alleged. The Dutch preyed upon unwitting Indians, luring them into 
their houses to trade, then inciting them to drunkenness before spiriting away their 
furs for a pittance. In some cases, Wraxall claimed, greedy Dutchmen sank so low as 
to buy goods distributed as official presents to the Indians, only to sell them back 
within a few days at greatly advanced prices. "Our Dutch reptiles," he hissed, 
"considered nothing but their present profit, & were animated by no Views to 
Posterity, wch is the genuine Character of true Dutchmen." Since the Indians "have 
often laid it down as a fundamental Maxim that their Connexions with us arose from 
& depended on trade," Wraxall contended, Dutch commercial abuses ultimately paved 
the way for the "Progress of the French."12
Though none could match Wraxall for ferocity of invective, it is clear that his 
fellow New York imperialists shared similar ethnic prejudices. Johnson did not go so 
far as to accuse New York’s traders of complicity with the French, but he made it 
clear that being the "posterity of the Low Dutch," they were naturally frugal and so 
had no interest in "extending the trade" but were content merely to barter enough to 
maintain themselves "in idleness" for the rest of the year.13 Though his criticism was 
more subtle than Wraxall’s, Johnson’s message was essentially the same. The New 
York fur trade had never reached its full potential as a diplomatic tool because the 
traders had been more interested in their own petty profits than in greater imperial 
transactions.
12 Wraxall, AIA, 132n., 180n. 205n.
13 Johnson, 1HC, 3: 25-26.
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If the Dutch were the great villains of the New York fur trade, the Scots-Irish 
were similarly the scapegoats of Pennsylvania’s equally dysfunctional frontier 
commerce. Described uncharitably as "a sett of the most debased banditti that ever 
infested a government, the greater part gaol gleaning and the refuse of Ireland,” the 
Ohio Valley deerskin traders soon earned the derision of Philadelphia legislators 
driven to despair by the endless complaints of disgruntled Delaware and Shawnee 
emissaries.14 The colonial assembly, showing increasing concern for Indian relations 
in the days preceding the outbreak of full-fledged war with the French, lamented "the 
miserable situation of our Indian trade carried on (some few excepted) by the vilest of 
our own Inhabitants and Convicts imported from Great-Britain and Ireland, by which 
means the English Nation is unhappily represented among our Indian Allies in the 
most disagreeable Manner."15 It was easy, in retrospect, for prim Pennsylvanians to 
foist blame for the decrepit state of Anglo-Indian relations on Scots-Irish "convicts" 
and troublemakers. But whatever their pedigree, many deerskin traders admittedly 
used remarkably poor judgment--and equally remarkable quantities of liquor~in their 
dealings with the Indians of the Ohio Valley.16
14 John Baynton and Samuel Wharton to Richard Neave, 1 July 1760, quoted in 
Wainwright, George Croghan, 67.
15 Thomson, An Enquiry, 76.
16 Jennings suggests that as a result of their peculiar historical experience, the 
Scots-Irish more than any group in Pennsylvania’s backcountry were "accustomed to 
the invader’s role and practices" and carried with them a "hatred of both overlords 
and natives." Francis Jennings, The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire: The Covenant 
Chain Confederation o f Indian Tribes with English Colonies from its beginnings to the 
Lancaster Treat o f1744 (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1984), 348-50.
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Most New Yorkers believed, justifiably, that the handlaers had been guilty of 
their fair share of fraudulent dealings when the Indians had come directly to trade at 
Albany. They hoped, however, that the new post at Oswego could be better governed 
to prevent any further alienation of the colony’s Indian allies and trading partners. 
Despite the presence of a commissioner charged with overseeing the day-to-day 
conditions of the trade, it soon became clear that the Oswego traders were no less 
likely to cheat the Indians than their much maligned Albany counterparts.17 Peter 
Kalm, the peripatetic Swede, came away from a brief visit to the lakeside post 
convinced that the Indians were "frequently cheated in disposing of their goods, 
especially when they are in liquor" and that "sometimes they do not get one half of 
the value of their goods."18 On a similar visit, Pennsylvania naturalist John Bartram 
optimistically detailed the measures recently taken at Oswego to prevent such 
violations, though his description of the alleged reforms reads less like a paean to the 
improved character of the trade than a commentary on past abuses. Bartram noted 
that the town consisted of about 70 houses in two opposing rows. Indians arriving for 
trade were lodged in their own dwellings, where all exchanges were to be conducted. 
"This is surely an excellent regulation for preventing the traders from imposing on the 
Indians," Bartram opined, "a practice which they have been formerly too guilty of, 
and which has frequently involved the English colonies in difficulties, and constantly
17 Governor Montgomerie to the Lords of Trade, 29 August 1729, NYCD, 5: 896; 
Montgomerie to the Lords of Trade, 21 December 1730, NYCD, 5: 907.
18 Peter Kalm, Travels Into North America, translated by John Reinhold Forster 
(Barre, Massachusetts: The Imprint Society, 1972), 331-32.
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tended to depreciate us in the esteem of the natives." Bartram further noted that the 
post’s "chief officer" kept a watchful eye for Indians arriving by water, sending out a 
canoe to guide them safely to the fort to prevent any overambitious traders from 
offering the traditional Oswego welcome: "inciting them with spiritous liquors" and 
relieving them of their peltry. The commander was also vigilant to prevent the 
eruption of violence, ensuring that "all quarelling [sic], and even the least 
misunderstanding, when any happens, be quickly made up in an amicable manner," 
thus precluding the "disagreeable consequences of an Indians endeavouring to right 
himself by force."19
Bartram’s claim that the Oswego trade had been remedied proved optimistic. 
While concerned New York officials agonized over how to curb continuing abuses at 
the only Anglo-American post on the Great Lakes, the Indians continued to suffer at 
the hands of ruthless traders. As filtered through English records, the Iroquois and 
western Indians who traded with the New Yorkers recounted an embarrassingly 
familiar narrative of victimization and mistreatment. To illustrate the ease with which 
his painstaking diplomatic efforts could be ruined by a single reckless trader, Johnson 
graphically recounted the most alarming instances of fraud. Drawing from a "Variety
19 Bartram seems implicitly to have grasped the interrelatedness of trade and 
diplomacy and the danger of ignoring this fact. The Indians "can scarcely be blamed 
for judging of a nation, by the behaviour of those with whom they have the most 
intercourse," Bartram suggested, "a judgment I am sorry to confess that has (till 
lately) tended much to the making them in favour rather of the French, than English." 
John Bartram, Observations on the Inhabitants, Climate, Soil, Rivers, Productions, 
Animals, and other matters worthy o f notice, Made By Mr. John Bartram, In his 
Travels from Pensilvania to Onondago, Oswego and the Lake Ontario, in Canada 
(London: J. Whiston and B. White, 1751), 48-50.
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of unheard of frauds," he recounted the tale of an influential Ottawa chief who
brought his packs of peltry to an Oswego trader in order to "try the Market."
The Trader after the usual practice of deceiving him in the Weight 
hurried the peltry into a private room telling the Indian that all 
Merchandise was very dear, owing to the Severity of dutys (a Stale, but 
dangerous Artifice still practised) desired him to choose out what goods 
he wanted, the Indian having made a Choice was astonished to find that 
his Skins produced not one third of what he had been Accustomed to 
receive for the like Quantity (for the Trader had besides his Extortion 
on the goods reckoned the peltry at only one Third of its real weight) 
went away discontented but returning Said he was Ashamed to go back 
with Such Small returns begged for a small keg of rum which the 
Trader gave him as he said as a high favor but on opening the keg soon 
after his departure it proved to be Water.20
This incident, among others, resulted in the loss of "the Trade and Affections" 
of the Ottawas he had long labored to attract to Oswego. Yet another Ottawa chief, 
Johnson recalled, had purchased thirty small kegs of rum for a "General feast." 
Claiming that he would be punished for allowing them too much alcohol, the 
scheming trader cautioned his customers not to open them until they had returned 
home. When the Ottawas thirstily opened the kegs before reaching Niagara, 
however, they too tasted Lake Ontario’s waters. "This has been often acknowledged 
by these Traders," Johnson claimed, "and on its coming to the knowledge of the
20 Johnson, IHC, 16: 28-29. Fraudulent use of weights and measures was 
characteristic of the Anglo-American trade. Kennedy called for "proper Regulations 
for the Trade" that would prevent the Indians from being "so unmercifully imposed 
upon, both in Weight and Measure, as well as in Quality and Prices, which has 
almost alienated their Hearts from us." Archibald Kennedy, Serious Considerations 
on the Present State o f the Affairs o f the Northern Colonies (New York, 1754), 11; 
see also Johnson, IHC, 16: 26; Atkin, Appalachian Indian Frontier, 22; Peter 
Wraxall, "Some Thoughts Upon the British Interest in North America, More 
Particularly as it Relates to the Northern Confederacy Commonly Called the Six 
Nations," 9 January 1756, NYCD, 7: 27.
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French, they made so good a Use of it, that these People and all their friends were 
ever after our most implacable enemys."21
Johnson’s last woeful yam concerned a Seneca warrior whose "influence and 
abilities" were legendary and who was only reluctantly won into alliance with the 
English. In a gesture of good will, Johnson issued a passport for the Seneca and his 
war party to travel to Schenectady to seek a market for their peltry. Johnson made 
arrangements in advance for a local fur merchant there to "use them kindly and do 
them the Strictest Justice," but his carefully laid plans soon went awry. The trader 
later confessed that "as they were Strangers he had doubled the prices of his goods 
and allowed them but half the Weight of their peltry." The Senecas were not amused. 
On their way home the chief sent Johnson a wampum belt to notify him of the 
treacherous transaction, the details of which were also marked on an axe handle. The 
chief assured Johnson that he would always have a "personal regard" for him but 
emphasized that he had no more patience for the English who had too often "served 
him so." The Seneca leader was so angered by the Schenectady incident, Johnson 
noted glumly, that he soon pledged his allegiance to the French "who knew how to 
treat them." In a few days, in fact, the Seneca chief "cut off a large Settlement" and 
henceforth continued to be "the most Violent Enemy" of the English.22
Examples of abuse were hardly limited to the New York trade. In fact, some 
of the worst examples of flagrant mistreatment were recounted by the Delawares,
21 Johnson, IHC, 16: 29.
22 Johnson, IHC, 16: 29-30.
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Shawnees, and Susquehannas who dealt with Pennsylvania deerskin traders. In the 
Ohio country as on the Great Lakes, most incidents of fraud involved the liberal and 
often illegal distribution of alcohol. Whenever rum traded hands, the potential for 
abuse increased markedly. Because it typically bore such a high trader markup, 
alcohol was virtually the only European product that enjoyed an elastic demand with 
notoriously tight-fisted Indian customers, and could easily be watered to increase 
stocks, unscrupulous traders inevitably used alcohol in their commerce.23 That they 
frequently succeeded is evident from the Indians’ appeals at virtually every colonial 
Indian conference. Representatives of the Cayugas and other Iroquois nations who 
met with Governor Patrick Gordon in Philadelphia in the summer of 1727 claimed 
that "there come many sorts of Traders among them . . . who all Cheat them, and 
tho’ they get their Skins they give them very little in Pay." What the Indians wanted 
was more gunpowder and shot for hunting; what they received was rum sold for "at 
least 3 or 4 times more than it is worth. "?4
Fifteen years later, conditions had only worsened. Speaking through Conrad 
Weiser, the chiefs of the Six Nations and Delawares addressed Pennsylvania Governor 
George Thomas:
23 "Yet so great is the profit resulting from that Article," Johnson remarked, "and 
such oppertunitys were thereby furnished for Imposition, that a Great Number of the 
Traders used every Artifice to induce the Indians to Apply for a Toleration for that 
Article." Johnson, IHC, 16: 37. See also Ray and Freeman, Give Us Good Measure, 
129-41.
24 Minutes o f the Provincial Council o f Pennsylvania, From the Organization to 
the Termination o f the Proprietary Government, edited by Samuel Hazard (Harrisburg: 
Theophilus Fenn, 1852), 3: 274.
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It is always our Way, at the Conclusion of a Treaty, to desire you will 
use your Endeavours with the Traders, that they may sell their Goods 
cheaper, and give us a better Price for our Deer-Skins. Whenever any 
particular Sort of Indian Goods is scarce, they constantly make us pay 
the dearer on that Account. We must now use the same Argument with 
them: Our Deer are killed in such Quantities, and our Hunting- 
Countries grown less every Day by the Settlement of white People, that 
Game is now difficult to find, and we must go a great Way in quest of 
it; they therefore ought to give us a better Price for our Skins; and we 
desire you would speak to them to do so.25
For all his evident concern, Thomas had made little progress in restraining the 
Ohio traders. He admitted that the Indians frequently made allegations concerning 
"divers gross irregularities and abuses" in the trade. Alcohol was consistently at the 
root of these problems. "I cannot but be apprehensive that the Indian trade as it is 
now carry’d on will involve us in some fatal Quarrel with the Indians," Thompson 
admitted.
Our Traders in Defiance of the Law carry Spiritous Liquors amongst 
them, and take the Advantage of their inordinate Appetite for it to cheat 
them of their Skins and their Wampum, which is their Money, and 
often to debauch their Wives into the Bargain. Is it to be wondered at 
then, if when they Recover from the Drunken fit they should take 
severe Revenges.
Though he promised to encourage more rigid enforcement of licensing laws 
and to renew the longstanding Pennsylvania prohibition of the transportation of 
alcohol to the tribes of the Ohio country, Thomas realized that these measures would 
"avail but little, the ill practices of these people being carry’d on in the Woods, and at 
such a Distance from the Seat of Government that it will be very difficult to get
25 Cadwallader Colden, HF1N, 2: 109-10.
236
Evidences to Convict them."26
From his vantage point in South Carolina, Atkin was similarly distressed by
the destructive influence of rum trafficking in the Ohio country, noting its pernicious
influence in weakening the fabric of native society. The "greatest disorders, and the
most pernicious Consequences of all, have been introduced by the many Traders
licensed and unlicensed, who have made a constant practice of carrying very little
Goods, but chiefly, and for the most part intirely R um ” Atkin claimed. In fact, the
traders made a practice of placing themselves and large liquid stocks directly in the
path of Indian hunters as they returned home with their deerskins. "The poor Indians
in a manner fascinated," he remarked,
are unable to resist the Bait; and when Drunk are easily cheated.
After parting with the fruit of three or four Months Toil, they find 
themselves at home, without the means of buying the necessary 
Clothing for themselves or their Families. Their Domestick and inward 
Quiet being broke, Reflection sours them, and disposes them for 
mischief.27
If the Anglo-American traders were a uniformly miserable lot, ill-suited to 
advancing the diplomatic ends of fretting imperialists, the Canadian traders appeared 
infinitely better suited to winning and keeping the friendship of their Indian trading 
partners. In the period shortly after the conquest of Canada, Johnson came to realize 
that the Americans were at a profound disadvantage in competing with the French for 
the Illinois trade. Proposing that "there is little reason to Expect that our People in
26 PA Council Minutes, 4: 760-61, 740.
27 Atkin, Appalachian Indian Frontier, 35.
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general will ever treat the Indians with the like kindness and Civility," Johnson 
conceded that the French traders were more adept in the nuances of Indian trade.
"By their Superior Adress and knowledge of the different Languages," Johnson noted, 
"they maintain their Influence, enjoy the Major part of the Trade, whilst our Traders 
are considered as Interlopers, and have it not in their power to acquire the good 
Opinion, or even a proper Acquaintance with Indians.1,28
Having lived and traded among the Indians, Croghan was equally familiar with 
the unparalleled success of the Canadians. In the wake of Pontiac’s failed uprising, 
the veteran trader was not surprised by the allegations of French influence in 
encouraging the revolt. "They have been bred up Together like Children in that 
Country," Croghan remarked, "& the French have always adopted the Indians 
Customs and manners, Treated them Civily & supplyed their wants generously, by 
which means they gained the Hearts of the Indians & commanded their Services, & 
injoyed the Benefit of a very large Furr Trade."29 Croghan implicitly recognized a 
fundamental fact underlying French superiority in the eighteenth-century fur trade: 
Canadian traders were generally more adept than their Anglo-American rivals at 
maneuvering within the alien context of Indian society. Through language, habit, and 
marriage, the Canadians had earned the respect and alliance of their Indian partners 
and were accordingly less prone to view the trade as simply an economic opportunity 
to be exploited. No wonder, then, that the Indians preferred to trade with the French,
28 Johnson to the Lords of Trade, 16 November 1765, IHC, 11: 118.
29 Croghan to Johnson, November 1765, IHC, 11: 53-54.
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regardless of the supposed superiority or cheapness of English goods.30
But just as certain honest and far-seeing English traders were careful to foster 
Indian confidence, there were also admittedly some Canadian traders who abused and 
cheated their native customers. In fact, admiring Anglo-American officials 
undoubtedly exaggerated the harmonious nature of French-Indian relations in their 
effort to understand the overwhelming success of their commercial and military rivals. 
"There is no need to romanticize this relationship," White claims. "Indians and 
French abused and killed each other; they cheated each other as well as supplying 
each other’s wants." But, he adds, the often intimate familiarity of the French and 
Indians "had no equivalent among the British." Though the British may have 
reluctantly accepted the relationship between trade and alliance on the "middle 
ground," this grudging compromise could not make up for the lack of the intimate 
day-to-day experience of living side by side on native terms.31
Though it is not necessary to laud the French for any inherently "enlightened" 
cultural superiority—the g4nie coloniale extolled by nineteenth-century chauvinists-it 
is still worth recognizing that certain peculiarities of their colonial situation 
encouraged the Canadians to inculcate a more accepting and often admiring attitude
30 Johnson suspected that the French must have been engaged in some form of 
intrigue in the Illinois country because they were buying up English trade goods at 
high prices and then selling them to the Indians at little or no profit. This was a clear 
example of what Johnson referred to as the "Indians’ partiality and blindness in 
dealing with the French," for they evidently preferred to purchase the same
goods at higher prices from the French than deal with English traders. Johnson to the 
Lords of Trade, 16 November 1765, IHC, 11: 119.
31 White, Middle Ground, 316-17.
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toward the Indians that prompted them to privilege, or at least tolerate, the "non­
economic" aspects of Indian exchange. In his examination of the development of 
French cultural attitudes toward native North Americans, Cornelius Jaenen posits that 
the essential structure of the Canadian experience prescribed the limits of French- 
Indian perceptions. The paramount importance of the fur trade in Canadian economic 
and social life, combined with the notable absence of an encroaching settlement 
frontier, had "far-reaching results," Jaenen suggests, in the formulation of both 
French and Indian attitudes. In fact, "the relationship between behavior and attitude 
was so marked in this case," he notes, that "ethnic stereotyping" resulted. While the 
Indians came to regard the French primarily as "trader/soldiers" who dispensed 
valuable manufactured merchandise but who had little interest in acquiring new 
territory, the French were similarly prone to imagining the Indians as "skilful 
hunters/wary warriors," and not the "forest fiends" who blocked the preordained 
expansion of settlement.32
Broad theoretical constructs aside, it is evident that the French were motivated 
at least as much by pragmatic considerations in acceding to native conceptions of 
trade and alliance. Whatever supposed intellectual tolerance the French may have 
exhibited relative to the Indian societies they encountered in North America, they 
ultimately found it necessary to "adapt and accommodate" to Indian notions of trade,
32 Cornelius Jaenen, "French Attitudes towards Native Society," in Old Trails and 
New Directions: Papers o f the Third North American Fur Trade Coitference, edited by 
Carol M. Judd and Arthur J. Ray (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980), 59- 
63, 70.
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diplomacy, and warfare in pursuit of their own self-interested economic and imperial 
ambitions.33 Just as French officials recognized the need to fuse trade and diplomacy 
in their dealings with their Indian allies, so too did the Canadian traders and 
voyageurs shrewdly oblige the demands of their Indian customer-suppliers. At times, 
this "enlightened" approach was all that stood between a trader and his scalp. Having 
passed far beyond the protective reach of French authority, Canadian traders arrived 
in the pays d ’en haut as "wealthy," defenseless strangers with no social standing in 
Algonquian villages. Though they never abandoned their original desire to make a 
profit through the trade, the Canadians quickly found that to successfully conduct 
their business, indeed to survive the experience, it was essential to establish some 
form of social and personal connection with their native hosts. And many of them 
invariably did, by the most convenient and gratifying means at hand.34
The intimate relations between Canadian men and native women in the pays 
d ’en haut, perhaps more than any other mode of European-Indian intercourse, formed 
"the basis of fur trade society."35 Such unions served as far more than a sexual outlet 
for traders and voyageurs in the absence of French women; marriage native-style—d
33 Olive Patricia Dickason, The Myth o f the Savage, and the Beginnings o f French 
Colonialism in the Americas (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1984), 277-78; 
White, Middle Ground, 33, 115.
34 White, Middle Ground, 57, 109.
35 Sylvia Van Kirk, "Fur Trade Social History: Some Recent Trends," in Carol 
M. Judd and Arthur J. Ray (eds.), Old Trails and New Directions: Papers o f the 
Third North American Fur Trade Conference, edited by Carol M. Judd and Arthur J. 
Ray (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980), 165.
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la fagon du pays--offered more extensive benefits to French and Indians alike. The 
"all-encompassing" work role of Indian women attracted traders who needed a 
helpmate to cook, sew moccasins, make clothes, scrape pelts, stitch and caulk canoe 
seams, gather firewood, string snowshoes, and perform a variety o f other essential 
domestic tasks. Native women further facilitated trade relations by informally 
introducing their French partners to the language and customs of a particular Indian 
group. Beyond its obvious practical advantages, however, marriage symbolized the 
formation of reciprocal and mutually beneficial bonds that integrated Europeans into 
familial relations with potential Indian consumer-suppliers. Traders who married 
Indian women gained ready-made social and trade contacts in the pays d ’en haut, 
while the Indians in turn secured guaranteed access to European goods and 
protection.36
Post commanders and Canadian officials were quick to grasp the fact that 
interracial marriages bolstered otherwise tenuous trade and military alliances and they 
enthusiastically encouraged their subordinates to form these intimate alliances.37 Their 
English counterparts, acknowledging the immeasurable advantages their rivals had 
gained through extensive intermarriage, promoted similar Anglo-Indian liaisons but 
with admittedly dismal results. In his 1755 report to the Board of Trade, Atkin
36 White, Middle Ground, 64-69; Van Kirk, "Fur Trade Social History," 165;
Van Kirk suggests that later in the eighteenth century the Montreal-based Nor’Westers 
possessed a distinct advantage over their Hudson’s Bay Company rivals primarily 
because of the marriage alliances they had made with the Indian groups of the 
interior. Sylvia Van Kirk, "Many Tender Ties”, 28-31, 45, 53.
37 White, Middle Ground, 69.
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proposed that it would be prudent to imitate French marital practices, both to facilitate 
better Indian relations as well as to subdue the notoriously rambunctious traders. 
Anglo-Indian intermarriage would insure that the two groups did not remain "intirely 
Strangers to each others Persons & manners," he suggested, but that "their 
Knowledge and Acquaintance therewith may be introduced, preserv’d, and transferred 
imperceptibly." Atkin also stipulated that only those men who had taken Indian wives 
should be allowed to remain in the West for longer than two years, assuming that 
their treatment of native customers who also happened to be relatives might naturally 
be more circumspect.38
The following year Wraxall recommended to Johnson that in order to improve 
New York’s trade relations with the Six Nations, traders should be encouraged to live 
among their Indian customers, suggesting as well that garrison soldiers might be 
persuaded "by some gratuitys & advantages" to marry Protestant native women.39 But 
even if the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel had managed to convert enough 
Iroquois women to supply suitable mates for New York soldiers and traders, it was 
unlikely that such officially sanctioned unions would ever take place. As Johnson had 
noted, by the 1750s the Anglo-American trade had lost its most experienced traders, 
the very men most likely to have adapted to Indian practices or taken native wives.
The "very dregs of the people" who increasingly populated the Anglo-American 
trading frontier stood little chance of duplicating the marital success of the Canadian
38 Atkins, Appalachian Indian Frontier, 80.
39 Wraxall, NYCD, 7: 27.
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traders and voyageurs. The French may have been just as eager for profits as their 
New York and Pennsylvania counterparts, but their economic ambitions were 
generally tempered by a necessary respect for the Indians with whom they lived, 
traded, and married. Having failed to develop similarly intimate ties, the English 
found their largely unregulated trade perennially in danger of lapsing into mutual 
distrust and violence.40
Despite the apparent ease with which Canadian traders and voyageurs 
assimilated themselves into Indian groups, the French could not have enjoyed such 
overwhelming success in the fur trade without a coherent imperial policy that 
presupposed a well-regulated commercial system. In 1701, while the French fur trade 
languished in the face of a crippling glut, Louis XIV embarked on an aggressive 
policy to contain the Anglo-American colonies east of the Appalachians. It is 
impossible to understand the eighteenth-century French trade merely as a commercial 
endeavor after this date, Eccles argues, because the fur trade had been "definitely 
subordinated to a political end." By recognizing that a mutually profitable and closely 
monitored trade would best preserve the Indian alliances that were crucial to French
40 White, Middle Ground, 317; Eccles suggests that the familiarity of the French 
with Indian languages, material culture, and customs eased their relations with the 
tribes of the pays d ’en haut. Visitors frequently commented that Canadians were "in 
constant association" with the Indians and had adopted their foods, dress, and habits. 
Both secular and clerical officials, in fact, decried the frequency with which their 
young men took to the woods, and the ease with which they were assimilated socially, 
sexually, and psychologically into Indian groups. It was because the Canadians had 
been "trained from infancy" to imitate native ways that their relations with the Indians 
were usually better than those of the Anglo-Americans. W. J. Eccles, The Canadian 
Frontier, 1534-1760 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1969), 89-92.
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imperial aims in North America, the French were able "maintain its claim to more 
than half a continent" with only a small number of traders and troops.41
No one recognized the French ability to win Indian allies through commercial 
means better than their English rivals. "That we have lost, in great Measure, all that 
sincere Friendship and Attachment which did once subsist between us and our 
Indians," wrote New York legislator Archibald Kennedy, was inevitable considering 
the "injurious and villainous Treatment" they received at the hands of Ango-American 
traders, while they were always "honestly and justly" dealt with by the French.42 But 
if French traders were better able to win the allegiance of the Indians, it was largely 
due to the fact that they were not followed into the pays d ’en haut by land-hungry 
settlers. "The French did not alarm them much on the Score of Lands," Johnson 
conceded, in striking contrast to their Anglo-American competitors. "Whilst the 
Traders on the Frontiers were disgusting and Defrauding the Indians," he recalled,
"the Inhabitants were over-reaching them and Availing themselves of their Ignorance 
and passion for Liquor, daily Stealing away their Land as the Indians emphatically 
express it.1,43 If the Indians saw Anglo-American traders as the harbingers of
41 W. J. Eccles, "The Fur Trade and Eighteenth-Century Imperialism," William & 
Mary Quarterly, 3rd Series, 40:3 (1983): 341-49; "The efficiency and unity of 
French organization were completely victorious," Adair claimed. "And the English 
were not going to do anything about it that would be likely to produce results." E. R. 
Adair, "Anglo-French Rivalry in the Fur Trade during the 18th Century," Culture, 8 
(1947), reprinted in Canadian History Before Confederation: Essays and 
Interpretation, J. M. Bumsted (Georgetown, Ontario: Irwin-Dorsey, 1972), 162.
42 Kennedy, Serious Considerations, 8-9.
43 Johnson, IHC, 16: 26, 30.
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encroaching settlement, they also understood that French trading posts served a less
ominous purpose. Thomson commented at length on the "different Manner" in which
the English and French had treated the Indians in pursuing their divergent aims in the
West. "The English," he noted,
in order to get their Lands, drive them as far from them as possible, 
nor seem to care what becomes of them, provided they can get them 
removed out of the Way of their present Settlements; whereas the 
French, considering that they can never want Land in America, who 
enjoy the Friendship of the Indians, use all the Means in their Power to 
draw as many into their Alliance as possible; and, to secure their 
Affections, invite as many as can to come and live near them, and to 
make their Towns as near the French Settlements as they can.44
The true genius of the French trade was its unique fusion of private initiative, 
government regulation, and military supervision. It was unwise, French officials 
realized, to allow Canadians to flood freely into the pays d ’en haut’, no matter how 
prone the traders were to becoming "Indianized," an unmonitored trade could easily 
breed misconduct and exploitation. Dissatisfied customers, they had learned, made 
poor allies. Once the congi system was permanently reinstated in the mid-1720s, it 
proved remarkably effective in financing the cost of garrisoning the trading posts of 
the pays d ’en haut, as well as preventing the excesses and abuses characteristic of the 
Anglo-American trade.
44 Thomson, An Enquiry, 48. Eccles notes that the presence of a French post in 
the pays d ’en haut in no way implied "sovereignty" over the Indian lands, and was 
tolerated only so long as it served native interests. Eccles, "Eighteenth-Century 
Imperialism," 349. Indians could also distinguish between a French blockhouse that 
"secured the trade against occasional raids" and an English fort designed to "secure 
its garrison against the tribe in whose territory it stood." Jennings, Ambiguous 
Iroquois Empire, 299.
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Barring a brief flirtation in the 1740s with the leasing of posts to private 
traders, the Canadian fur trade was dominated by what has been described as a 
"military-commercial complex." Within the framework of this system, military 
officers who were granted trading monopolies at individual posts formed partnerships 
with Canadian merchants who possessed the capital resources and credit necessary to 
finance trading expeditions to the West. Though Canadian civil officials persisted in 
their opposition to the military dominance of the post system, its defenders countered
i
that merchants were more interested in potential eamings-and liberal brandy sales- 
than the exigencies of Indian diplomacy. Military officers alone, they asserted, had 
the prestige and authority necessary to ensure that imperial policy, not private profit, 
dictated the conduct of the trade.45
While the Canadians argued over who should exercise ultimate control over 
trade in the pays d ’en haut, envious English observers concluded that the military 
regulation of the posts had given their rivals a decided advantage. The French, Atkin 
decleard, "employed Men of the greatest Knowledge and Experience" to oversee the 
trade, specifically officers "who are supported out of the Trade with the Indians, who 
rest their hopes of Preferment on their own Behaviour, and who on all Occasions 
support the Honour and Dignity of the French Nation, and watch all opportunities to 
turn every Occurrence to their own Advantage." He concluded that "it is no small 
addition to the influence of the French, that their Officers allways on the Spot, both
45 Dale Miquelon, New France, 1701-1744: A Supplement to Europe (Toronto: 
McClelland & Stewart, 1987), 159-62.
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prevent Abuses being offer’d to the Indians by particular Persons, and also never fail 
to demand immediate Satisfaction for any Injuries or Insults offer’d by them; which 
is the more readily complied with.1,46 Johnson agreed that the French had enjoyed 
greater success in the trade because they had committed Indian affairs to experienced 
officers. Post commanders enjoyed substantial authority over the local traders: if an 
Indian complained of mistreatment, the offending trader was "with (at least an 
appearance of) great resentment put in Irons and sent away (as they were told) to 
suffer death."47
In contrast, native customers who had been wronged by Anglo-American 
traders could rarely expect even a token show of justice. "The Cries of injured 
Indians against the Lesser Traders," Johnson grimly noted, "could not reach the 
Capitals."48 The problem stemmed mainly from the fact that the Indians trading with 
the English had no reliable local authority figure to appeal to for restitution. In the 
absence of disinterested officials-Oswego’s commissariat was notoriously venal--there 
was little chance that Indian concerns would even be heard, let alone redressed. 
Recognizing that "the greatest discouragment, in the management of the Indian 
Affairs, is by the Indians being constantly cheated by them with what they deal,"
46 Atkin, Appalachian Indian Frontier, 7-8, 12. "If a French commander violated 
the standards of chieftainship," White alleges, "he risked the loss of his command." 
White, Middle Ground, 177. Similarly, Eccles notes that complaints by the Indians 
might "jeopardize promotion or the granting of commissions to sons." Eccles, 
"Eighteenth-Century Imperialism," 345.
47 Johnson, IHC, 16: 27, 54.
48 Johnson, IHC, 16: 28.
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Colden struggled with the ramifications of a colonial legal system that refused to 
recognize Indian concerns. In order to obtain redress for any alleged fraud, Colden 
noted, an Indian had to take out a writ, file a declaration, then wait as long as a year 
for a decision. In addition, Indian plaintiffs were also responsible for all the charges 
of the suit. The courts were often hundreds of miles away, but making an appearance 
at Albany or Philadelphia would have served little purpose anyway, Colden conceded, 
since Indian testimony could not legally be admitted as evidence.49
Even during formal conferences, the context in which Indian concerns about 
trader fraud were traditionally voiced, the native complainants were more likely to 
obtain promises than results. Having traveled to Philadelphia in the summer of 1727, 
the Cayuga and other Iroquois sachems found their pleas for less rum and cheaper 
goods sternly rebuffed by Pennsylvania’s Governor Gordon. The governor justified 
his refusal to intervene in commercial matters by reminding them of the "laws" of 
supply and demand. "As to Trade," he contended, "they know ’tis the Method of all 
that follow it to buy as Cheap and sell as dear as they can, and every man must make 
the best Bargain he can; the Indians cheat the Indians & the English cheat the 
English, & every Men must be on his Guard." As for the large quantities of rum 
flooding the Susquehanna Valley, Gordon merely maintained that "we have made 
divers Laws to prohibit it, & made it lawfull for an Indian to stave all the Rum that is 
brought to them." If problems with alcohol continued to plague their tribes, Gordon 
believed, it was because "the Indians are too fond of it themselves" and would not
49 Colden to Governor Clinton, 8 August 1751, NYCD, 6: 741.
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destroy the traders’ illegal stocks.50 It is unlikely that Gordon’s cynical lecture on the 
workings of capitalist exchange or his assertion that the Indians themselves were to 
blame for their own trading woes fell on sympathetic ears. "Can these people who 
are treated in this manner be supposed to be treated like friends, or like rational or 
human creatures?" Colden justifiably asked. "It is but too obvious what the 
consequences of this treatment must be."51
Though Gordon and his fellow colonial capitalists would have contended that 
economic competition between independent traders ultimately benefitted the Indians by 
keeping prices low and merchandise plentiful, it is evident that native consumers were 
easily alienated by the unbridled commercial rivalries that characterized the Anglo- 
American trade. Benjamin Stoddert, one of Johnson’s agents at Oswego, admitted to 
his employer that he envisioned a time when a monopoly company would oversee all 
trade at the post. Stoddert believed that a strictly regulated commerce could still be 
profitable, and because it would sanction only a few trustworthy agents, such a 
reform could only improve the tenor of Anglo-Indian relations. "I am certain that if 
some such Scheme does not go on," Stoddert warned, "the Trade of this Place will 
soon be ruined, for their is such a Number o f Traders here and such Vile Steps taken 
to undermine each other in his trade that it consequently cant hold Long." The 
veteran trader further recognized that "the little low means used in the Trade to hurt
50 PA Council Minutes, 3: 274-75.
51 Colden to Governor Clinton, 8 August 1751, NYCD, 6: 741; see also Johnson, 
IHC, 3 : 56, 63.
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each other must give even the Savages a Damn’d mean Opinion of us; especially our 
Honesty &c."52
When Stoddert broached his idea for an Oswego monopoly, the reaction of the
local traders was predictably hostile, with some even threatening rebellion. New
York legislators were equally skeptical. No plan to reorganize the Oswego trade was
seriously contemplated before the Seven Years’ War, but by the unsettled mid-1760s
Johnson acknowledged the wisdom in Stoddert’s earlier assessment of the detrimental
influence of overzealous English competition. "In Short," Johnson proposed,
the Mixed Multitude of persons trading at the posts, and in the Indian 
Country, many of whom have survived their Credit, and dare not come 
down the Country, act such a part by endeavoring to draw the Trade 
from one another, by selling some Articles below the first Cost, and 
Extorting upon others, that the Merchants who Supply the Goods must 
Suffer, Numbers of the Traders be ruined, and the Indians universally 
discontented- The little Artifices usually practised by Low People in 
dealings with one another, are much more general and attended with 
infinitely greater circumstances of fraud in dealings with the Indians,—
The Low character of the people, their Necessity, and the Extravagance 
in which many of them live set them on the practice of every fraud to 
Support themselves, . . .  and the latter not only Endeavor to force a 
Trade by Slandering each other, publishing and enlarging on the frauds 
committed by their Neighbors, but forge Stories dangerous to the 
publick to Account for their prices, the badness of Goods, or any other 
purposes of Gain."53
52 Benjamin Stoddert to Johnson, 16 July 1749, WJP, 1: 236-37.
53 Johnson, IHC, 16: 44. In assessing the effects of Anglo-French rivalry for the 
fur trade of the Hudson Bay region, Ray concludes that as economic competition 
increased, so did the potential for Indian dependence. "Because the Indians could 
satisfy their needs for other trade goods with less effort due to the falling prices 
demanded for them, they spent much more of the free time which they gained at the 
local trading posts drinking and smoking and leading what the traders termed the 
"indolent life." In this way," he concludes, "competitive conditions further 
strengthened the tendency toward greater addiction." Ray, Indians and the Fur
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If Indian consumers were the ultimate victims of the ruthless competitiveness 
that prevailed in the unregulated Anglo-American trade, the more tightly-knit French 
system of posts and congis promised rock-solid trade relations, if not rock-bottom 
prices. Thomas Wien has suggested that the greatest enemies of the Canadian fur 
traders were not the English but other Canadian fur traders. French officials 
understood that trader profits and subsequently revenues from the sale of permits and 
post leases would be significantly reduced should French-speaking traders flood into 
the pays d ’en haut en masse. By restricting the number of canoes that left Montreal 
and assigning traders to distinct trading regions, the state was largely successful in 
precluding a "bidding war" among Canadians in the West. This practice of "zoning" 
did not entirely prevent either licensed or unlicensed traders from commercial 
"trespassing," but in general the system was remarkably successful in keeping "the 
Canadians and their merchandise thinly strewn, and goods prices high."54 Wien 
suggests that this policy of buffering internal competition may have ensured that 
French merchandise was never cheap. But considering the pitiful state of Anglo- 
Indian relations occasioned by full-blown trader competition, it is apparent that 
Colden, Johnson, and their few fellow imperialists would rather have paid the 
economic costs of commercial regulation than the significantly higher price of native
Trade, 142. With the ample supplies of rum and low prices that attended fierce 
competition between Anglo-American traders, it is possible that a similar pattern of 
increased addiction might have also have prevailed among the Ohio Indians.
54 Thomas Wien, "Selling Beaver Skins in North America and Europe, 1720- 
1760: The Uses of Fur-Trade Imperialism," Journal o f the Canadian Historical 
Association, 1 (1990): 316-17.
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resentment and defection.
For all their concern with economic competition, legal reform, and commercial
regulation, the most perceptive English commentators intuitively grasped that the
rivalry for the trade and allegiance of the Indians had an overarching spiritual
dimension. This was one battle, they conceded, that the French had won long ago.
Canadian traders may have triarried their women and post commanders heeded their
complaints, but it was the Jesuit missionaries who ultimately won the trust, faith, and
commerce of the Indians. Though characteristically suspicious of their motives and
means, observers such as Atkin could not help but envy the Jesuits’ unrivalled
successs. "All the World knows," he remarked, "the great share the French
missionaries have in influencing the Indians, by means of their superstition; whose
service is such, that they have been esteemed almost of as much Consequence as
Garrisons. They have been the means o f gaining as much respect from the Indians to
the French," Atkin conceded, "as our Traders have caused disrespect to us, by their
dissolute Lives and Manners. *'55 No one offered a more eloquent testament to the
importance o f French missionary efforts in securing the affections of Indian trading
partners than Johnson. "The Indians are fond of pomp and Ceremonys," he declared,
and that Religion in which they most abound is most likely to Succeed 
amongst them, but the French to that advantage Gained a Still more 
Material one in the Choice they Generally Made of Men of Spirit,
Abilities, and a knowledge of the World, who lived amongst them, 
became Masters of their Language, acquired a thorough knowledge of 
their Manners, and disposition, and at length obtained a vast influence 
which they improved to such Advantage (without attempting to alter
55 Atkins, Appalachian Indian Frontier, 12-13.
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established forms of no ill consequence, or to Wean them from 
hunting, in which they are usefully employed for the public) as to 
convince us from a View of Some Tribes under their peculiar care, that 
the Dutys of Religion are not incompatible with those of a Warrior, or 
Hunter, and that they need not cease to be the Latter in order to 
become to all appearances better Christians, than Numbers of their 
White Neighbours.5®
Shining Jesuit altar silver and tinkling communion bells aside, a far greater 
attraction of the "Blackrobes" to many Indian customers was their resolute opposition 
to the sale of alcohol. When the Oswego traders first laid out their wares in the late 
1720s, Canadian officials who had long opposed the clerical ban on the sale of 
alcohol raised the panicked-and profitable-cry that the French trade was doomed 
unless they could compete dram-for-dram with the rival rum-sellers. This argument 
may have swayed the ministry, but the Church remained steadfast in opposition to the 
brandy trade until the Conquest, knowing full well the pernicious effects of alcohol 
abuse within Indian groups.57 Like the French, the Indians who participated in the 
trade were of two minds when it came to alcohol. Some claimed that they could not 
get it cheaply or plentifully enough. But more often than not, the Indians— 
particularly the older, and presumably wiser, men-pleaded with the colonial
56 Johnson, IHC, 16: 52. For a similar summary of the advantages enjoyed by 
French Jesuits in winning Indian converts see James Axtell, The Invasion Within: The 
Contest o f Cultures in Colonial North America (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1985), esp. 277-79.
57 For the origins of Jesuit opposition to the brandy trade in the seventeenth 
century, see Jean Delanglez, Frontenac and the Jesuits (Chicago: Institute of Jesuit 
History, 1939), 69-129.
254
authorities to stem the flood of alcohol into their villages.38 Cheap rum may have 
enticed some to trade at Oswego or with the peripatetic merchants of the Ohio 
country, but those Indians who accurately gauged the proportions of the looming 
social and cultural crisis undoubtedly embraced the steadfast moral stance of the 
Jesuits in opposition to those who would profit by alcoholic means.39
The Protestant counterparts of the Jesuits, by contrast, seemed distinctly ill- 
suited to the challenge of luring Indians to chapel or trading post. Having already
38 "We have been stinted in the Article of Rum in Town," claimed the Iroquois 
and Delaware representatives who conferred with Governor Thomas in Philadelphia in 
1742. "We desire you will open the Rum-Bottle, and give it to us in greater 
Abundance on the Road." Colden, HFIN, 2: 110. In contrast, Thomson declared 
that the Indians of the Ohio Valley "were sensible of their own Weakness, and 
immoderate desire of strong Drink, by which they exposed themselves to many 
Abuses and Inconveniencies. They had frequently complained to the English 
Governments, and desired that some Measures might be taken to prevent Liquors 
being carried among them in such Quantities, but nothing was done to Purpose." 
Thomson, An Enquiry, 74, 75-76. See also Wraxall, AIA, 86, 139, 174-75; Atkin, 
Appalachian Indian Frontier, 25-26, 36; Johnson, IHC, 16: 37.
39 By some accounts, Indian groups split into pro and anti-alcohol factions along 
generational lines. "The Chiefs of every Nation finding the Evil daily encreasing," 
Atkin remarked, "and their Young Men growing untractable in their National 
Concerns, have at times requested the Govemours of our several Colonies to restrain 
the Indian Traders from carrying either too much Rum, or any at all among them."
He further noted that "a licentiousness hath crept in among the young men, beyond 
the Power of the Head Men to Remedy," to the extent that "the discreet Old men 
Censure alike their own Young Men and us." Atkin, Appalachian Indian Frontier,
26, 36; see also Johnson, IHC, 16: 37; Frangois Vachon de Belmont, "Belmont’s 
History of Brandy," edited by Joseph P. Donnelly, Mid-America, 34:1 (1952): 49. 
Unlike the English traders who only showed concern for the younger hunters, the 
French shrewdly courted the favor of older, more influential members of the tribe. 
Atkin noted that the French would often give small gifts to the old men who could no 
longer hunt for themselves, who then would "repay the French largely for those 
Trifles, in their Harangues at the round Houses, by great Encomiums on their 
kindness, and recommendations of them to favour." Atkin, Ibid., 10-11, 29.
255
"conceived such invincible Prejudices against English "Manners and Religion" by
abusive traders, Thomson noted, the Shawnees on the Susquehanna quickly rebuffed
the earnest proselytizing efforts of a young minister named Sergeant. Why should
they accept his teachings, asked his hostile hosts, when his fellow colonists would
"lie, cheat, and debauch their Women, and even their Wives, if their Husbands were
not at home."60 Johnson expressed a similar skepticism as to the heavy-handed
missionary methods of Sergeant and his coreligionists. "The Steps taken by many
probably well meaning but Gloomy people among us," he judged,
to abolish at once their most innocent Customs, Dances, Rejoycings at 
Marriages &ca and their premature proposals for bringing familys 
amongst them to instruct them in Agriculture &ca as well as their 
Arguments against Hunting alarm all Indians who hear of them with the 
Apprehension that it is done with design to wean them from their way 
of Living purely that they may be the readier induced to part with their 
Lands to the white people.61
A few Mohawks might have succumbed to the reasoned arguments of the Society of 
the Propagation of the Gospel and some Delawares to the gentle teachings of the 
Moravians, but on the whole the Protestant performance in winning Indian hearts and 
minds has been aptly described as "lacklustre."62
In the contest for souls and skins, the French by all accounts emerged the 
victors. Those who prayed together, traded together. But Jesuit accomplishments 
alone were not all that Anglo-Americans hoped to emulate. Most imperialists, from
60 Thomson, An Enquiry, 56.
61 Johnson, IHC, 16: 52-53.
62 Axtell, Invasion Within, 275-76.
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New York to South Carolina, agreed with Wraxall that the French had succeeded in 
winning the greater part of the North American fur trade because they acted upon "a 
Uniform Plan," while the American colonies floundered as a result of their "divided 
Interests & temporary Expedients."63 In the absence of any effective regulation, the 
Indian trade had become a diplomatic liability for the English while the French 
continued to harness commercial means to imperial ends. The creation of two 
colonial Indian superintendencies in 1756 and the subsequent appointment of Johnson 
and Atkin to the respective posts signaled at least some recognition that the trade and 
the conduct of Indian relations in general was greatly in need of "one uniform 
Regulation.1,64 Though it arrived in London too late to have much effect on the 
shaping of colonial policy, Atkin’s report to the Board of Trade outlined some of the 
changes he believed necessary to set the Indian commerce back on track. The prices 
of trade merchandise should be fixed at acceptable rates, Atkin proposed, and officers 
instructed to visit the posts to monitor the behavior of the traders, give a hearing to 
Indian complaints, and mete out justice where required. He further recommended 
that the Indians be provided with their own scales and weights to discourage fraud and 
that the traders be annually licensed and held to stringent standards of conduct by the 
seaboard governments.65
63 Wraxall, AlA, 190n.
64 Stephen H. Cutcliffe, "Colonial Indian Policy as a Measure of Rising 
Imperialism: New York and Pennsylvania, 1700-1755," Western Pennsylvania 
Historical Magazine, 64:3 (1981): 239, 266-68.
65 Atkin, Appalachian Indian Frontier, 78-86.
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By the 1750s, critics of the current state of the Anglo-Indian commerce were 
unanimous in their calls for "some good and sufficient Laws for the Regulation of 
their Trade, and for summary and severe Justice in case of Abuses."66 But countless 
laws and ordinances had been enacted in the past by various colonial governments 
with little visible result. Without the support of the traders themselves, cheating and 
fraud would continue unabated. In the absence of reliable officers to oversee the day- 
to-day conduct of the trade, all legislative efforts at reform, no matter how well 
intentioned, were doomed to fail. New York’s Governor Montgomerie had hoped to 
create an effective role for Oswego’s chief officer at the post’s inception in the 1720s 
but, by the beginnings of the Seven Years’ War, Wraxall was still complaining that 
the post desperately required the supervision of a salaried "intendant of trade" who 
would refrain from all commercial activity and inspect all weights and measures, 
prevent all "Frauds & Impositions," and bring all offenders to trial."67 Colden also 
noted that the officers could not fully enforce justice at Oswego or anywhere else on 
the trading frontier unless the colonial legal system was reformed "whereby the 
Indians, on their complaints, may get Justice done them speedily, by summary 
process, and that in all dealings, between Indians & Christians, Indian evidence be 
allowed."68
These optimistic plans for the reform of a notoriously unorganized and unjust
66 Kennedy, Serious Considerations, 9; see also Johnson, IHC, 16: 4-50;
Wraxall, AIA, 11 In.
67 Wraxall, NYCD, 7: 27.
68 Colden to Governor Clinton, 8 August 1751, NYCD, 6: 744.
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commerce were bom of one inescapable conclusion: if the Anglo-Americans were to 
succeed in directing the traffic in furs and skins to serve broader diplomatic and 
military aims, they would simply have to emulate their French rivals in virtually 
every aspect of the trade. In fact, in the aftermath of French defeat, the Indians of 
the Ohio Valley demanded as much. But with equal measures of arrogance and 
parsimony, the British conquerors ultimately balked at the daunting price of empire. 
Though its roots ran deep, to the earliest days of Anglo-French rivalry in North 
America, the reluctance of the British to wed trade to diplomacy would henceforth 
become increasingly lethal.69
3d Warrior. These are the Scalps o f those two fa­
mous Cheats
Who bought our Furs for Rum, and sold us Water. 
[holding out the Scalps, which Ponteach takes. 
Our Men are loaded with their Furs again,
And other Plunder from the Villains Stores. 
Ponteach. All this is brave! [tossing up the Scalps, 
which others catch, and toss and throw them about. 
This Way we’ll serve them all.70
69 White, Middle Ground, 248, 315-17.
70 Robert Rogers, Ponteach: Or, The Savages o f America, A Tragedy (London: J. 
Millan, 1766), 78.
EPILOGUE
AFTER THE CONQUEST
In the summer of 1761, less than a year after the conquest of New France, the 
Canadian fur trade was still in disarray. Even so, the young American Alexander 
Henry, arriving with the invading forces and seduced by the promise of fortune and 
adventure, was determined to penetrate the pays d ’en haut. Trade merchandise was 
scarce in occupied Montreal and General Thomas Gage, the new British commander, 
sternly warned against a premature expedition into potentially hostile territory. But 
the enthusiastic youth could not be deterred. Stepping gingerly aboard a canoe 
crammed with trade goods from Albany, Henry gave the word and his crew of 
French-Canadian voyageurs dipped their paddles and pushed off for distant 
Michilimackinac.
Only a  handful of Americans had ever made this westward journey. As he 
traveled up the Ottawa River, Henry was struck by the beauty of the northern 
country-the misting falls of the Rideau River and the roiling Chaudibre rapids-but 
his reveries were soon invaded by a creeping sense of foreboding. The first Indians 
he encountered were Algonquins returning to their village from winter hunting.
Henry amicably bought their maple sugar and a few beaver pelts, but before they 
parted ways the Indians were curious to know the motives of this stranger in their
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midst. The English must be mad to risk their lives for beaver, they ominously 
remarked. Did he not realize that the "Upper Indians" would certainly have his 
scalp?
Henry’s initial enthusiasm dissipated as he drew nearer his destination.
Having been warned repeatedly that he would meet his end at Michilimackinac, he 
was tempted to abandon his ill-considered venture. But supplies were dwindling and 
return to Montreal now seemed impossible. Despite their hostile attitude toward the 
English, the Indians they met welcomed the Canadians with "cordial good will," and 
Henry realized that his only hope of survival lay in disguising his identity. Stripping 
off his "English" clothes, he donned the traditional attire of his Canadian companions: 
a breech-cloth, loose-fitting shirt, blanket coat, and large, red, worsted cap.
Smearing his face with dirt and grease, and wielding a paddle as best he could, the 
American completed his transformation. His desperate ruse succeeded, and Henry 
finally arrived at Michilimakinac unscathed, though hardly the conquering adventurer 
of his earlier imagining.1
As Henry precipitously pursued his fortunes in the pays d ’en haut, the course 
of the Canadian fur trade remained uncharted. Though now subject to British 
authority, local traders were not arbitrarily barred from their traditional commerce in 
furs. In fact, merchants who elected to remain in the country were granted all the
1 Alexander Henry, Travels and Adventures in Canada and the Indian Territories 
Between the Years 1760 and 1776 (originally published New York: I. Riley, 1809;
Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1966), 1-37.
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rights and privileges accorded to the "Old Subjects" of Great Britain. The formal 
articles of the 1760 capitulation expressly safeguarded their stores of furs and trade 
merchandise, authorized the Compagnie des Indes to transport all remaining beaver to 
France, and allowed the traders up to two years to retrieve any assets that remained in 
the West. In no sense was the French-speaking merchant community deliberately 
"decapitated" from the Canadian body politic after the Conquest.2
The relatively benevolent terms dictated by the British occupiers, however, did 
not leave the traders altogether free to conduct business as usual. Over their protests, 
Canadian merchants were prohibited from importing merchandise from their former 
suppliers in France and so were forced to seek new commercial connections in 
Britain. Cautious British officials also tended to discriminate against Canadians when 
it came to granting military contracts or trading permits to the West, But in the face 
of these initial setbacks, those marchands of Montreal who were determined to persist 
in the fur trade proved remarkably resilient. Before long, they had established 
profitable ties with London agents and neutralized opposition to their participation in 
the western trade by striking partnerships with newly-arrived English-speaking
2 Marjorie Gordon Jackson, "The Beginning of British Trade at Michilimackinac," 
Minnesota History, 11:3 (1930): 231-32. For a discussion of the "decapitation" 
hypothesis that attributed the ascendancy of an Anglo-Canadian mercantile elite to the 
post-conquest flight of a nascent French-speaking bourgeoisie, see S. Dale Standen, 
"The Debate on the Social and Economic Consequences of the Conquest: A 
Summary," Proceedings o f the Annual Meeting o f the French Colonial Historical 
Society, 10 (1984): 179-80.
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traders.3
Left to their own devices, it is likely that the Canadian fur merchants would 
have successfully continued their commerce, having made the necessary adjustments 
to unfamiliar merchandise and foreign suppliers. But the Canadian commercial 
climate was rapidly evolving beyond their control. General Gage had immediately 
recognized the importance of the Canadian fur trade but was intent on reforming what 
he viewed as an overly authoritarian structure of monopolies and permits. With a nod 
to enthusiastic British manufacturers, the newcomers hoped to remodel the trade after 
that of the American colonies, where open markets, easy credit, and competitive 
conditions prevailed. Despite the encouragement of British officials, relatively few 
prospective English or American traders arrived in Montreal before the American 
Revolution. Those who did venture north, however, quickly came to dominate the 
Montreal market.4
If a flood of British and American entrepreneurs did not engulf Canadian 
commerce after the Conquest, the gradual decline of investment by French-stock 
merchants was due rather to the advent of the cut-throat commercial conditions they 
had so scrupulously avoided in the past. The fur trade, though crucial to the
3 Josd Igartua, "The Merchants of Montreal at the Conquest: Socio-Economic 
Profile," Histoire sociale/Social History, 8:16 (1975): 279-81; Igartua, "A Change in 
Climate: The Conquest and the Marchands of Montreal," Historical 
Papers/Communications historiques, Annual Meeting of the Canadian Historical 
Association (1974): 116; Standen, "Consequence*of the Conquest," 184.
4 Jackson, "Beginning of British Trade," 233-36; Igartua, "Change in Climate," 
115-16.
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Canadian economy, had made few Montrealers wealthy in the eighteenth century.
The rigid demands of Indian consumer-suppliers, a  cramped local market, and the 
regulatory oversight of colonial officials had dampened the potential for spectacular 
profits. But the Montreal merchant community had persisted for decades under these 
ultimately salutary constraints. The majority of French-speaking merchants, many of 
whom were now approaching the end of their trading careers, were reluctant to wade 
into the treacherous current of competition ushered in by their former rivals.
Gradually, inconspicuously, the Canadians relinquished their traditional trade to the 
conquerors.5
As they took the reins of the Canadian fur trade, the neophyte Anglo- 
Americans soon perceived the advantages wielded by their French predecessors. Like 
their colleagues in New York and Pennsylvania, the English-speaking Montreal 
merchants soon found themselves floundering in a commerce geared more toward the 
ruthless pursuit of profits than the encouragement of stable relations with the Indians 
upon whom their fortunes ultimately rested. In fact, the formation of the famed 
North West Company in the 1780s signaled the belated recognition of the new 
merchants that the French "oligopolistic" system had been ideally suited to the 
peculiar exigencies of the fur trade. In a few years, the organization of Canadian 
commerce had come full circle, though the language of its masters was now English
5 Igartua, "Change in Climate," 118-22; Igartua, "Merchants of Montreal," 291; 
Standen, "Consequences of the Conquest," 184.
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rather than French.6
Old loyalties, the British learned, could not be erased by the stroke of a pen. 
The military defeat of New France did not signal the death of the unique culture of 
the Canadian fur trade any more than it did the abandonment of the Catholic faith or 
the French tongue. After decades of intense rivalry for the Great Lakes fur trades, 
the Anglo-Americans finally beat their Canadian competitors, not by force of arms or 
cheapness of goods, but merely by joining them. Their victory in wresting the 
Canadian trade from local hands, however, ultimately proved hollow. Just as 
Alexander Henry survived his fateful journey to the West by shedding his English 
clothes, his fellow traders found themselves forced to adopt the manners and means of 
their erstwhile rivals. There was no better tribute, perhaps, to the hard-won success 
of the French-Canadian trade, the memory of which yet endured in dusty ledgers, 
lusty paddling songs, and the aching bones of ancient voyageurs.
6 Igartua, "Change in Climate," 122-23.
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APPENDIX
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY WEIGHTS AND MEASURES 
source: Ross, Archaeological Metrology.
ENGLISH FRENCH
Liquid capacity
gallon =  4.3985 1. pot =  1.86 1.
Dry capacity
bushel =  35.2371 1. minot = 39.03 1.
Dry weight
pound =  453.6 g. livre = 489.41 g.
Linear measure
yard =  .9144 m. 
ell =1.143 m.
aune =  1.1884 m.
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